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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the meeting between the conceptualisations of crime and the 
varied formations of utopian projections in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
socialist discourse in Britain. Beginning with a survey of the epochal explosion of 
literary socialist utopias and their dystopian counterpart, I scrutinise how ideas on anti-
sociality, deviance, and immorality interacted with imaginations of fundamental social 
reorganisation. These imaginary places allowed for profoundly different approaches to 
the matter of crime and its prevention, and the measures found therein could edge past 
the bounds of possibility in the author’s time, beyond both the practical and ethical. 
Such radical approaches to crime would be satirised and criticised in the anti-socialist 
dystopia, which are also analysed. I then contend with the thought of four figures 
occupying prominent positions in the British socialist scene, each of whom directed 
considerable attention to criminological enquiry. H. G. Wells, Havelock Ellis, Peter 
Kropotkin, and Edward Carpenter addressed the matters of the criminalisation of the 
poor, moral degeneracy, and repressive Victorian mores in their distinct critiques of 
the sociopolitical order. In their thought, as in the literary utopias/dystopias, I bring to 
light how the treatment of crime in socialist imaginations of reorganised society was 
fraught with paradoxical problematics. On the one hand, though projections of the 
socialist state could promise to eradicate the roots of crime by providing equality, 
justice, and well-being for all, the extent to which ‘benevolent’ force could be directed 
against those who continued to threaten society complicates such images. On the other, 
diminishing the state along anarchist lines might result in the ascent of ungoverned 
social harmony, but this is unsettled by the conception of individuals portraying anti-
social physiological tendencies who would need to be prevented from harming the 
community. This thesis critically examines how such projections of socialist 
reorganisation contended with and articulated such uncertainties, as I uncover the 
relationship between these crime-free utopias and their unstable foundations.  
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Introduction 
 
There is a history of the professional discipline of criminology […] but 
there is a need for a complex history of ‘thinking about crime’. That 
would include the debates around the rise of the positivist school […] 
that would include the debates about social biology at the end of the 
nineteenth century, that would include interventions by Fabians, and H. 
G. Wells, and George Bernard Shaw, as well as other fields over time. 
If you look at it in this way, rather than in a disciplinary sense, then you 
conclude that there is a long history and debate about crime questions.1 
 
Anonymous interview, quoted in Reece Walters, Deviant Knowledge: 
Criminology, Politics and Policy (2003) 
 
 
The site where criminological discourse intersects with socialist and anarchist thought 
in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain is suffused with complexity. 
Therein, the social issues of crime, criminality, punishment and prevention 
intermingled with wider political motives, Enlightenment conceptions of freedom and 
reason sat uncomfortably alongside contemporary notions of rehabilitative 
incarceration and criminal insanity, and inconsistencies within individual approaches 
all make such a history of ‘thinking about crime’ as propounded by the criminologist 
speaking to Walters appear incoherent. Although profound critique of the sociopolitical 
contours of the Victorian age spawned visions of vastly improved societies, such 
futures were often undermined by calls for practical reform, crime-free utopias were 
corrupted by the means with which they were built, and the organisation of 
communities could be gravely complicated by the organisation of the human body. 
This thesis examines such an unstable domain of criminological discussion in Britain 
between 1870 and 1914, specifically focusing on the contributions of four figures with 
socialist and anarchist politics, exploring how they read and inflected theory from 
across the sciences to form perspectives on crime, criminality, the management of 
offenders, and the object of judicial law. Not only did these authors make a number of 
observations over their careers on the problem of the British criminal, they also penned 
or contributed to a seminal text that addressed this figure. Such texts are subjected to a 
                                                 
1  Anonymous interview, quoted in Reece Walters, Deviant Knowledge: Criminology, Politics and 
Policy (Cullompton, Devon: Willan Publishing, 2003), pp. 50-51. 
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critical reading in the respective chapters. 
 Consulting historical and contemporary approaches, both foreign and domestic, 
these four figures occupied a terrain dominated by the paradigm of biological and social 
evolution, themes of which permeated the countless texts of fiction in which the 
progress of humankind was questioned. Amongst these texts, such sociobiological 
themes were frequently embodied in the fictional reflections of present-day society 
wherein the ills of the human condition were articulated by writers such as Émile Zola 
(1840-1902) and Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881). But they also featured heavily in 
projections of the non-present, in the utopias of fin-de-siècle Britain. Therein the 
failings of society, often presented as the cause or result of socially or physiologically 
debased populations, were vanquished in the ‘good’ and ‘just’ utopian ones, the 
organisation of which was fundamentally different from their real-life counterparts. 
Within the utopian genre itself there existed considerable interaction with socialist and 
anarchist theory, presented in the main as either the ideological foundations of the ideal 
organisation of populations or as that which leads to a deplorable, dystopian future. 
Alternative approaches to crime and anti-social behaviour are frequently proposed in 
these utopias, the criminal often assumes a different character, and the measures taken 
in the treatment of whom are untenable to the author’s society. This literary perspective 
of criminological discussion is herein situated alongside that of the four authors, and 
they are both treated as contributing towards a shared discourse. 
 This thesis begins with a survey of the criminological discussion found within 
the anarchist and socialist literary utopias and their ideologically-opposing dystopias, 
itself starting with a brief history of the genre as a whole (specifically in relation to its 
presentation of crime and the criminal) before attending to the utopias penned during 
the covered period. There then follows my analysis of the criminological thought of 
our socialist and anarchist protagonists in the following order: H. G. Wells (1866-
1946), Havelock Ellis (1859-1939), émigré Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921), and Edward 
Carpenter (1844-1929). Though considerable focus is placed on what I consider to be 
each figure’s key ‘criminological’ texts, such works are placed amongst the author’s 
broader literary output, and ideas are contextualised by being located within both the 
passage of their thought over time and the specific cultural settings in which they 
appear. As they approached criminological topics these figures did not make 
excursions into separate disciplinary domains, but considered such questions on 
territories with which they were familiar, their wider sociopolitical and philosophical 
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perspectives interacting with their thoughts on crime. 
 In each of the five chapters it will be seen that conceptions of the human 
individual, one’s relationship with others, and human society played host to both 
classical and positivist interpretations of crime: the first depicting crime as a product 
of rational thought, the second finding it to be determined by physical, psychological, 
and environmental forces. Traditional notions of morality and free will can be found to 
unsettle psychosocial and biological conceptions of instinct and hereditary 
predetermination. And the problem of criminal behaviour could on the one hand inspire 
proposals of immediate, pragmatic intervention whilst on the other provoke rather 
fanciful speculations of crime-free societies. Such a history of ‘thinking about crime’ 
is indeed complex, and can appear incoherent when one considers the discontinuity and 
dissonance in an individual’s thought. Each of the four figures in this thesis certainly 
did not present a harmonious theory of criminology. Their own conflicting and 
seemingly incompatible ideas, statements, and approaches to the question of crime and 
criminality will not, however, be shown to undermine their methods and means of 
understanding. Though I emphasise where there is consistency in each author’s thought 
– necessary to my depiction of how they participated in and contributed to specific 
discourses on crime – the inconsistencies therein are equally important. I intend to 
illuminate the instances of and ways in which seemingly compatible and incompatible 
structures of knowledge collided, where ideas coalesced or conflicted with others as 
the author thought about crime. Theirs was a site of discursive heterogeneity, where 
sociopolitical, scientific, and philosophical theory could repel, appropriate, and inflect 
specific languages of crime. I do not attempt to define a homogenous structure of 
concepts and epistemologies within the field of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century British criminology, but to observe, as Michel Foucault would say, ‘the 
interplay of their appearances and dispersion’.2 
 A Foucauldian methodology is thus assumed, but without seeking to attribute 
such language to particular forms of power and control, to a specific conception of 
authority. If any such attributive endeavour is made, it is in trying to explain why, in 
the criminology of the socialist and anarchist thought I encounter, a site of incongruity 
was inevitable. Those occupying this political arena were fighting on a number of 
                                                 
2  Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 38-39. 
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different, sometimes oppositional, frontiers: their contributions to the scientific theories 
of the criminal, recidivism, and degeneration were inflected with their humanitarian 
ideals of a just and equitable society, whilst practical proposals for social reform were 
complicated and often undermined by the sciences of heredity and evolution. 
Furthermore, as the utopian impulse of those calling for the fundamental reconstruction 
of the sociopolitical system required the confrontation with crime, anti-social 
behaviour, or deviancy, the proposed futures often involved rather anti-utopian or 
dystopian conditions: the increased powers of a socialist state suggested tougher laws 
on citizens; the reduction or removal of the state meant the same for state law and its 
enforcement; and the triumph of science saw ethical codes decay and logical ones 
thrive. As such, the treatment of crime in the socialist and anarchist projections was 
always fraught with problematics: the socialist state interfered with individual rights; 
anarchism was synonymous with lawlessness and terror; and the rule of science was 
inhumane. A critical discourse on the questions of crime, the criminal and law from 
such perspectives was naturally paradoxical and controversial. 
 It is asserted, then, that the criminological theory explored in this thesis needs 
to be read by taking into account the varied ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological perspectives through which the subject was observed, and I will 
respond to the questions raised by such an approach. How did the disciplinary expertise 
and political belief of the authors figure in their construction and presentation of such 
theory? How was this articulated in their texts, and in what ways were biological traits, 
normative standards, and human rights ascribed to the individual? Who was 
responsible for helping, reforming, or removing the criminal and how was this to be 
enforced? And how exactly was the criminal observed as both a biopolitical body and 
a human individual? In light of the approach expressed by Walters’ anonymous 
criminologist, the thought of Wells, Ellis, Kropotkin, and Carpenter, as well as that 
excavated in the survey of socialist utopian and dystopian literature, though largely 
absent from the historical narratives of professional criminology, will be shown to form 
a complex history of ‘thinking about crime’. 
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Criminological Thought 
 
It is a rather daunting task to survey the many discourses of crime, anti-social 
behaviour, and deviancy in fin-de-siècle Britain, one that is made all the more troubling 
when taking into account the numerous narratives that historical theory and scholarship 
have constructed on such a subject. Without even addressing the conflicting and often 
capricious perspectives of the period’s contemporaries, one is faced with this much-
contested ground of historical analysis. The resistances of ‘classical’ conceptions of 
crime against those of positivism; the unstable processes of the ‘humanitarian’ 
approach to penology; the struggles between disciplines for jurisdiction over the 
criminal; the inconsistent movements between scientific theory and judicial practice; 
the conflict found within all of these sites are expectedly mirrored by their 
inharmonious historical analyses. This study aims, to some extent, to temper such 
discord by treating the inconsistencies within the criminological discourse of the period 
as an inevitable product of the diametrical positioning of the criminal, a figure who 
occupied oppositional domains, whose very construction was, for want of a more 
suitable term, schizophrenic. 
 Shifting paradigms and unstable discourses have been emphasised in the 
histories of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century British criminological theory. 
A focus on the changing ‘architects’ of criminological reform, who established that the 
identification and punishment of the criminal was a matter for the human sciences and 
dictated by medico-psychiatric expertise, has been reiterated since Foucault by, for 
instance, David Garland and Martin J. Wiener.3 These perspectives, in the main, have 
proposed the epistemic reign of positivist criminology, fundamentally affecting the 
reform of the criminal justice system and rather coherently transferring from theoretical 
enquiry to practical reinforcement. Although such a narrative has been made more 
sophisticated by those such as Wiener in his asserting that biological criminology was 
not the counterpart to perceptions of the environment as an agent of force in crime, 
uniting both approaches as the pursuit of criminal causality, there nevertheless remains 
the view that a dominant paradigm of sociobiological determinism saturated the 
juridico-penological complex. 
                                                 
3  David Garland, Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies (Aldershot: Gower, 1985); 
Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, Law, and Policy in England, 1830-1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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 Those who have challenged such a history include William Forsythe and Victor 
Bailey, both of whom emphasise the resistances within the British legal and penal 
establishment to such change.4 It must be said that Wiener has recently taken a similar 
perspective, and by observing the legal commentaries used and contributed to by the 
British judiciary he considers how the languages of both positivist and classical 
criminological theory were inflected in criminal proceedings.5 Neil Davie has followed 
Forsythe and Bailey’s lead, and has examined the relationship between these 
epistemologies of crime, reiterating its complexity, and scrutinising the theory-to-
practice transposition, not to mention surveying the reception of criminological theory 
in Britain in this period.6 Although Davie remarks that Bailey may have exaggerated 
the resistance to ‘scientific’ criminology by emphasising the failure of law reforms 
which were inspired by the positivist approach, it is nevertheless important to consider 
where Bailey situates such obstruction, and what he considers occurred there:  
 
[H]umanitarians began to use more deterministic language and to 
propose more ‘scientific’ remedies. Yet humanitarians also modified 
and limited the effect of positivist theory by their emphasis on the 
suffering and dignity of individual prisoners.7 
 
The focus on how language was used and theory modified will be adopted in this thesis 
as I explore how our socialist and anarchist protagonists participated in the complex 
domain of criminology as it experienced considerable instability whilst distinct 
methodologies and epistemologies collided with, resisted against, and appropriated one 
another. Such a history of ‘thinking about crime’ is expectedly more intricate, 
multifarious, and complicated as we find positions and approaches caught between, for 
instance, romantic ideals and scientific fact, sympathy for the individual and 
                                                 
4  William Forsythe, The Reform of Prisoners, 1830-1900 (London: Croom Helm, 1987); idem, ‘The 
Garland Thesis and the Origins of Modern English Prison Discipline: 1835 to 1939’, The Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 34, 3 (1995), 259-73; Victor Bailey, ‘English Prisons, Penal Culture, 
and the Abatement of Imprisonment, 1895-1922’, The Journal of British Studies, 36, 3 (1997), 285-
324. See also Alyson Brown, English Society and the Prison: Time, Culture, and Politics in the 
Development of the Modern Prison, 1850-1920 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2003). 
5  Martin J. Wiener, ‘Murderers and ‘Reasonable Men’: The ‘Criminology’ of the Victorian 
Judiciary’ in Criminals and Their Scientists: The History of Criminology in International 
Perspective, ed. by Peter Becker and Richard F. Wetzell (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 43-60. 
6  Neil Davie, Tracing the Criminal. The Rise of Scientific Criminology in Britain, 1860-1918 
(Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2005); idem, ‘The Impact of Criminal Anthropology in Britain (1880-
1918)’, Criminocorpus, Revue Hypermédia (4 November 2010). Accessed online at 
<http://criminocorpus.revues.org/319> on 12 January 2013. 
7  Bailey, ‘English Prisons’, p. 309. 
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sociopolitical agenda. One would need to consider, for instance, how Kropotkin could 
articulate a political appeal to the power of human morality when he describes the 
individual as biologically predisposed to criminality. 
 
 
Crime and Utopia 
 
The discussion of crime in the literary utopia is found in the genre’s very inception. In 
his account of the just, albeit unlocatable, land of Utopia (1516),8 Thomas More (1478-
1535) presented an early sociological reading of crime, which included both the 
correlation between theft and the landed class’s ruinous exploitation and plunder of the 
poor and the criticism of capital punishment as a means of deterrence. Another early 
example is Civitas Solis (‘The City of the Sun’), written by Tommaso Campanella 
(1568-1639) in 1602 as he resided in his prison cell in Naples, which contained a rather 
extensive consideration of the matter of crime and punishment. Therein is found the 
notion that offences are to be seen as transgressions from a social contract, and that 
punishment is the collective’s right to reaffirm itself and its moral fabric against those 
that threaten its dissolution, precursory to the sociological approach such as that of 
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) found in his 1893 The Division of Labor in Society.9 
More and Campanella show us that crime and utopia have a long history. 
 When Utopia’s Raphael Hythloday denounces the attitude towards crime found 
in England, insisting that a society must not punish those it creates, More’s critique of 
what he sees as the faulted social customs and practices of his day is explicit. Yet social 
critique is latent in utopian thought itself. The utopian mentality, Karl Mannheim 
attests, is that which simultaneously transcends reality and shatters the prevailing 
order. 10  Utopian thinking challenges the superiority or naturalness of the present, 
                                                 
8  More’s ‘utopia’ derived from the Greek οὐ (ou) meaning ‘not’ and τόπος (topos) meaning ‘place’, 
a translation that was played on with that of ‘eutopia’, whereby εὖ (‘eu’) means ‘good’. 
9  For a discussion of More’s and Campanella’s approaches to crime in their respective literary 
utopias, including a comparison with that found in strands of libertarian and anarchist thought, see 
Vincenzo Ruggiero, ‘Crime and Punishment in Classical and Libertarian Utopias’, The Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice, 52, 4 (2013), pp. 414-32. For Durkheim’s approach to punishment, see 
David Garland, ‘Sociological Perspectives on Punishment’, Crime and Justice, 14 (1991), 115-65 
(pp. 121-127). 
10  Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York, 
NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954) p. 173. 
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anticipating 11  or desiring 12  that which is fundamentally different to the social 
conditions from which it is projected. Such hopeful speculations implicitly challenge 
the ills and injustices that are responsible for encouraging one to think about a better 
existence, and projections of improved ways of living necessarily construct a more 
harmonious society than the present one. A better existence must presume a better 
social existence; there is no utopian city without a utopian population, and the fantasy 
of a better life in solitude does not constitute utopian thought. 13  An increased 
sociability is thus intrinsic to utopia, and the conduct between individuals is inevitably 
improved. Utopia is not simply a space reorganised, but moralised.14 The hopes and 
desires for societies where individuals behave better towards one another are moored 
in the assumed reality of substandard or anti-social behaviour in the present.  
 Whether they are explicitly contrasted, as in More’s Utopia, or not, the anti-
social conditions of one’s reality are righted in the projections of moralised societies. 
The imagined lands of individuals living and working in harmonious cohesion outline 
or encourage the speculation of how moralisation could be brought about. In Utopia, 
such moralisation was shown to be possible in more equitable social conditions and 
with the emphasis of moral education through schooling and social interaction. In the 
literary descendants of Utopia one finds similar depictions of the means to enhance the 
sociability of populations. A fundamental difference, however, that separates the late 
Victorian utopias from their predecessors in the matters of moralisation proceeds from 
the nineteenth century medicalisation of morality. The ‘born criminal’, for instance, 
would be a threatening figure even in the moralised space of utopia, and the methods 
of dealing with those who deviated from the moral norms would follow the curative 
ideal of ‘rehabilitation’ rather than the disciplinary technology of punishment. The 
language and ideas that formed the developing criminological and psychiatric 
                                                 
11  Ernst Bloch’s Marxist utopian hermeneutics as a critical ‘anticipatory consciousness’ underlies his 
The Principle of Hope. He explores this idea directly in Part 2 of Volume 1. Bloch, The Principle 
of Hope, 1, trans. by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1995), pp. 43-336. First published in 1954. 
12  For Ruth Levitas, ‘utopia is the expression of the desire for a better way of being or of living’. Ruth 
Levitas, The Concept of Utopia (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 8. 
13  Gillian Beer’s has recently explored solitude and utopia through a reading of Daniel Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe and Admiral Richard Byrd’s Alone. See Gillian Beer, ‘‘Our Natural Loneliness’: 
Solitude and Utopia’ in The Good Place: Comparative Perspectives on Utopia, ed. by Florian 
Mussgnug and Matthew Reza (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 17-31. Though Beer is right to 
suggest that projections of solitude may stimulate the impulse of freedom (p. 31), the idea of 
seclusion pertaining to the concept of utopia is rather difficult to take on. 
14  Gregory Claeys, ‘News from Somewhere: Enhanced Sociability and the Composite Definition of 
Utopia and Dystopia’, History, 98, 330 (2013), 145-73 (pp. 150-151). 
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discourses of the period penetrated utopian projections, forming the means by which 
such imagined societies – and the individuals residing therein – were to be moralised.  
 
 
Socialism and Crime 
 
The conceptual and methodological frameworks of modern criminological thought, 
though formalised into a sociobiological science in the final third of the nineteenth 
century, can be seen to have emerged in the mid eighteenth century.15 The intellectual 
forces of the Enlightenment were at that time assembling the philosophy of humanism 
whereby man was a knowing, reasoning subject of great potential and at the same time 
a knowable, malleable object, occurring in the physical world, living as a biological 
being, and acting according to sociopolitical convention. Ideas concerning man’s 
progress, liberty, and citizenship were being shaped by etiological investigations into 
the natural laws found within the conditions of his existence. The matter of 
sociopolitical order – and, therefore, disorder – became a scientific enquiry into the 
causal factors that shaped human activity. 
French political philosopher Charles Montesquieu (1689-1755) in his 
influential The Spirit of Laws (1748) proposed that man and his actions were governed 
through the tension of natural laws and free will. 16  In his treatise one finds the 
contention that levels of crime were proportionate to the climate and that crime 
prevention would follow good legislation.17 And Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) 
would similarly state in The Social Contract (1762) that with a well-organised and 
well-governed society criminality would be reduced.18 Theorising within the same 
theoretical framework, Italian philosopher of law Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) would 
compose the first treatise devoted to observing criminal behaviour as a natural 
                                                 
15  For an account of the criminological approaches of three Enlightenment thinkers, and their subtle 
connections with the later science of criminology, see Philip Jenkins, ‘Varieties of Enlightenment 
Criminology: Beccaria, Godwin, de Sade’, British Journal of Criminology, 24, 2 (1984), 112-30. 
16  For analysis of Montesquieu’s dialectical exploration of the tension between free will and 
determinism in The Spirit of the Laws, see Ana J. Samuel, ‘The Design of Montesquieu’s The Spirit 
of the Laws: The Triumph of Freedom over Determinism’, American Political Science Review, 103, 
2 (2009), 305-321. 
17  Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. by Thomas Nugent (New York, NY: The Colonial 
Press, 1899), pp. 224, 81. First published in 1748. 
18  Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘The Social Contract’ in The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, trans. with an intro. by G. D. H. Cole (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1923), pp. 
1-123 (p. 31). First published in 1762. 
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phenomenon that was largely determined by social influences and not original sin: the 
epistemological tenet of what came to be known as the ‘classical’ school of 
criminology. Of Crimes and Punishment (1764) would posit what has been called 
Beccaria’s ‘judicial idealism’,19 wherein it was held that by reforming the system of 
criminal law, such as by introducing preventative punishment that is proportionate to 
the crime, society would see crime rates fall.20  
But to some, preventing crime was not as simple as reforming the current 
institutions of power, for the very foundational social structures on which they were 
built would always encourage its occurrence, and what was needed was fundamental 
reorganisation. William Godwin (1756-1836), in his 1793 Enquiry Concerning 
Political Justice, posited the ideal of the natural society that would emerge with the 
end of government and property. Therein Godwin saw that property – protected by 
laws created by the propertied classes as an extension of their power – would result in 
crime through the destitution that such an inequitable system would guarantee. In a 
phrase that Kropotkin would echo a century later in his In Russian and French Prisons 
(1887), Godwin asserted that social conditions gave birth to assassins, who were 
‘propelled to act by necessary causes and irresistible motives […]. The assassin cannot 
help the murder he commits any more than the dagger’.21 His was precursory to the 
environmental determinism seen in much of the anarchist and socialist discourse on 
crime that will be encountered throughout this thesis. But Godwin’s approach was 
unsettled by a certain tension. On the one hand he apportioned social conditions with 
much of the blame for crime, and desired to guarantee liberty and well-being for all 
individuals. On the other lay his profound belief in the necessity to safeguard society 
from the criminal if such a figure emerged to threaten it. Social conditions were not 
solely responsible for crime, and anti-social behaviour must surely, Godwin thought, 
be influenced by one’s own ‘propensities and dispositions’. 22  As a dangerous 
individual the offender would have to be restrained, both for the protection of society 
and in the hope that he will be reformed. Aware of this oscillatory antagonism between 
                                                 
19  Marc Renneville, ‘The French Revolution and the Origins of French Criminology’, in Criminals 
and Their Scientists, pp. 24-42 (29-30). 
20  For Beccaria’s criminological thought and its placement in the history of ideas see Piers Beirne, 
Inventing Criminology: Essays on the Rise of ‘Homo Criminalis’ (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1993), pp. 11-64. 
21  William Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Morals and Happiness, 
2 (London: G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1793), p. 690. 
22  Ibid., p. 752. 
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his desire for humankind’s freedom and his fear of social dissolution, Godwin posited 
that criminological thought must consider the balance between ‘how the personal 
liberty of the offender may be least intrenched upon, and how his reformation may be 
best promoted’. 23  This very tension and the malleable conceptions of criminal 
‘propensity’ and ‘disposition’ are found to complicate anarchist and socialist 
criminological thought at the end of the following century, and will be explored in this 
thesis.  
Throughout the work of Robert Owen (1771-1858), one of the earliest and most 
influential of socialist thinkers in Britain, one finds the insistence that poverty and 
inequality breeds crime. Right at the beginning of A New View of Society (1816) he 
would argue that the social conditions in which the poor live ‘must train them to the 
extreme of vice and misery, and of course render them the worst and most dangerous 
subjects’.24 In the second essay he would develop such an idea, contending that if the 
conditions of the criminal’s childhood and those of the judge who tries him were 
exchanged, the former figure would be trying the latter.25  As in Godwin, Owen’s 
answer to crime lay not in reforming the penal system and tenets of criminal law, but 
in reorganising the fundamental structures on which society rested. Cultivated in the 
mid 1830s, Owen’s final proposals, which composed a utopian vision of a 
communitarian society that utilised and advanced the enormous potential of manual 
and scientific power and was divided only by the natural distinctions of age, would 
continue to stress the moralising effects of education and agreeable labour in social 
environments free from want and disease. Indeed, it is arguable that his determinism 
hardened as his final projections matured: 
 
[M]an is, altogether, a being whose organization, feelings, thoughts, 
will and actions are predetermined for him by the influence of external 
circumstances acting upon his original constitution, and that he is, 
                                                 
23  Ibid. 
24  Robert Owen, A New View of Society; Or, Essays on the Principle of the Formation of the Human 
Character, and the Application of the Principle to Practice (London: Richard Taylor and Co., 
1813), p. 5. 
25  Ibid., p. 32. 
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therefore, irresponsible for the character formed for him, whatever it 
may be.26 
 
Moral responsibility, which would become a highly contentious legal concept in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, was complicated by Owen’s insistence that the 
individual – his body, mind, and behaviour – was determined by external conditions 
for which he could not answer. Not only did he discuss how the environment affected 
one’s character and behaviour, but also the extent to which one’s heredity traits were a 
determining influence. Ultimately, Owen would place social influences rather than 
biological ones as the deciding factor. 27  In so doing, he approached the idea of 
removing or diminishing the individual’s ‘bad’ qualities through compassionate social 
assistance in a remarkably similar discursive tone as that of the late nineteenth-century 
advocates of corrective rehabilitation in ‘curing’ one’s criminal traits, which as will be 
seen was a complicated ground to tread by those with socialist and anarchist ideals. 
 A new turn in the history of socialism and crime is found in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. The discussion of crime by Godwin, Owen, and others followed in 
the footsteps – though on a radical political track – of those aforementioned figureheads 
of the Enlightenment who observed man and his actions in a world of general laws. 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), however, as they 
considered the socioeconomic relations of society under the system of capitalism, 
would come to emphasise the idea of crime not as an abstract phenomenon that emerges 
from the mismanagement of social forces, but as a historically contingent legal 
construct that criminalised those actions deemed antagonistic to the ruling class’s 
ideology. In this sense, nineteenth-century ‘crime’ is the judicial pseudonym for 
working class resistance and reaction to the capitalist extension of expropriation. The 
inter- and intra-class relations forged by the socioeconomic forces of the day resulted 
                                                 
26  Robert Owen, The Book of the New Moral World, Containing the Rational System of Society, 
Founded on Demonstrable Facts, Developing the Constitution and Laws of Human Nature and of 
Society (London: Effingham Wilson, 1836), p. 20. This would be the first of seven parts, published 
between 1836 and 1844. For the development of Owen’s sociopolitical thought, and its place in the 
history of British socialist thought, see Gregory Claeys, Citizens and Saints: Politics and Anti-
Politics in Early British Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 63-105. 
27  Owen, The Book of the New Moral World, pp. 70-84. 
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in ‘criminal’ behaviour; such actions were intrinsic of capitalism. 28  Engels’ 
observations in the 1840s on the working class and their living conditions in 
Manchester included considerable critical analysis of crime. Theft, prostitution, sexual 
assault, and violence were all expressions of the socioeconomic relations that the 
brutalising and combative system of capitalism in Victorian England had created. The 
seminal point of Engels’ argument, John Lea states, ‘is that crime is not a result of the 
breakdown of social relations, it is rather one of the necessary forms they take in the 
circumstances of the time’.29 
In the same way that they presented their ‘scientific’ socialism against the 
‘utopian’ socialism of the likes of Owen and Wilhelm Weitling (1808-1871), Engels 
and Marx insisted that ‘crime’ had to be understood as occurring within and relative to 
specific historical conditions, and was a ‘normal’ expression of wider, dynamic 
socioeconomic forces.30 Such an understanding of crime will be shown to figure in the 
thoughts of the socialist and anarchist protagonists of this thesis. In Carpenter’s 
accounts of crime and criminality he would emphasise the historically relative nature 
of such phenomena: ‘The Accepted of one age is the Criminal of the next. […] When 
the ideal of Society is material gain or possession, as it is largely to-day, the object of 
its special condemnation is the thief’.31  And in Ellis’ criminological enquiries he 
considers criminal actions alongside non-criminal, expressing the idea that to 
understand crime one must consider the social relations between individuals in general: 
 
We to-day regard it as a great crime to kill our own fathers or children; 
                                                 
28  Such are the basic tenets that underlie the Marxist criminological schools of thought, seen in 
‘conflict criminology’ and the radical ‘new criminology’ that emerged in the 1970s. Though Marx 
did not write as much as Engels on the subject of crime, his analysis in 1842 of laws passed by the 
Provincial Assembly of the Rhine that criminalised the gathering of fallen wood fashioned the lens 
through which Engels and other such advocates saw crime. Indeed, it was his 1842 reflections on 
the forest thefts that compelled Marx to begin his study of political economy. See Peter Limbaugh, 
‘Karl Marx, the Theft of Wood, and Working Class Composition: A Contribution to the Current 
Debate’, Crime and Social Justice, 6 (1976), 5-16 (p. 6). 
29  John Lea, ‘Karl Marx (1818-83) (and Frederick Engels (1820-95))’ in Fifty Key Thinkers in 
Criminology ed. by Keith Hayward, Jayne Mooney, and Shadd Maruna (London: Routledge, 
2010), pp. 18-24 (p. 23). A more detailed historical analysis of Engels’ criminological approach is 
found in Lea, ‘Poverty, Crime and Politics: Frederich Engels and the Crime Question’ in The 
Condition of Britain: Essays on Frederick Engels, ed. by Lea and Geoffrey Pilling (London: Pluto 
Press, 1996), pp. 84-109. 
30  For an exploration of the utopian aspects of Marxism see Vincent Geoghegan, Utopianism and 
Marxism (Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang, 2008). See specifically pp. 39-54 for Marx and Engels’ 
views on utopian socialism. 
31  Edward Carpenter, ‘Defence of Criminals: Criticism of Immorality’, To-day, 2, 63 (1889), 31-41 
(pp. 31-32). The article was concluded the following month. See idem, ‘Defence of Criminals: A 
Criticism of Morality (Concluded)’, To-day, 2, 64 (1889), 61-71. 
 19 
but even the most civilised European nation—whichever that may be—
regards it as rather glorious to kill the fathers and children of others in 
war. We are not able yet to grasp the relationship between men. In the 
same way, while we resent the crude thefts practised by some lower 
races, we are still not civilised enough to resent the more subtle thefts 
practised among ourselves which do not happen to conflict with the 
letter of any legal statute.32 
 
Socialist and anarchist perspectives on crime would largely move within the same 
conceptual framework that Marx and Engels’ sociological analyses had formed. Such 
a criminological approach was not confined to the legal construct of crime but explored 
the complex network of all social relations as explained by contemporary 
socioeconomic forces. Punishment was neither an ethical nor effective means to tackle 
phenomena that arise out of social conditions, and even the rehabilitative ideal would 
be seen as merely symptomatic relief if not accompanied with social reorganisation. 
As they formulated their sociopolitical plans and analysed the human condition 
socialists and anarchists such as Wells, Ellis, Kropotkin, and Carpenter would take 
from Marx and Engels the crucial idea that the system of capitalism did not produce 
the immoral figure of the criminal but simply pushed otherwise social individuals into 
conflict with one another. 
 In late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain socialism and anarchism 
were both widely eclectic domains of thought and activity. A historical investigation 
that seeks to define a distinctly socialist approach to crime or an ‘anarchist 
criminology’ is an exercise in futility. Individual approaches, as will be shown in this 
thesis, though each promulgating ideas of radical reform and revolution from the same 
sociopolitical terrain, would vary considerably in their epistemological, ontological, 
and methodological composition. And yet there is in this particular historical setting a 
shared language of crime. Socialists and anarchists, though not the exclusive 
proprietors of such a discursive domain, would unanimously conceptualise the figure 
of the criminal as an individual who has been failed by the conditions in which society 
had placed him. Most would apply themselves to the task of calling for penological 
reform – heard not only in Britain but through Western Europe, Russia, and America – 
at the same time as emphasising the need for social reorganisation as a means to tackle 
crime. The demands for an end to the perverted, brutalising and largely ineffective 
                                                 
32  Havelock Ellis, The Criminal (London: Walter Scott, 1890), p. 206. All subsequent references to 
the text will refer to the first edition unless specified otherwise. 
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British penal system were particularly vociferous from the socialist and anarchist 
camps, understandably so when considering their interactions with the juridico-
penological complex. Such radicals were experiencing the strong and subversive arm 
of the law first-hand during the social unrest of the 1880s and 1890s: anarchist Johann 
Most (1846-1906), after publishing an article in 1881 in his London based Freiheit 
wherein he applauded the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, was sentenced to sixteen 
months hard labour; Carpenter himself was assaulted by the police in the 1887 
Trafalgar Square demonstrations; and the activity of police entrapment was illuminated 
after the show trial of the Walsall Anarchists in 1892.33 
But the perceived corruption of these institutionalised practices were to those 
in the socialist and anarchist circles indicative of the failures of society as a whole. As 
such, correcting the failings of the police, judiciary, and prisons was a method of mere 
symptomatic relief. One finds Sidney (1859-1947) and Beatrice Webb (1858-1943), 
founders of the Fabian Society, pressuring parliament to push through reforms to end 
the abysmal state of the penal system all the whilst pressing home the message that 
there was no prison imaginable that would ‘not be gravely injurious to the minds of the 
vast majority of the prisoners, if not also to their bodies’ and ‘the most practical and 
the most hopeful of “prison reforms” is to keep people out of prison altogether’.34 
Holding on to such hopes, socialist and anarchist radicals would question the very 
structure of social organisation itself, as seen in Ellis’ quote above. In doing so, they 
would participate within a shared discourse of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century criminological thought that looked to explain anti-social behaviour in 
sociological, psychological, and biological terminology, through the methodological 
apparatuses of statistics, the case study, and anatomical observation, as they put 
forward their sociopolitical claims for the vast expansion (and perfection) or complete 
eradication of the state. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33  For this episode in Most’s history, see Bernard Porter, ‘The Freiheit Prosecutions, 1881–1882’, 
The Historical Journal, 23, 4 (1980), 833-856. 
34  Sidney and Beatrice Webb, English Prisons Under Local Government, with pref. by Bernard Shaw 
(London: Longmans, 1922), p. 248. 
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Chapters 
 
The introductory chapter will consist of a survey of perspectives on the criminal as 
portrayed in the socialist utopia and anti-socialist dystopia within this period. Themes 
of eugenics and degeneration, as well as great advances in science and technology, are 
abundant in the literature, shaping discussions of crime and law enforcement, and 
criminals are dealt with in ways that would be rather implausible in the authors’ 
contemporary settings. In fact, the irony of these utopias, which so easily allowed for 
their satirising counterparts, was that the closer one envisages the practical 
achievements that could lead to the ‘good’ and ‘just’ society, the less palatable the 
original utopia becomes. Similarly, the means of ridding society of its criminals and 
‘undesirables’ is far less appealing than the final utopian panorama. Found in these 
utopias are the extermination of the ‘moral monster’, the sterilisation of or refusal of 
procreation for prospective parents, forced labour, and very little space for pleas of 
mitigating circumstances. The socialist and anarchist utopias simultaneously boasted 
their equitable and happy societies whilst being constructed on such unsavoury 
foundations.  
 Even where the devised utopias do not feature such uncomfortable proposals, 
there nevertheless arise confrontations with the question of crime. When Daniel Pick 
introduces his Faces of Degeneration with Gustave Flaubert’s (1821-1880) unfinished, 
posthumously published Bouvard and Pécuchet (1881), it can be noted that Bouvard’s 
‘rosy view’ of mankind’s future includes the belief that ‘[e]vil will disappear as want 
disappears’, suggesting that economic inequality is the cause of crime, or perhaps even 
that immorality is only found amongst the poorer members of society.35 Even in the 
romantic ideal of socialism found in William Morris’ (1834-1896) News from Nowhere 
there remains ominous inflections of positivist criminology, and the criminal who is 
found to be ‘sick or mad […] must be restrained till his sickness or madness is cured’.36 
Criminal law and criminal proceedings are sometimes extensively documented in the 
                                                 
35  Quoted in Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration: a European Disorder, c.1848-c.1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 1. 
36  William Morris, News from Nowhere; or, An Epoch of Rest. Being Some Chapters from a Utopian 
Romance (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1890), p. 114. 
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socialist utopia, as seen in John Petzler’s Life in Utopia (1890).37 Both the socialist 
utopia and anti-socialist dystopia share common themes in the identification and 
treatment of the criminal, and we often find discussion of the habitual criminal and its 
relationship to insanity and disease, hereditary criminal traits, eugenic schemes, and 
penal colonies. A critical survey of such themes, their placement in the wider discursive 
practices of their time, and their relationship with the doctrines of anarchism and 
socialism will be provided in the opening chapter.  
 Chapter Two addresses the criminological discourse of the first of the four 
figures to feature in this thesis: H. G. Wells. Whilst drawing on his scientific romances 
and journalism on sociobiological matters, the focus will centre on what is widely 
regarded as his trilogy in the Fortnightly Review, wherein he addresses contemporary 
concerns by making a number of observations on the identification, punishment, and 
rehabilitation of the criminal. Although Mankind in the Making (1902-3) and A Modern 
Utopia (1904-5), the second and third papers, can be read as Wells’ attempts to revise 
positions taken in the first, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific 
Progress Upon Human Life and Thought (1901), there are a number of continuities in 
his approaching the questions that concerned anti-social behaviour. The notion, for 
instance, of unseen tendencies or undesirable traits, transmitted from parents to their 
offspring, which would, if environmental or accidental conditions permitted, push the 
afflicted individual into criminality is discussed in each text, as are the responsibilities 
of both the individual and the state in this matter. Such an approach to the biological 
causes of criminality allowed Wells on the one hand to dismiss the ‘extraordinary 
assertions’38 of Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909) and the anthropological school, and to 
hold the lens over a toxic capitalist society, yet simultaneously keep one eye firmly 
                                                 
37  John Petzler, Life in Utopia. Being a faithful and accurate description of the institutions that 
regulate labour, art, science, agriculture, education, habitation, matrimony, law, government, and 
religion, in this delightful region of human imagination (London: Authors’ Co-operative 
Publishing Co., 1890), pp. 168-81. 
38  Wells, ‘Anticipations. VII.—The Conflict of Languages’, Fortnightly Review, 70, 418 (1901), 725-
38 (p. 726). 
 23 
placed on the human body.39  
 As will be contended in this thesis, Wells was not alone in such an unsettled 
domain, and the views of the other figures featured herein bear similarities: Ellis’ 
assertion that crime was often a question of how natural drives and forces could become 
corrupted and caused to erupt in poor social conditions; Kropotkin’s conviction that 
anti-social tendencies do not assuredly lead to criminal behaviour; Carpenter’s belief 
that individuals could, in the right environment, consciously evolve into better beings 
through ‘exfoliation’. The causes of and the solutions to anti-social behaviour had to 
be placed under both the individual’s hereditary influences and the inequitable society 
of which they were a constituent part. I consider the ‘fragmented’ and sometimes 
‘contradictory’40 sociobiological discourse in Britain, to use the vocabulary of Greta 
Jones, to emerge from the unstable space between biological and social determinism, 
as classic interpretations of physical phenomena and metaphysical conceptions such as 
the body and morality were unsettled by a number of new scientific epistemologies. 
Davie assumes a similar position as he examines the competing criminological 
disciplines in Britain between the late nineteenth- and early twentieth centuries, 
arguing that such fragmentations ‘distinguished different kinds of offender, rather than 
what they shared as members of an homogenous “criminal class”’.41 The unclear image 
                                                 
39  Lombroso, heralded as the father of modern criminology, placed the body at the centre of criminal 
causation in his 1876 publication L'Uomo Delinquente (‘Criminal Man’). He was seen by his 
contemporaries to be leading the ‘anthropological school’ of criminology, the principles of which 
were widely regarded – somewhat reductively – to hold that crime was caused by perceived 
abnormalities within an individual’s physiological composition. Indeed, by the fifth edition of 
Criminal Man Lombroso had observed that the threats of those figures which throughout history 
had been viewed with anxiety originated from their bodies: the woman was innately hysterical; the 
child amoral at birth; the non-white races savage through atavistic degeneration; and the poor 
inherently diseased and intellectually deficient. See Cesare Lombroso, Criminal Man, trans. and ed. 
by Mary Gibson and Nicole Hahn Rafter (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). However, as 
Gibson and Rafter point out, Lombroso also embraced the ‘environmental school’ of crime, which 
saw social and other external conditions as influencing anti-social behaviour. See Gibson and 
Rafter, ‘Editors’ Introduction’ in Lombroso, Criminal Man, 1-36, pp. 2, 13, 31. Beirne has 
previously emphasised that such intellectual development of Lombroso was ignored by some of his 
contemporaries, allowing them to criticise his thought as monocausal biological determinism. Piers 
Beirne, ‘Heredity versus Environment: A reconsideration of Charles Goring’s The English Convict 
(1913)’, The British Journal of Criminology, 28, 3 (1988), 315-39 (p. 315). This article would 
largely make up chapter 6 of Inventing Criminology (pp. 187-24). Whether or not Lombroso’s 
approach was misinterpreted, theories of crime that advanced monocausality and hard determinism 
were challenged by those that employed the type of language one finds here used by Wells. Phrases 
such as ‘predisposition’ and ‘tendency’ suggested malleability and indeterminacy, and were used 
by those who offered the perspective that behaviours were not prescribed by one’s body but by the 
way it interacted with the conditions in which one lived. 
40  Greta Jones, Social Darwinism and English Thought: The Interaction Between Biological and 
Social Theory (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), p. ix. 
41  Davie, Tracing the Criminal, p. 185. 
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or ambiguous nature of the criminal is all the more indistinct owing to the form of his 
diverse textual and conceptual configurations. As they explored the uncertain space 
between the criminal’s body and its environment, Wells, Ellis, Kropotkin, and 
Carpenter would discuss such a figure in various literary spaces. They wrote about the 
subject of crime and criminality in a number of genres, and we find the criminal being 
thought about differently if our authors are projecting prophetic ideals or putting 
forward limited social resolutions, if they are writing creative, imaginative texts or 
sober sociological reports. ‘Thinking about crime’ for them is inevitably complicated, 
if not contradictory. As it will be seen, in the thought of this thesis’ protagonists the 
criminal is on the one hand, for instance, a dangerous individual who damages the well-
ordered conditions of society and on the other an individual whose otherwise well-
ordered condition has been damaged by a dangerous society. For them, the figure of 
the criminal, therefore, was deeply ambivalent. Problematically, these ambiguities in 
their positions naturally resulted in the misinterpretation of their commentaries, both 
by their contemporaries and historians alike. For Wells, then, although there was no 
‘criminal ear’ or ‘criminal thumb’, individual bodies could not be ignored by the 
sociopolitical reformers of his day or by those of the future.42  As he aptly put it, 
speaking through his protagonist Remington: ‘Statecraft sits weaving splendid 
garments, no doubt, but with a puny, ugly, insufficient baby in the cradle’.43 
 Chapter Three analyses the criminological discourse of Ellis. With the 1890 
publication of The Criminal, Ellis was to some extent responsible for being the first to 
encourage a wide audience in Britain to engage with the largely international ‘science’ 
of criminal anthropology. Collating and condensing the current leading opinions of the 
heterogeneous movement, arguably spearheaded by Lombroso’s Italian school, Ellis 
introduced the public to a number of the scientific discourses concerning the 
physiological, psychological, and environmental construction of the criminal. The 
composition of this fellow man, woman, or child had hitherto been largely ignored by 
a public with a keen interest only in such a figure’s monstrosity and horrifying crimes. 
Ellis intended for the criminal to be assessed on measured, scientific grounds, to be no 
longer merely ‘a subject for sensational excitement, or unwholesome curiosity, as a 
                                                 
42  H. G. Wells, ‘Mankind in the Making. II.—The Problem of the Birth Supply’, Fortnightly Review, 
72, 430 (1902), 704-22 (p. 713). 
43  H. G. Wells, The New Machiavelli (London: John Lane, 1911), p. 408. 
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creature to be vituperated or glorified without measure’.44 Though this book, his main 
work on criminology, came at the very start of his literary career, Ellis continued to 
write about the subject throughout his life. Questions concerning the criminal, morality, 
and law often appeared in his articles, sexological case histories, and book chapters, 
and Ellis frequently reviewed leading works of domestic and foreign criminal 
anthropologists for The British Journal of Psychiatry between 1890 and 1919. 
 Only recently have studies on Ellis started to situate him within a wider 
historical context, rather than merely portraying a melodramatic personal life. In 
particular, some excellent scholarship by Ivan Crozier and Chris Nottingham has 
addressed the lack of critical interaction with his biosocial theory: the former engaging 
with Ellis’ contributions to the new medical and secular discourses of sex, the latter 
uniting the various intellectual positions of the ‘new man’,45 both scholars placing his 
writing within the vacillating domain of the ‘new politics’.46 Historical analysis of 
Ellis’s ideas on crime and the criminal, whereby his thought is placed amongst the 
discursive practices that surrounded these subjects, is, however, still wanting. Davie 
has recently provided a useful account of Ellis’ introduction, and the subsequent 
reception, of continental criminal anthropology to Britain.47 But as of yet, no study has 
seriously engaged with Ellis’ overall treatment of crime or penality, let alone framing 
it against his political and philosophical outlook, and we find him largely devalued to 
having only produced an English edition of Lombroso’s Criminal Man (1876) and his 
contributions having little effect on British practitioners.48 
 Ellis’ views on crime, sex, women, and morals need to be read, following 
Crozier and Nottingham, in the various contexts that surrounded the body as a 
                                                 
44  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 283. 
45  The term ‘new man’ is borrowed from Thomas Dixon. Such a man ‘was unimpressed by [the] 
traditional morality’ of the Victorian age, looked to sociopolitical reorganisation rather than ‘the 
sentimental and earnest philanthropy of his parents’, and ‘experimented with unconventional sexual 
relationships’. Thomas Dixon, The Invention of Altruism. Making Moral Meanings in Victorian 
Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 325-326. 
46  Havelock Ellis and John Addington Symonds, Sexual Inversion: A Critical Edition, ed. by Ivan 
Crozier (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Chris Nottingham, The Pursuit of Serenity: 
Havelock Ellis and the New Politics (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1999). The ‘new 
politics’, as described by Nottingham, ‘was all issues, plans, and causes; the rights of women, the 
imperative of peace, the need for an international language, the virtues of an open approach to 
human sexuality. It was always inclined to the utopian and the self-righteous and was infinitely 
richer in substance than the thin gruel served up by conventional politicians’. Nottingham, The 
Pursuit of Serenity, p. 16. 
47  See fn. 6 above. 
48  Elizabeth C. Miller, Framed: The New Woman Criminal in British Culture at the Fin de Siècle 
(Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2008), p. 32; David Garland, ‘British Criminology 
before 1935’, British Journal of Criminology, 28, 2 (1988), 1-17 (pp. 5-6). 
26 
 
biological entity, the mind with all its ‘natural’ drives and desires, and the human as a 
sociopolitical being. One such context concerned the role Ellis’ generation had in 
ensuring the prosperity of the next. As part of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century eugenics ‘movement’, Ellis’ views on crime were never far from the matter of 
procreation. Indeed, his views on crime and eugenics were both directed at a common 
goal: a utopian Britain based on the tenets of socialism, where a heterogeneous 
collective of men and women, able-bodied and free-willed, all lived and worked under 
the legitimacy of scientific naturalism. But to interpret Ellis’ views on criminal 
anthropology and eugenics in light of his politics is not the simplest of tasks, for he 
appears to be inconsistent on a number of key topics when it comes to the reach of the 
state. Sometimes denouncing the idea of any compulsory state-prohibition on matters 
of procreation – a territory which garnered support (particularly when concerning the 
criminal) from a number of his fellow eugenicists – and sometimes advocating it, Ellis 
gave mixed messages on these issues. Such conflict in Ellis’ writing will be placed 
within the unstable, self-contradictory, and highly ambiguous discursive practices of 
British criminology in this period. 
 It will be contended that at the foundation of his sociopolitical outlook Ellis is 
caught in a struggle between his utopian ideal of a higher collective conscience, which 
was to be realised through education and the re-evaluation of ethics, and his political 
radicalism, which demanded a more practical outlook on social reform. Ellis’ criminal 
anthropology is also marked by this philosophical tension. For although he may 
advocate programmes of education and reform, rather than discipline and punishment, 
for the imprisoned criminal, he also concedes that identifying ‘abnormal children’ and 
providing them with the appropriate treatment would be a better method to tackle the 
problem of crime. ‘We cannot catch our criminals’, Ellis sinisterly states, ‘too young’.49 
 In Chapter Four the focus takes a detour from socialism, and examines the 
criminological theory of Russian anarchist Kropotkin, whose writing had been 
published in Britain since 1876, ten years prior to his settling in London after his release 
from the Maison Centrale of Clairvaux. Kropotkin’s positions on crime, law, and 
prisons were generated through his scientific naturalism, his revolutionary political 
idealism, and his experiences of incarceration. More accountable than the cosmical and 
anthropological causes of crime, he argued, were the economic, jurisdictional, and 
                                                 
49  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 300. 
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social conditions of post-Napoleonic Europe. As Kropotkin professed, echoing the 
aphorism attributed to Alexandre Lacassagne (1843-1924): ‘We have our part of shame 
in the deeds of our assassins’.50 Many of those working in the discipline of criminology 
recognise Kropotkin as anticipating some of the theoretical approaches that emerged 
in the second half of the twentieth century; his ‘sociological criminology’ is found 
centring on the tension between the social-natured individual and the anti-social 
inequities of his environment. The most thorough work coming from this field is that 
of Larry L. Tifft and Lois E. Stevenson’s 1985 paper, wherein Kropotkin’s 
criminological thought is assessed abstractly and contemporarily, but not historically.51 
Other criminologists have also discussed Kropotkin’s contributions to their 
discipline. 52  A perspective that centres on such ideas in their historical context 
however, has largely been overlooked, and remains undeveloped in those who have 
approached the subject. Emile Capouya and Keitha Tompkins briefly discuss 
Kropotkin’s ideas on crime in their introduction to a collection of the anarchist’s major 
works, but fail to adequately situate his writing within sites of conflict and instability: 
Kropotkin’s criminals are, to the authors, merely placed in opposition to the ‘bad 
bloodlines’ which ran through those of Max Nordau (1849-1923) and Lombroso.53 
Stephen Osofsky presents Kropotkin’s criminological views as partly occupying the 
sociobiological realm, and critically engages with them, albeit rather firmly from a 
philosophical (not to mention slightly polemical) rather than historical stance. Osofsky 
provides a valuable reading of how Kropotkin saw prison, with its injurious effects on 
                                                 
50  Peter Kropotkin, In Russian and French Prisons (London: Ward and Downey, 1887), p. 361. For 
more on Lacassagne, including the aphorism referred to here and his relations with Kropotkin, see 
fn. 411 below. 
51  Larry L. Tifft and Lois E. Stevenson, ‘Humanistic Criminology: Roots from Peter Kropotkin’, 
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, 12, 3 (1985), 488-520. 
52  Jeff Ferrell, ‘Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921)’ in Fifty Key Thinkers in Criminology, pp. 30-36; Bruce 
DiCristina, The Birth of Modern Criminology: Readings from the Eighteenth and Nineteenth 
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53  Emile Capouya and Keitha Tompkins, ‘Introduction’ in The Essential Kropotkin, ed. by Capouya 
and Tompkins (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1976), pp. xiii-xviii. In his 1892 
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Fashioning Gothic Bodies (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 101. 
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its inhabitants, as a microcosmic variant of malignant bourgeois society. Such an 
interpretation will be developed in this thesis.54 
 Though he would maintain throughout his life an aversion to the belief in 
biological fatalism, Kropotkin was nevertheless very much part of that knowledge 
regime which held the individual’s body at the epistemic centre. Indeed, just as criminal 
anthropologists could not avert their eyes from the individual’s physiological 
constitution, Kropotkin saw society and politics through a biological lens, as 
epitomised in his exploration of evolutionary psychology that composed Mutual Aid: 
A Factor of Evolution (1902). In fact, because his criticism of the state and of modern 
society and its institutions was fundamentally made from a bio-evolutionary 
perspective, Kropotkin asserted that the individual suffered physiological maladies as 
a result of such social organisation, and nowhere was this course of poor health more 
concentrated than within the walls of the prison. For Kropotkin, humankind’s ‘illness’ 
caused by this unnatural organisation of society was literal: he deemed the artificiality 
of society as responsible for the actual abnormal functioning of the body of the citizen. 
And where function was found to be impaired in diseased bodies or fragile wills, 
focusing only on curing or reforming those typified as social deviants (the course to 
health as suggested by the juridico-medical expertise of the state) would result in mere 
symptomatic relief. 
 It was his conviction, one that was similar to Ellis’ belief in the natural ‘formal 
statement’ of socialism, in humankind’s biological sociality – in a distinctly Russian 
coalition of Darwinism and Lamarckism 55  – rather than in the doctrine whereby 
individuals competed in a Huxleyian ‘struggle for existence’, which separated 
Kropotkin from many of his European counterparts on the problem of crime. Yet he 
never strayed too far from the assumptions of the positivist school of criminology, and 
he believed that the individual’s unnatural physiology could lead to crime. Though he 
disagreed with the theory of criminal predetermination, such as that held by British 
psychiatrist Henry Maudsley (1835-1918), who ominously proclaimed in 1870 that 
‘[n]o one can escape the tyranny of his organisation; no one can elude the destiny that 
                                                 
54  Stephen Osofsky, Peter Kropotkin (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1979), in particular pp. 111-12. 
55  Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) emphasised the role that the environment had on evolution, 
stressing that through the organism’s interaction with the environment new traits would be 
acquired, and that such traits were inheritable. For Lamarck, see Richard W. Burkhardt, Jr., The 
Spirit of System: Lamarck and Evolutionary Biology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1995), in particular pp. 143-85 for his theory of evolution. 
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is innate in him’, 56  Kropotkin conceded that in particular circumstances those 
possessing a ‘nervous impressibility’, a mental state which may have been inherited 
and had remained ill-attended since childhood, were at risk of committing crimes.57 
Criminals were made in defective societies and reinforced in the prison, and it was only 
by combating the former’s organisation of its members that the problem of anti-social 
behaviour could be effectively addressed. 
 Chapter Five turns to the thought of another writer with anarchist views, 
Carpenter. As John Stokes accurately asserts, on the question of crime Kropotkin, Ellis, 
and Carpenter shared the same intellectual predicament: the rehabilitation of the 
criminal.58 As aforementioned, attempting to deal with such an issue was not as simple 
as merely looking to make improvements to prisons, for these remained, to use 
Kropotkin’s concise phraseology, ‘institutions based on a false principle’.59 Although 
the three radicals agreed that penological reform could only be accomplished alongside 
sociopolitical change, each of their approaches and judgements differed. Stokes notes 
the distinctions: 
 
Apparent deviants had to be understood within the context of a social 
ideal: Carpenter’s ‘a healthy body’, Kropotkin’s ‘one great family’, 
Ellis’ model of harmonious social order.60 
 
Carpenter’s approaches to criminology and penology, summarised below, have been 
treated as belonging to a narrative whereby a positivist, radical secularism informing a 
socialist ideal favoured forced labour and medicinal cure for the criminal. Philip 
Jenkins rhetorically asks how Carpenter as a socialist and homosexual could ‘possibly 
                                                 
56  Henry Maudsley, Body and Mind: an inquiry into their connection and mutual influence, 
specifically in reference to mental disorders (London: Macmillan, 1870) p. 75. 
57  Kropotkin, In Russian and French Prisons, p. 352. 
58  John Stokes, In The Nineties (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 102. 
59  Kropotkin, In Russian and French Prisons, p. 301. This chapter, entitled ‘On the Moral Influence 
of Prisons on Prisoners’, was first delivered as a speech in Paris in 1877. 
60  Stokes, In the Nineties, p. 104. Their united concerns and varied perspectives were points not 
pursued by the author (which is no criticism, for they were tangential to his primary endeavours) 
yet they constitute an integral route that will be explored in this thesis. 
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favour the discretion and medical imperialism inherent in the new penology’.61 Other 
writers have given Carpenter a little more credit. Similarly, in Sheila Rowbotham’s 
thoroughly researched and detailed biography, Carpenter’s texts concerning crime, 
though grounded in their historical and political settings, are not treated to any critical 
engagement.62 Tony Brown’s collection of essays is an excellent example of writing a 
history of Carpenter’s ideas, and his work is placed amongst that of his fellow radicals, 
actively participating in the contemporary dialogues concerning feminism, sex and 
sexuality, socialism, and science.63  Again, however, Carpenter is not found to be 
occupying the debate on crime, criminals, or prison reform. Although Bailey justly 
allocates space to Carpenter and Ellis in his paper on the ‘abatement of imprisonment’, 
there is little expansion, and their positions are arguably misplaced, the former merely 
contributing towards ‘a more ‘scientific’ view of crime’, the latter only repeating 
positivist calls for treating crime as disease.64 
 Like Kropotkin, a man whom he greatly admired, Carpenter wrote a damning 
indictment of the modern prison system. In Prisons, Police and Punishment (1905), 
Carpenter condemned the state for its arcane laws and penal institutions: together they 
manufactured criminals and were responsible for the recidivist; as branches of capitalist 
corruption they enslaved the working classes; and they held humanity in a stranglehold 
that prevented the path to true freedom and selfhood. Although the penal system of 
Carpenter’s day had advanced from its most primitive stage, which he defined by the 
notion of ‘Revenge’, it continued to bear the atavistic features of the second phase, 
‘Punishment’, with its irrational and unreasonable enforcement, and had not yet passed 
the third stage of ‘Deterrence’, with its failed methods of preventing crime. Finally, the 
process reaches its resolution in the stage of ‘Reclamation’, when in a society without 
fear and without the desire to punish, the prisoner is educated, reformed, and returns as 
                                                 
61  Philip Jenkins, ‘The Radicals and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 1890-1930’, Criminology, 20 (1982), 
347-372 (p. 361). Jenkins’ approach reduces the complex biosocial discourse found in socialist 
criminology to mere deterministic social Darwinism which, among other broad assertions, invites 
criticism: ‘Many [radicals] were driven to socialist conclusions by Darwinian views, reminding us 
that social Darwinism was not a conservative preserve. [...] This broad philosophical approach was 
reflected in socialist attitudes to criminology. English-speaking radicals wholeheartedly espoused 
the various theories of determinism in competition in these years’ (pp. 363-4). A history such as 
this removes the various scientific and philosophical excogitations made by socialists to the 
theories of, for instance, Lamarck, cooperation, and evolutionary psychology. 
62  Sheila Rowbotham, Edward Carpenter: A Life of Liberty and Love (London: Verso, 2008), pp. 
146, 251, 308-09. 
63  See Edward Carpenter and Late Victorian Radicalism, ed. by Tony Brown (London: Frank 
Cass, 1990). 
64  Bailey, ‘English Prisons’, pp. 306-07. 
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a fellow-citizen.65 Here, prisons were to act as ‘Industrial Asylums’, wherein prisoners 
would be ‘cured’ through health-giving work, as modelled by the new American state 
reformatories of Elmira in New York and Concord in Massachusetts.66 Carpenter’s 
idealism created a humane solution to the problem of anti-social behaviour, but 
arguably blurred the harsh realities of these institutions. 
 To understand Carpenter’s approach to the criminal, as Stokes maintains, and 
place it in the context of his social ideal – the healthy body – we are forced to confront 
his somewhat confusing philosophical oeuvre. Consistently advocating an organic 
spiritualism, albeit informed by a diverse range of intellectual roots, Carpenter 
struggled with the wedding of the natural, the individual, and the collective, their 
alienation having been brought about by modern, capitalist organisation. But this 
alienation could be reversed and humankind’s progress achieved through a Lamarckian 
process whereby desire and effort would produce favourable variation, a system 
Carpenter named, in homage to Walt Whitman (1819-1892), ‘exfoliation’.67 Refuting 
the ultimacy of pre-formed character, he accepted only a ‘loose’ Darwinism: a ‘soft’ 
determinism whereby an individual could defy their corrupted physiological and 
psychological organisation in order for their true self to emerge. The idea of exfoliation 
coloured his ideas on criminality and Carpenter believed that once an individual shed 
their false consciousness and rejected the moral relativism of legal and ethical codes 
could they be free to desire solely that which is beneficial to both the individual and 
collective self. With humanity redeemed – free from repressive mores and 
harmoniously unified – a true democracy would commence. Such a philosophical 
position was first formulated and expressed in the 1870s and 1880s, and there is 
certainly continuity in Carpenter’s thought throughout his life. In the 1890s and 1900s, 
however, as he engages with the increasingly discussed problems of criminal insanity, 
hereditary degeneration, and disease, his commentaries on crime are found to be 
situated further within the biological domain of criminological discourse. 
                                                 
65  Edward Carpenter, Prisons, Police and Punishment. An Inquiry into the Causes and Treatment of 
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 Wells, Ellis, Kropotkin and Carpenter were four figures who wrote rather 
extensively on the matters of crime and criminality. Although one might find them 
absent from a history of criminology in Britain their thought on criminological topics, 
expressed in a variety of textual genres (from fiction to scientific treatise) and in 
relation to extra-criminological discourses (such as sexological enquiry and the 
evolutionary theory of mutual aid) can be placed in a complex history of thinking about 
crime. In such a history that concentrates on the intersection where ideas on crime 
crossed those on socialism and utopianism in Britain, other prominent individuals 
could feature. And yet, not only have these four figures’ thoughts on criminological 
topics been largely overlooked, their interdisciplinarity and diverse socialist positions 
allow for a wide-ranging historical study. Discussion of crime and criminality can be 
found in, for instance, Wells’ experiments in prophecy, Ellis’ studies on sexuality, 
Kropotkin’s autobiographical accounts of imprisonment, and Carpenter’s dreams of 
humanity’s liberation. Furthermore, each engaged with a substantial volume of 
scientific theory that came to Britain from abroad. As such, though they lived, thought 
and wrote in Britain, their ideas are found to be part of a far wider intellectual and 
cultural context.68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68  Kropotkin is perhaps the best example of this. Though he lived and wrote in Britain for thirty-one 
years of his adult life, he had inhabited regions across Europe, from Siberia to the Jura Mountains, 
and his thought is easily read within this pan-European context. 
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Chapter One: Crime in the Socialist Literary Utopia/Dystopia 
 
Is the Land of Social Unity yet explored? or is a true chart of the 
Ocean of Life yet drawn ?  
It was to learn, if possible, more of these, to approach them 
nearer, but, at the same time, not to lose sight of our work-a-day world, 
I set forth.  
 Those who would condemn as chimerical, and those who would 
adopt as reality, what I have described, would be equally in the wrong. 
The gist thereof is a Speculative Hope.69 
 
Henry Wright, Mental Travels in Imagined Lands (1878) 
 
 
Learning the shapes of possible new lands and moving towards them, at the same time 
as staying within the realm of reality, Henry Wright’s ‘Speculative Hope’ is not, he 
warns, to be dismissed as ‘utopianism’ in the pejorative sense of the word, nor is it to 
force its way into the real to radically change society. His is a utopianism that sees a 
land not yet explored, and a picture of life not yet drawn. There are echoes of Bloch’s 
idea of the utopian ‘anticipatory consciousness’ in Wright’s view of historical 
processes, whereby the latent possibilities of speculative lands lie within the present, 
the only home of hope, and each moment nears towards possible territories from within 
the waters of the ‘work-a-day world’. ‘Speculative Hope’ and ‘anticipatory 
consciousness’ are to the respective authors necessary for any understanding of 
unrealised potentialities and any approach towards future lands. As Wright contrasts 
his utopianism with the chimerical, Bloch advocates the ‘concrete’ utopia against the 
‘abstract’ one, the latter being passive, compensatory daydreaming that has only 
discredited all that which receives the name ‘utopian’. As we will see in Wright’s 1878 
literary projections, the concrete utopia emerges from within a social reality: it is 
inextricably tied to it, proclaims its dangerous falsehoods, and hopes for and speculates 
its alternative.70 
 Visualisations of utopia, then, of places yet to be charted, stand in conflict with 
the real place from where such thought comes into existence. Utopian construction is 
not merely speculative prognostication and must be, as Frederic Jameson asserts, 
                                                 
69  Henry Wright, Mental Travels in Imagined Lands (London: Trübner Company, 1878), ‘Preface’. 
70  Hereon my use of the term ‘utopia’ and its derivatives refer to this interpretation unless stated 
otherwise. 
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‘motivated’.71 Peter Stillman states that ‘[e]ven at a minimum, the utopia demonstrates 
that alternatives to the present can and do exist, even if only in thought; the utopia 
serves to destabilise and relativise the present, to put it into a perspective in which it is 
not the only (and perhaps not the most desirable) possibility’. This is intrinsic to all 
utopian projections, whether presented as explicit critique or not:  
 
So long as that imagined society contains instantiated alternative 
principles that are seen as in any way better than those of present 
society, or if the imagined (dystopic) society contains instantiated 
principles that are fearsome extensions of currently latent or submerged 
principles, the utopia may raise doubt or dissatisfaction in the reader’s 
mind about the moral superiority of the present and may suggest 
possibilities for change.72 
 
In destabilising and relativising the present, utopias are platforms of critique. ‘One 
cannot be critical about something that is believed to be an absolute’, stressed Zygmunt 
Bauman. ‘By exposing the partiality of current reality […] utopias pave the way for a 
critical attitude and a critical activity which alone can transform the present 
predicament of man’.73 The ‘predicament of man’ is important here. Human activity 
must be included in utopian speculation. Garden cities and techno-utopias of the future 
are nothing without a population that lives in accordance with the harmonious 
environment envisioned. As such, a ‘quintessentially utopian component’, asserts 
Gregory Claeys, ‘has to involve an expectation of behavioural improvement’. The 
increased sociability of a population, whether caused by or resulting in the idealised 
landscape, is integral to the concept – utopia sees the ‘moralisation of space’.74 Indeed, 
in this sense it could be contended that utopian and criminological thought can share a 
semantic space.75 
 Imagined moral spaces, or more moral than the ground from which they were 
projected, would paint a picture of more or less well-behaved individuals, working and 
living together in socially cohesive communities of various types. Unsurprisingly, that 
                                                 
71  Frederic Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science 
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72  Peter G. Stillman, ‘‘Nothing is, but what is not’: Utopias as Practical Political Philosophy’ in The 
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74  Claeys, ‘News from Somewhere’, p. 150. 
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which made the individuals better behaved would be outlined or suggested. In More’s 
Utopia, as briefly discussed below, the emphasis is placed on moral education, the 
Utopians learning – initially through formal schooling and then further augmentation 
in life’s social interactions – how to be better for the benefit of society and the state. 
Utopian projections of the late nineteenth century similarly presented improved 
institutional and social support as beneficial for the individual’s moral faculties. But 
the understanding of virtue being bestowed upon men and women, enlightened by 
social and religious induction, was complicated by new medical conceptions of 
morality.76 Figures such as the born criminal and those suffering from moral insanity 
would not necessarily be influenced by the moralisation of space in utopia. As will be 
shown in this chapter, utopian populations would commonly be moralised through 
changes to their physiological constitution. Although focusing solely on eugenics and 
thinking of ‘betterment’ in a much wider sense than that of moral improvement, Patrick 
Parrinder asks an important question: ‘Can we imagine a better society without 
imagining, and wishing to create, better people?’77 
 
 
The Inequitable Environment 
 
The social conditions depicted in the late nineteenth-century socialist utopia would 
stand in stark contrast to those of real life. The very arrangement of Victorian society 
would be scrutinised by its utopian counterpart, and the objectionable condition of life 
would be presented as the result of such a structure. In the speculated land, crime and 
criminals would be better prevented and punished due to fundamental changes in 
society’s processes. Crime, in this sense, would be placed within the system itself. 
Indeed, it was so in More’s Utopia. When Hythloday, world traveller who has visited 
the land of Utopia, speaks about his time in England, he recalls his disagreement with 
a lawyer about the causes and punishment of crime. On the subject of capital 
punishment for larceny, he expressed the opinion that as well as it being grossly 
disproportionate and cruel, there is no punishment horrible enough to keep one from 
                                                 
76  For a study of this historical development see Heidi Rimke and Alan Hunt, ‘From sinners to 
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Sciences 1, 15 (2002), 59-88. 
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stealing if it is the only means of living. For Hythloday, crime would inevitably result 
from an inequitable environment: 
 
For great and horrible punishments be appointed for thieves. Whereas 
much rather provision should have been made, that there were some 
means whereby they might get their living, so that no man should be 
driven to this extreme necessity, first to steal and then to die.78 
 
He saw the causes of crime in destitution and need, brought upon the common man by 
the idle, profiteering, and land-seizing gentleman. Furthermore, as the English 
impoverished suffered poor education and moral guidance from youth, Hythloday put 
it to his company that the only conclusion was that such a society first makes the 
criminals and then punishes them.79 More’s radical aetiological assumptions of the 
causes of crime would sit quite comfortably alongside much of that found within the 
socialist literary utopias emerging three and a half centuries later. Indeed, we find it 
being directly referenced in Reverend William Tuckwell’s The New Utopia, or 
England in 1985 (1885). In discussing the applicability of More’s Utopia in his own 
age, Tuckwell’s first point of reference is the discussion of crime and its relation to the 
inequitable economic system.80 Crime as an intrinsic condition of rapacious capitalism 
would become a common motif of the genre in the late nineteenth century. As is 
asserted in Frederick W. Hayes’ The Great Revolution of 1905; or, The Story of the 
Phalanx (1893) that dealing with crime itself is merely symptomatic treatment – ‘of 
dealing merely with the results of the system’ – and that what was needed was 
fundamental restructuring of society.81 
One commonly criticised structure of the late Victorian socioeconomic 
apparatus was the system of property. Just as More had seen in property the 
misappropriation of the common man and the cause of his ruin and subsequent 
criminality, the relationship between property and crime in the socialist literary utopia 
follows a similar figuration. In Robert Desborough’s State Contentment: An Allegory 
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(1870) Abel Temple asks Quilt Harnot, founder of the socialistic utopian community 
to which Abel has travelled, how moral beliefs can be valued when there is no 
inalienable religious doctrine on which to base them. He does this by putting forward 
each of the Ten Commandments. ‘Thou shalt not steal’ is the most easily answered. 
‘Here we have nothing to steal’, Harnot explains, ‘all is common property. The 
commandment does not apply to us’.82 In this utopia, theft has been removed with the 
negation of property and the imposition of common ownership. Similarly, communal 
goods in Ellis James Davis’ Pyrna: A Commune; or, Under the Ice (1875) had 
extinguished the ‘incentive to accumulation’. Crime was unknown, for want and need, 
‘the great temptation to evil’ did not exist: ‘none quarrelled, none robbed their 
neighbours, none envied’.83 Though property remains in the realm of Nomunniburgh 
in Wright’s Mental Travels in Imagined Lands, it is held only by those who wish to put 
it to good use and, with the eradication of money and the provision of universal well-
being, we are told, property does not create crime as it does in other countries.84 In 
Morris’ News from Nowhere (1890), Old Hammond tells the utopian dreamer William 
Guest that since private property – an ‘injustice of the state’ – was abolished, the 
criminal laws and criminal class it had created went with it.85 Harold Edward Gorst’s 
Without Bloodshed (1897), though largely satirising a socialist utopian Britain, sees 
government abolish property, a system described as being ‘responsible for most of the 
crime and bloodshed which darken the pages of the world's history’.86 
 The notion that property created crime – and that the eradication of the former 
would largely or entirely remove the latter – is mirrored in the socialist literary utopia 
with respect to capital and an exploitative wage system. In Louisa Sarah Bevington’s 
Common-Sense Country (1890), the eradication of a competitive economic system had 
seen the end of theft and fraud.87 Similarly, the abolition of money in John Petzler’s 
Life in Utopia has put an end to prostitution, and women no longer ‘embrace vice’ out 
                                                 
82  Robert Desborough, State Contentment: An Allegory (London: The Newsagents’ & Publishing 
Company, 1870), p. 45. 
83  Ellis James Davis, Pyrna: A Commune; or, Under the Ice (London: Bickers and Son, 1875), pp. 
118-19. 
84  Wright, Mental Travels in Imagined Lands, p. 81. 
85  Morris, News from Nowhere, p. 111. 
86  Harold Edward Gorst, Without Bloodshed; a Probability of the Twentieth Century (Westminster: 
Roxburghe Press, [1897]), p. 92. 
87  L[ouisa] S[arah] Bevington, Common-Sense Country (London: James Tochatti, “Liberty” Press, 
[1890]), p. 11. 
38 
 
of the need or desire of financial gain.88 Returning to Hayes’ The Great Revolution of 
1905, the result of the revolution in abolishing money and the very notion of profit 
‘disposed at one stroke of nineteen-twentieths of the offences at common law’.89 
Indeed, Hayes goes on to discuss how the desire for money could result in the most 
egregious of crimes. Citing the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children’s (NSPCC) rather staggering 1892 annual report into child abuse,90 his very 
first example of Victorian crime is that of the murder of children for insurance claims, 
mainly from ‘deliberate starvation’ and ‘the innocent-sounding but deadly ‘neglect’’.91 
Though such offences were most often committed from within the impoverished 
section of the population, Hayes clarifies that poverty itself was not the cause of the 
crime: 
  
[N]either poverty nor large families had much to do with the prevalence 
of the offences, [therefore] the student of the late régime can only 
assume that the profit-mongering system had ample power to extinguish 
even that love of offspring.92 
 
William Thomson’s projections of what a socialist utopia would look like criticised the 
contemporary money system too. In A Prospectus of Socialism; or, A Glimpse of the 
Millenium (1894) he devoted a chapter to law and order. After explaining that the vast 
majority of crimes fit into the classes of fraud, forgery, embezzlement, stealing, and 
pilfering, Thomson asserted that the exploitative system of modern commerce had such 
an intrinsic relationship with crime – irrespective of social class – it could be described 
as crime itself.93 John Bagot, behind the pseudonym John B. Middleton, unequivocally 
linked the desire for money with crime in The God of this World: A Story for the Times 
(1905). In the appendix Bagot inserts a passage of his writing that had recently been 
printed in the Middleton Guardian, which he had edited since 1877. Attacking the 
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greed of the age, he attributes the vast majority of crimes that come to court as being 
produced by money, ‘the root of all evil’. In what seems seeped in the pessimistic-
optimistic oscillation of the age, Bagot asserts that ‘[t]here is money in the temptations 
which are held out to men to drink, to gamble, or to commit the many offences, 
mentionable and unthinkable, which go to make this glorious old world of ours so 
seedy and disreputable at all times’.94 
One might assume that such condemnation of how the mercenary property and 
wage systems of the day were the cause of criminal acts illustrated poor people wilfully 
choosing to commit offences – albeit confronted with death as the only alternative – in 
a classical criminological interpretation. And yet, as will be shown, the genre displays 
a considerable convergence with the aetiological frameworks offered by a positivist 
reading of crime. Murder in Desborough’s country of State Contentment was unheard 
of. No laws or moral codes were required to discourage violent behaviour, Harnot tells 
Temple, for ‘[t]o prevent a crime is to annul the cause’, and the eradication of the 
socioeconomic class system meant that those debased feelings that lead to ‘malice 
aforethought’ were no longer engendered by the animosity between the rich and poor.95 
In Wright’s Nomunniburgh, as we have seen, the eradication of money has meant that 
the property system is no longer a causal factor of crime as it is in other countries. The 
decision to rid the municipality of money was based on the belief that it invoked evil, 
and was the cause of fundamental moral codes being ever broken. It was regarded as 
the source of much crime, for the desire to make money ‘stimulated some of the 
[mental] faculties to an unhealthy degree, left others disused and unexercised to an 
equally injurious extent […] and the consequence was a total rusting of all the nobler 
faculties’.96 Though there is undoubtedly some satire in the medicalisation of crime in 
Scottish physician Joseph Carne-Ross’ Quintura; Its Singular People and Remarkable 
Customs (1886), the very idea that crime can be observed in physical and mental 
phenomena was rooted within the biological perspectives of criminal anthropology. 
The ‘forms of disease’ that resulted in theft, chicanery, and forgery had been eradicated 
with the abolishment of poverty and excessive wealth.97 Money (or ‘mammon’) in 
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Bevington’s Common-Sense Country did not only encourage or even force one to 
undertake criminal activity, it affected one’s moral and mental constitution. It depleted 
the very soul, drained ‘moral individuality’, and created the ‘moral paralytic’. As such, 
when money filled one hand, the other wielded manic desires of power and 
oppression.98 As Hayes argued in The Great Revolution of 1905, theft and such-like 
crimes resulted from the ‘profit-mongering system’. Again, money is presented as 
something that disturbs the natural moral faculties, a cognitive affliction that can create 
a criminal just as it can create professionals who work out of greed: 
 
[T]he use of money […] led directly to the evolution of that section of 
the predatory classes which consisted of professional loafers and 
roughs, petty thieves, and dangerous criminals of the burglar and 
garrotter types […] The instincts which in other grades of society 
produced the lawyer, the sweater, the slave-driver, the company-
promoter, and the blackmailer, operated more simply among the lower 
classes and in more direct lines.99 
 
And in Thomson’s Prospectus, private ownership and competitive business is found to 
evoke hateful and malicious feelings amongst and between men, and are condemned 
for ‘provoking the evil passions of our nature, tempting us to be deceivers, traitors, 
backbiters, and liars, to gain our ends and accomplish our purposes’.100 By removing 
the system of capitalism such tendencies would not be evoked, and with the adoption 
of socialism ‘all those causes of crime, wretchedness, and misery would be swept 
away.101 Similarly, in the anonymously authored An Amazing Revolution and After 
(1909), a universal moral shift has been brought about by the advancement of 
socialism:  
 
They had not realised the effect which would be produced by not merely 
relaxing but withdrawing all the stringent and unnatural social and 
economic rules which had for generation after generation hampered the 
free action and play of human nature in every class. They did not realise 
that the movement, originating as it did with the more privileged 
classes, would at once exercise an enormous moral influence on every 
class, including its own.102 
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The fears of moral sickness were not always so directly linked to the domain of money, 
commerce, and property. In fin-de-siècle Britain a vast array of factors and conditions 
were perceived to be contributing to moral degeneration. Alcoholism, disease, insanity, 
atavism, and other afflictions began to form the basis of discussions on crime. All 
discursive fields – from legal to literary, religious to scientific – encountered crime 
through an engagement with such notions, and the socialist critique of Victorian social 
mores and cultural institutions was no different. And yet it rather consistently directed 
its gaze to social conditions, its pessimistic perspective oscillating with the hope that 
the factors behind moral disorder could be eradicated or abated with the improvement 
or fundamental change of the environment.  
Diseased, unhygienic, squalid environments did not only have deleterious 
effects on one’s body, but also harmed one’s moral faculties. Harnot tells Abel in State 
Contentment that he fled Victorian London before the ‘dirt and infamy’ left him 
‘irretrievably corrupted’.103 In the anonymously authored Darkness and Dawn; The 
Peaceful Birth of a New Age (1884), highly commended by Alfred Russel Wallace who 
saw it as a book which deals more with critiquing the current evils of the age than with 
constructive socialism, but still eloquently expresses the ideas and aspirations of the 
movement,104 a socialist state maintains strict hygiene and health in jails, and it is 
contended that had the inmate enjoyed such conditions before his imprisonment it 
‘would have kept him from criminality’.105 The passage from squalid conditions to 
crime was simply a matter of cause and effect, and Victorian England’s failure in such 
basic criminal aetiology is condemned by the inhabitants of Elizabeth Corbett’s New 
Amazonia: 
 
“Prevention is better than cure,” is just as trite and useful a maxim for 
the State as it is for the subject, as is also the warning against being 
“penny-wise and pound-foolish.” It would cost much less for our 
country to feed, clothe, educate, and train to useful avocations half-a-
million youngsters taken from the slums, than it would cost to meet one-
half of the expenses that same half-million of juveniles will provide for 
their compatriots before they have run the course of drunkenness, 
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pauperism, misery, and crime which the laws of cause and effect have 
only too surely marked out for them in the unhappy future.106 
 
Thomson’s prospectus explicitly details the importance of the environment in shaping 
human morality. Moral faculties improve through the mechanism of evolution, but 
only if the surroundings are conducive to such development: 
 
Evolution and natural development have proved that everything in 
animal and vegetable life is more or less affected for good or evil by its 
surrounding conditions […] By the condition with which he is 
surrounded is his moral development advanced or retarded; and that the 
lower ranks of our common humanity have advanced but very slowly, 
if at all, since we may almost say pre-historic times, is just because of 
their shocking surroundings. Such surroundings, where the brothels and 
public houses swarm, draw their victims to their ruin and death, and thus 
destroying their manhood, and their humanity, sending them forth as 
firebrands of crime, prostitution, destitution, and outrageous 
madness.107 
 
In An Amazing Revolution and After, the utopian socialist society has seen 
environmental changes change the moral constitution of man – his very instincts and 
passions – for the better. Reflecting on the revolution, a utopian citizen admits that he 
‘did not realise how largely human nature is affected by its surroundings’, and goes on 
to pour scorn on a ‘depressing book’ that encouraged the perspective that humankind 
was in a state of irrevocable degeneration.108 The revolution, however, has been a 
revelation. Humans are found to have ‘divine instincts’ which are ‘grand and noble, 
tender and true’. There is in every individual the drives of self sacrifice and love; 
‘devotion so deep, so absorbing, that even sexual desire ceases to be gross and sensual’. 
Such instincts would emerge and expand, the socialist revolution had proven, even 
under merely ‘reasonable’ social conditions.109 
The improvement or increased virtuousness of sexual desire following a 
socialist revolution, as just mentioned, arises in a number of titles in the genre. In 
Pyrna, a free, equal, fraternal and sanitary existence is extolled above all else. As such, 
the mental and physical health of the population is excellent. This has, in turn, led to 
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the near-eradication of immorality and crime, particularly that which can derive from 
the sexual passions: 
 
Immorality is unknown to such an extent, that we lack a word for 
adultery, or that other vice which makes night hideous in your crowded 
capitals. Think you that vice is alone the product of the natural mind of 
man? No! It is the weak frame, the debilitated and nervously infirm 
constitution that rushes from one form of evil to another in the 
endeavour to forget in the momentary gratification of the passions the 
maladies that are eating away the health and diminishing the very life-
blood of the unfortunate.110 
 
Pyrna was not Davis’ only foray into utopian fiction. In Etymonia (1875), a communal 
utopia set in the North Sea, the Etymonians have created a society that emphasises 
equality – labour and land is shared fairly, all thought and opinion is valued alike, and 
men and women are considered equals. With no imbalance of power between the sexes, 
and none of the repressive and hypocritical religious customs as found amongst the 
Victorians, sexual relations are seen to be healthy and natural. Were it otherwise, crime 
and immorality would ensue. We are told that ‘[n]atural sexual desires, if restrained 
for too long, would develop into a psychopathy, a monomania’. In Victorian society 
this not only led to prostitution, but to ‘[s]eductions, rape, violence, and unnatural 
offences against children’. In Etymonia, there exists the custom of sexual friendship: 
‘[A]ppetites are not allowed to attain to an unhealthy force […] They do not indulge, 
but merely satisfy the appetites without imagination’. 111  In News from Nowhere 
Morris, who, as has been shown, saw the abolishment of private property as a key cause 
of crime’s elimination, connects the notion of property with sexual violence. Old 
Hammond explains to Guest: 
  
Let us look at the matter closer, and see whence crimes of violence 
spring.  By far the greater part of these in past days were the result of 
the laws of private property, which forbade the satisfaction of their 
natural desires to all but a privileged few, and of the general visible 
coercion which came of those laws.  All that cause of violent crime is 
gone.  Again, many violent acts came from the artificial perversion of 
the sexual passions, which caused overweening jealousy and the like 
miseries.  Now, when you look carefully into these, you will find that 
what lay at the bottom of them was mostly the idea (a law-made idea) 
of the woman being the property of the man, whether he were husband, 
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father, brother, or what not. That idea has of course vanished with 
private property, as well as certain follies about the ‘ruin’ of women for 
following their natural desires in an illegal way, which of course was a 
convention caused by the laws of private property.112 
 
With the eradication of the poverty-producing, inequitable system of capitalism, 
criminal actions could be greatly reduced or even extinguished altogether. But 
importantly, the demise of such a system saw criminal tendencies and instincts 
quashed. Moral afflictions were greatly abated or even cured after fundamental 
changes in the social structure saw the removal of an unjust property and wage-system, 
and the improvement of hygiene and sanitary conditions.  
 
 
Punishment and Prevention 
 
In the socialist literary utopia the nature of the human condition can be so transformed 
by the new order of life that no punishment is required in the event that crimes do 
occur. In State Contentment, such is the moral betterment of individuals that when 
crimes have been committed – portrayed as accidents and mistakes – the only 
punishment for the perpetrators was ‘the torments of their own consciences’.113 Yet 
this is the exception to the norm. Punishment for crimes or measures for its prevention 
is a common subject in the genre. In Pyrna, all crimes, against the government or 
individual, would be punishable by death or exile: ‘If one person transgressed, the 
whole machinery was put out of gear; the mechanism was stopped; and the mischief 
done was incalculable’. 114  Capital punishment was used for those with infectious 
diseases, but would only occur with the consent of the perpetrator, who, again with a 
new conscience directed towards the social collective, would commonly provide it so, 
as they ‘would rather leave life than be the cause of injury to his brethren’. 115 
Prevention of crime in A Thousand Years Hence (1882) took the form of huge efforts 
of lighting in the city in what was seen as a ‘moral resanitation’ scheme, ‘turning all 
the criminal class out of the long-accustomed dark dens and recesses of old town life, 
which had previously sheltered from common view the hosts of those owls of the 
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night’.116 But if prevention did not work, and the professional or habitual criminal 
continued in their ways, for their sake and for the good of society they would be placed 
in permanent confinement. The author sees this as an ‘extirpatory method’. By 
improving the environment, those who are not constitutionally affected by criminality 
– ‘the casual or non-professional lawbreaker, and especially the juvenile first offender’, 
who ‘might yet be good citizens’ – were separated from those that are criminal by their 
nature, the ‘persons of whom there could be reasonably no such hope’. 117  In the 
anonymously authored Politics and Life on Mars: A Story of a Neighbouring Planet 
(1883), crime has been greatly reduced amongst the lower classes with the introduction 
of a form of syndicalism. Increased freedom and power for such individuals to conduct 
their own affairs has led to an increase in socialistic schemes, resulting in a well-
functioning, happy society. When crime does occur, it is punished by short sentences 
with the convicted undertaking compulsory but profitable labour.118 In Darkness and 
Dawn, criminals are ‘punished’ with employment in public schemes, which also helps 
to improve public hygiene and, by implication, reduce crime.119 That being the case, 
widespread fraternal feelings (though directed somewhat by a nationalism verging on 
the xenophobic) have diminished the need for law enforcement: ‘There was no 
starvation, degradation, lurking discontent, class enmities, or sedition among the 
populace; all were busy, cultured, leisured, moral […] Visitors to the country would 
see hospitals sparse, jails closed, lunatic asylums transformed into gardens.120 
In the state of Nommuniburgh in Wright’s Mental Travels in Imagined Lands, 
exile is the popular method of punishment. Following a common motif of the literary 
socialist utopia, such is the importance of universal labour that refusal to do one’s 
‘share’ is considered criminal, and banishment from the state would follow three 
unheeded warnings.121 The ideal of rehabilitation is also found in Wright’s text, and 
those found guilty of violent offences against an individual would serve time in prison 
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until they willingly offered reparations and their apology to their victim.122 Similarly, 
Petzler’s guide to utopian life lists the degrees of punishment for ‘the dereliction of 
duty in the performance of labour and its superintendence’. These range from being 
listed in the newspapers to imprisonment with penal labour for more serious 
misconduct of duties. 123  Hayes’ revolutionary collectivist society sees huge work 
schemes and reform result in an abundance of varied work being universally available. 
An Act was proposed that would see citizens penalised if they could not prove to hold 
a lawful means of subsistence, with penalties that were cumulative in severity up to the 
point of seven years imprisonment for successive offences. As a result, large numbers 
of criminals – who cared to live only by illegal means – voluntarily left the country. 
Those who did not were, on the day the Act came in to effect, rounded up in a 
nationwide police operation. Offered national service as recompense, most willingly 
accepted.124 In George Read Murphy’s 1894 Beyond the Ice, the collectivist utopia of 
the country of Zara has seen a great reduction of crime with the introduction of mass 
lighting, as seen in A Thousand Years Hence. The destitute, however, are sent to the 
Pentona labour colony, in what is seen less as a criminal sentence, and more as an 
opportunity for the individual to fulfil their duty: ‘When a man cannot get work, the 
Government gives it to him’.125 Nevertheless, they share Pentona with criminals of all 
guises. All are met with fair treatment and consideration, but to behave badly can see 
sentences extended and may even result in execution. It is exclaimed that the system 
works by being consistent rather than fearful: crimes of all sorts are deterred by the 
certainty not the severity of the punishment. 126  The prison system is very much 
intertwined with the wider economy: the country benefits from the labour, prisoners 
are well provided for, and as the notion of good labour becomes habitual they are 
reformed into voluntarily dutiful citizens.127 
Reforming individuals was not only a matter of instilling good habits, but of 
producing remedial recovery. The medicalisation of crime, emerging in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, had moved morality away from the conception of evil 
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towards the observable conditions of sickness. Such a movement is satirised in 
Quintura, whereby crimes are predicted by medically trained police in physiological 
indicators. Those displaying such criminal marks are sent to hospital for treatment.128 
A similar approach is found in New Amazonia. Criminal activity is seen to indicate 
diseases and afflictions of the brain, and a curative approach is taken.129 ‘Dietists’ treat 
mental and moral afflictions, such as violent tempers and nervous tendencies, as the 
body is treated to help ‘facilitate’ the mind’s moral faculties.130 In What Will Mrs 
Grundy Say? (1891) the punishment for crime must be read in light of the satirical 
nature of the novel, but the contemporary understanding of the interconnection 
between crime and disease are nevertheless highlighted. Offenders of minor crimes 
have diseases or physiological malcontent ‘transferred’ to their body for the period of 
their sentence.131 If offences are serious, such as murder, ‘for the protection of the 
State’ criminals are sent to prison for capital punishment or remain there until death.132 
Prison doctors, however, on finding that a criminal is suffering from mental maladies, 
can have sentences reduced. As these utopias have vastly improved or even ‘perfected’ 
the social conditions of existence, it is no surprise that criminality has to be treated as 
a physiological phenomenon. Thomson addresses this explicitly in A Prospectus of 
Socialism. Crimes in utopia ‘are more likely to be caused by some form of inherited 
disease or natural failing than from general unjust and unfair conditions of living as is 
now [in Victorian Britain] the case, and by a thousand aggravatory causes forced and 
twisted into being by and through the unjust inequalities of our circumstances’. 
Punishment in utopia would thus be more humane, and entirely directed toward 
reforming and improving the criminal. The prevention of such criminal physiological 
conditions would be key, and ‘as much care as possible would be taken to counteract 
evil tendencies’ in the young.133 After Guest condemns the violence of the police in 
News from Nowhere, particularly in the case of Bloody Sunday where they first 
assaulted protestors and then threw them in prison, Dick, his guide, calls imprisonment 
a disgrace, with nineteenth-century prisons being the worst. There are of course no 
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prisons in Morris’ utopia.134 But the subject of violent passions is more complicated. 
‘Hot blood will err sometimes’, says Old Hammond, but if violence is seen to arise 
from moral insanity the offender ‘must be restrained till his sickness or madness is 
cured’. Otherwise there is nothing else that can be done, for punishing individuals for 
the safety of society was a failed experiment, leading only to an existence of ferocity 
and fear.135 And yet it is difficult to see this put in to practice. When in the narrative a 
man commits murder out of jealous love, it is repeatedly suggested that he should ‘go 
away’ and live in solitude somewhere, sounding very similar to a non-compulsory, 
though somewhat coercive, banishment.136  
 
 
Men, Women, and Children 
 
The problem of crime that Morris depicted in News from Nowhere that concerned the 
relations between the sexes was encountered in the literary socialist utopia rather 
frequently. Love and sexual relations could result in crimes of passion and jealousy, 
and the conception and raising of younger generations carried with it the risk of making 
anti-social constituents. The fear of inborn criminality appears in Jane Hume 
Clapperton’s Margaret Dunmore; or A Socialist Home (1888), as seen in Frank’s 
concern about a natural, immoveable immorality found in some children. Though this 
is challenged by Margaret as one dimensional biological thought, and a dual 
relationship between the body and the environment is propounded, she nevertheless 
makes it clear that it is the commune’s duty to overpower the ‘forces’ that give rise to 
deviant thought. 137  State intervention into the realm of sex and the family was 
commonly increased in socialistic visions as a means of safeguarding social harmony. 
Petzler’s detailed description of utopian life discusses how the state closely regulates 
marriage from the commencement of adulthood. Such intervention is seen to prevent 
ruinous marriages by criminalising breaches of promise. Of most concern for the state, 
however, and which guided their marriage laws, was the possibility of the ‘physical 
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and mental degeneration’ of offspring.138 In Quintura, children are cared for by the 
state from birth for five years – it had found that mothers could not bring up their 
children on purely scientific grounds, and such a relationship was ‘injurious to a child’s 
moral nature’.139 After all the criminals were removed in Hayes’ Great Revolution, 
their children were taken under the care of the State, and guided with goodness, 
nutrition, and hygiene. Similarly, in Thomson’s Prospectus the law would see the 
children of criminals taken by the state and receive the necessary treatment to prevent 
them from leading the life of their criminal parents.140 Later generations benefitted 
from such social reorganisation. Though the socialist revolution was not directed 
towards improving man’s moral nature, it was observed that the introduction of a 
‘scientifically correct administration of the national affairs’ had resulted in all that 
which centuries of ethical and religious instruction had failed to achieve:  
 
Men were obliged to be outwardly moral, because the machinery for 
indulging their vices had disappeared […] The younger generation has 
to this extent benefited from the new régime, that whereas their 
progenitors became more or less virtuous through the withdrawal of 
most of their opportunities of being vicious, the youth of our day has 
grown up in almost complete ignorance of the rascalities, the vileness, 
and the devilries which were part of the very atmosphere of his daily 
life to the average citizen before 1905.141  
 
The state regulation of marriage and childcare were not the only methods of 
safeguarding society from anti-social beings and behaviour explored in the socialist 
literary utopia. The matter of procreation would also come under the arm of the state 
as a means of tackling crime and deviancy. 
In the state of Pyrna, eugenic schemes of marriage regulation (by the Social 
Council and by medics) and the killing at childbirth of those who are deformed and 
diseased has led to a population composed of strong, ‘well-made’ people. Strictly 
adhering to the principles of survival of the fittest, the utopians’ belief in acting 
‘entirely in accordance with those laws of nature’ has allowed for much moral 
improvement: ‘[L]ook at our morals’, the narrator’s utopian companion exclaims, 
‘[w]e are contented without excitement. There is no craving for change and novelty 
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among us, as there is with you, for our minds are healthy’.142 The projections in A 
Thousand Years Hence saw a society that would finally accept the science that said 
criminality in a parent is likely to result in criminality in the child. Though the state 
would not kill any badly born children, it would do its best to prevent them, and both 
lunatics and criminals were restrained from parenthood.143 In Grant Allen’s ‘The Child 
of the Phalanstery’ (1884) the community could only interfere with lives if it was in 
the ‘prevention of obviously wrong and immoral acts, such as marriage with a person 
in ill-health.144 Murphy’s collectivist city of Zara had legislation in place to put a stop 
to the born criminal:  
 
And last, but not least, our weak and criminal population are kindly 
provided for, and restrained from reproducing, as a curse for the next 
generation, children without the wisdom to be good or happy.145 
 
And as will be explored in Chapter Two, Wells discussed the uses of eugenic schemes 
(sterilisation, segregation, infanticide) in Anticipations, Mankind in the Making, and A 
Modern Utopia. 
 
 
The Anti-Socialist Dystopia 
 
The methods of eugenics and euthanasia as means to protect society from criminally 
injurious individuals or their hereditary make-up also appeared in the socialist utopia’s 
literary counterpart. The expression of a cultural fear of an amoral scientism that could 
lead to highly rationalised but ultimately dangerous and inhumane outcomes was a 
popular literary motif in the nineteenth century, the most famous early examples found 
in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s (1749-1832) Faust (1808) and Mary Shelley’s 
(1797-1851) Frankenstein (1818). Therein, the overreaching pursuit of scientific 
knowledge, often depicted as unleashed and running away from the palliative and 
ultimately salvational influences of morality, brings misery and ruin to its creators and 
others. Such a metaphor was evoked by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto 
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(1848), when they drew on Goethe’s figure of the sorcerer found in both Faust and his 
1797 poem Der Zauberlehrling (‘The Sorcerer’s Apprentice’). 146  Their political 
narrative of the bourgeoisie creating and then losing control of a system of production 
and exchange that would inevitably lead to their demise, evokes the same image of 
scientific knowledge and power not only escaping the hands of its maker but going on 
to threaten his existence. As Marshall Berman reflected: 
 
Marx’s imagery projects, here as ever, a sense of wonder over the 
modern world: its vital powers are dazzling, overwhelming, beyond 
anything the bourgeoisie could have imagined, let alone calculated or 
planned. But Marx’s images also express what must accompany any 
genuine sense of wonder: a sense of dread. For this miraculous and 
magical world is also demonic and terrifying, swinging wildly out of 
control, menacing and destroying blindly as it moves. The members of 
the bourgeoisie repress both wonder and dread at what they have made: 
these possessors don’t want to know how deeply they are possessed. 
[…] [S]triving to expand human powers through science and rationality, 
[they] unleash demonic powers that erupt irrationally, beyond human 
control, with horrifying results.147 
 
In the literary socialist dystopia of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries one 
commonly finds the depiction of science and rationality, freed from the system of 
ethics, driving the socialist state’s policies. The sorcerer motif presents itself in a 
tyrannical, murderous biopolitics. Therein, one would frequently find the state’s 
eugenic and euthanasic approach to crime. 
In June 1871, a matter of days after the violent fall of the Paris Commune,  
Fraser’s Magazine printed the anonymously authored story of ‘The Travels and 
Adventures of a Philosopher in the Famous Empire of Hulee, From an Old MS., AD 
2070’ (1871). A satirical picture is painted therein of a socialist state where all customs 
and conduct are rigidly directed by Comtean positivism. A Hulean professor tells the 
visitor the defining principle of the age: ‘Dans l’état (Hulée) l’esprit humain … renonce 
à chercher l’origine et la destination de l’univers, et à connaître les causes intimes des 
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phénomènes’.148 Adhering to a mechanical and scientific view of life, the state would 
possess a knowledge of and benevolent control over all things, safeguarding society 
from every possible danger. Eugenics and euthanasia were employed to protect the 
health and well-being of the social whole: marriage was largely controlled by the 
medical profession, sickly children were ‘immediately destroyed’, and older Huleans 
who could no longer work or had been afflicted with disease or disorder were killed 
for the good of society.149 The state saw that any individual with a chronic or incurable 
disorder was an offender, and was subjected to medical and scientific experimentation 
before execution. As the Hulean guide informs the visitor, ‘this mode of utilizing 
criminals is better than that which is in use in some countries of hanging them up on a 
scaffold without a thought of those valuable organisations which are thus absolutely 
wasted, so far as rendering any service to humanity is concerned’.150 In Henry Crocker 
Marriott Watson’s Erchomenon (1879), state-run ‘Baby Farms’ are responsible for 
children from the day of their birth. Euthanasia is practised there, and newborns and 
older children alike are killed if they are sick or so unhealthy that they suffer. It is also 
intended that such practice would save the suffering of the community. The familiar 
idea that ill, suffering, poorly raised children were at danger of developing a depraved 
constitution or the tendencies that would result in deviant behaviour makes its 
appearance: ‘I could not fail’, the visitor of Erchomenon and narrator of the novel tells 
us, ‘to contrast their position with that of thousands of children in the nineteenth 
century—ill-fed, badly clothed, and worse treated, allowed to grow up without 
instruction; or, rather, trained in every criminal instinct’.151 Amongst the inhabitants 
of Mars in Percy Greg’s Across the Zodiac (1880), ill-temper and selfishness in 
children is feared to be symptomatic of hereditary taint. The ‘Martialists’ thus rely on 
the science of eugenics and apply ‘the rule to deprive of life’ any child with physical 
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deformities that are likely to render it unable to be cured ‘of the habit of indulging mere 
temper and spite before they come to be men’. However, Esme – host of the narrating 
space-traveller – states that this is a rather exceptional custom, and many like him 
actively try to ‘influence’ children’s ‘gentler dispositions’, particularly through 
education, so that the will overrides instinct.152 Even if such information assuaged the 
narrator and reader’s unease with the Martialist’s approach to matters of dealing with 
deviant tendencies and behaviour, it is also revealed that all those suffering from 
insanity, alongside those guilty of serious crimes, are put to death. 
Eugenic schemes found in anti-socialist dystopias could of course be entirely 
unconnected to crime. State regulation of marriage in Percy Clarke’s The Valley 
Council (1891), for instance, appears to have nothing to do with the prevention of 
congenital criminality: ‘If the marriage is likely to prove unhappy for the state, as by 
making public scandal, or bringing up weak children, of course the state steps in. But, 
as a rule, our physicians say who is to be married and who not, and the council takes 
their advice’.153 However, eugenics, whether portrayed as criminological method or 
not, was not that commonly used in the anti-socialist literary dystopia as a means of 
discrediting socialism. 154  Indeed, after The Valley Council, it was not until Red 
England; A Tale of the Socialist Terror, published in 1909, that we find another 
dystopian literary example of socialism leading to eugenic practices. Therein, local 
communes would appoint marriage boards of three members – one of whom had to be 
a medical man – to regulate union.155 Echoing Quintura, but conversely from a sharply 
critical angle, Red England sees the socialist state take children into its care one month 
after their birth, ‘to be brought up according to ideal scientific methods’.156 It could 
even be the case that eugenics was positively displayed in the anti-socialist dystopian 
genre. The critique of socialism in that it led to abhorrent acts of eugenics was 
somewhat turned on its head in Alex Newton’s anonymously published Posterity: Its 
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Verdicts and Its Methods; or Democracy A.D. 2100 (1897). There, socialism is 
portrayed as anathema to progress partly because it is ‘soft’ on the lowest specimens 
of society. After an ominous ‘great war’ with Germany in the twentieth century, Britain 
looked to change her approach to crime and degeneration, encouraged by three factors: 
1) the ‘tonic and bracing effect’ that war had brought to the moral substance of the 
British people; 2) that Socialism had destroyed Germany, and its people had become 
degenerate from the ‘relaxed moral tone’ of the unnatural political ideology; and 3) a 
new-found appreciation for Japan’s moral codes, founded in strict discipline.  
 
These object lessons, coinciding with the increasing influence of the 
doctrine of evolution, taught our legislators that, in order to be just to 
the social body, and more especially to the generations which will 
succeed us, we must be severe to the unfit. Consequently, the tendency 
of criminal legislation has been to draw a line in our treatment of 
offenders, below which the individual is painlessly extinguished.157 
 
The eugenic code, founded on anti-socialist sentiments, has brought about the utopian-
like existence in Britain in 2100. ‘One principal cause of our serenity and prosperity 
lies in this’, the guide insists, ‘that for many generations we have prevented the morally 
unsound and the mentally diseased from leaving progeny to trouble succeeding 
generations with their unsoundness’.158  
Eugenics as a means of dealing with criminals appears to be as common in the 
anti-socialist literary dystopia as it was in its utopian counterpart. When it came to 
painting a dystopian image of crime, criminality, and criminological methods under 
socialism, eugenics was not the go-to area. Instead, there were two contradictory 
assaults. On the one hand, a socialist existence was depicted as being rigidly ordered, 
mechanical, and artificial. This could see compassion for the individual disregarded, 
for the state and the collective were far more important, leading to inhumane practices 
and punishments. Furthermore, the artificial way of life could cause natural human 
tendencies – such as self-restraint – to disappear. On the other hand, socialism was 
portrayed as chaotic. Antithetical to the natural hierarchies that develop out of a 
competitive environment, socialism would see ‘average’ men in places of power, 
whose incompetence with dealing with social problems such as crime could reach to 
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the level of the absurd. 159  The first of these two approaches is discussed below, 
followed in turn by the second. 
Satirising socialism’s ability to deal reasonably with crime was quite a common 
stance in these dystopias, and the principle of order and the rights of the collective over 
the individual were taken to extremes. In the Hulean Empire, for instance, the idea that 
socialism would result in the complete eradication of individual rights for the sake of 
social cohesion is attacked in the tale of a man violently beaten by his spouse for 
missing a customary religious practice of worshipping wives having his claims of 
assault thrown out of court.160 The playing to the fears of female empowerment under 
socialism is also rather clear here, and is a common trope in the anti-socialist dystopias 
of this period. 1871 also saw the publication of Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s The Coming 
Race, which like the Empire of Hulee sees women elevated to levels of superiority over 
men in anti-feminist, tongue-in-cheek fashion. Whilst crime does not exist in the 
subterranean community of the Vril-ya, it is largely due to the customary and 
hereditary depletion of passion. Furthermore, the individual has been subsumed by the 
communal and, in precursory tones to George Orwell, they live by the phrase “No 
happiness without order, no order without authority, no authority without unity”.161 
The idea that a socialist society, in placing the value of the state far higher than that of 
the individual, would result in the latter’s harm is found in Clarke’s The Valley Council. 
Therein the importance of the state has greatly diminished compassion for individual 
rights and lives. Barbaric forms of capital punishment such as being tied to a stake and 
left to die in the desert await those who ‘have offended against the state’.162 Similarly, 
individuals who are convicted of a crime for the third time face death by poisonous 
suffocation. It is explained that capital punishment is preferred to prisons simply 
because ‘they would cost the state a great deal’.163 Benevolence suffers as order is 
maintained in Red England; A Tale of the Socialist Terror by a tyrannical socialist 
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government, which, ruthless in its promotion of efficiency, punishes any citizen who 
fails to perform their labour ‘as well as it can possibly be done’.164 
The prospect of a socialist state so efficiently ordered that life becomes 
mechanistic and individual impulses are deadened can be found in Walter Besant’s The 
Inner House (1888). Crime has been eradicated in the socialist City of Canterbury. 
With no property or social inequity, ‘there is no incentive to jealousy, rapine, or double-
dealing’.165 Furthermore, the social conditions had brought about a gradual deadening 
of emotions, and with the freedom from anxiety and impassioned impulses individuals 
do not commit that class of crimes that fly out of love and rage alike.166 But it is 
undoubtedly dystopian in tone – and whilst crimes have been eradicated, it has come 
at too great a cost to natural human tendencies and individual freedoms. Similar to 
Besant’s dystopia, W. Graham Moffat and John White’s What’s the World Coming 
To? A Novel of the Twenty-First Century (1893) sees a socialist society virtually crime-
free due to its perfect and equitable structures. However, the satire is clear, and the 
eradication of crime would strike the reader as coming at a high price. Miss Preston, a 
psychic employed by the state for crime detection, boasts that the population’s 
emotions are largely held in check by the state, and it is only jealous love that can be a 
cause of crime: ‘[L]ove is the only passion left that is uncontrolled by legislation. Yet 
there is a cure even for love in these days’.167 Socialism has almost entirely eradicated 
individual feelings and willpower in Horace Newte’s 1907 dystopia, The Master Beast: 
Being a True Account of the Ruthless Tyranny Inflicted on the British People by 
Socialism, A.D. 1888-2020. After children were taken by the state, the ability to love 
was also removed, and men’s interests in life have gone since they cannot take pleasure 
in work of their own enterprise. As such, they have become ‘soulless automatons’ 
without the faculties to restrain ‘outbursts of animalism’.168 
Another line of attack posited that socialism’s promise of equality would 
reduce the social collective’s aptitude. Criminal law under socialism is satirised in 
Charles Fairfield’s The Socialist Revolution of 1888 (1884), and the law against ‘the 
misuse of natural gifts’ ensures that all act according to the lowest common 
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denominator – the idea that mediocrity would accompany universal equality.169 A 
similar criminal code was presented in Thomas Bertha’s ‘A Vision of Communism’ 
(1873), where a visitor to a communist world ends up in court for believing in the 
notion of betterment and honouring natural aptitude.170 Lastly, satirical blows could be 
made against socialism’s claims to science and reason. Law courts are mocked in 
Backwards and Forwards (1905), and in a clear indictment of the idea that socialism 
is a scientific doctrine belonging to a professional class of intelligentsia, the 
protagonist, on trial for scowling, witnesses medical experts incessantly squabble over 
authority and judges preside with conceited superiority, who go so far as accusing a 
man of insulting the universe.171 The satire may be distinguished by its rhetorical 
method, but the message is the same as that made by many anti-socialists of the period. 
Indeed, the common critique which loosely holds all of these anti-socialist dystopias 
together is the idea that socialism would lead to despotic rule. This built on existing 
fears of the period, such as those that were appealed to in G. E. Raine’s and P. C. 
Elgee’s 1908 anti-socialist Conservative Party handbook. Therein the authors use a 
number of authorities to highlight a reasonable and widespread concern over the extent 
of power a socialist state would hold over the individual. They attack socialism with 
the argument that, although socialists proclaim equality of all, a group of professional 
elites would inevitably rise to despotic governance, and society would be split into two 
classes of those who rule and those who serve.172  
 On the other side of the coin, the anti-socialist literary utopia could also depict 
socialism as chaos, with the state’s zeal for equality and freedom resulting in hedonism 
and philistinism. Henry Crocker Marriott Watson, who we have previously 
encountered with his Erchomenon, wrote another anti-socialist dystopia in 1890 called 
The Decline and Fall of the British Empire; or, The Witch’s Cavern. Therein, socialism 
is rashly adopted by a population panicking over severe climatic change. The socialist 
society sees moral values and traditional institutions quickly vanish: 
 
Laxity of morals followed. Women, even publicly, strove to break down 
the barriers with which the wisdom of ages had protected the sanctity 
of the marriage relation, and to sweep away, as far as might be, the 
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distinctions of sex. All the foundations wore out of course. Grinding 
poverty urged men to demand change, for change’s sake, in hope that 
something to the advantage of the poverty-stricken might turn up. 
Lawlessness was organised into a creed.173 
 
In Newte’s The Master Beast we are told that ‘Socialism has unhappily removed 
women's safeguards and inducements to morality, with the result that as a whole (of 
course, there are exceptions) the sex run morally amok’.174 One should recall that 
Newte depicted men as being afflicted by socialism in that it turned them into 
automatons, mere ‘cog[s] in a machine’. Lacking the willpower that men were 
otherwise presumed to hold, occasional outbursts of emotion could not be restrained.175 
The sexist Victorian hypocrisy should be clear. Socialism simultaneously endangered 
the social system by eradicating a man’s emotional faculties – of which he is presumed 
to have control – and by allowing those of a woman to develop unrestrained, which 
would lead to her debauchery. Frances Everett’s anti-socialist dystopia John Bull, 
Socialist (1909) includes throughout satirical references of well-known socialist texts, 
such as August Bebel’s (1840-1913) Woman in the Past, Present, and Future (1893), 
Robert Blatchford’s (1851-1943) Merrie England (1893), and Karl Kautsky’s (1854-
1938) On the Morrow of the Social Revolution (1903). Sexual relations come under 
tension now that women are ‘free as the wind’176 and, with references made to Ethel 
Snowden’s (1880-1931) The Woman Socialist (1907), such freedom for women leads 
to a jealous affair of love resulting in a planned murder of vengeance and ultimately 
mania and suicide.177 Alfred Morris’ explicit attack on Bellamy provides a dystopian 
image of socialist life in Looking Ahead! A Tale of Adventure (1892). A small 
community is founded after a shipwreck and directed along socialist lines, which is 
shown to be rather chaotic, inconsistent, and absurd. After a murder resulting out of 
jealousy occurs, it is first deemed that the killer ‘had committed no legal offence’. 
However, when it was agreed that it could be seen as immoral by other standards, a 
tribunal is set up. It descends into absurdity, with the woman to whom the murderer’s 
love is directed accused of being guilty for not returning it. He is subsequently found 
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not guilty, and the society begins to fall apart. 178 An absurd society is depicted in 
Ernest Bramah Smith’s What Might Have Been: The Story of a Social War (1907), 
where after socialism and universal suffrage had been introduced ‘the power of the 
pauper criminal was no less than that of the ducal millionaire, and the alcohol lunatic, 
presenting himself at the poll between the spasms of delirium tremens, was as potent a 
force as the philosopher’.179 
The 1880s and 1890s also saw the growing presence of anarchist ideas in 
British sociopolitical discourse, accompanied by a fear of anarchist terrorism after a 
wave of political assassinations and public violence. Even Morris, sympathetic to some 
anarchist ideals and largely supporting, at least initially, its involvement in the Socialist 
League, lambasted ‘the principles of anarchism’ which can resort to ‘promiscuous 
slaughter’ as a means of propaganda.180 Rather than seeing a number of groups or 
individuals use violence in their propaganda by deed, Morris saw the very principles 
of anarchism as terroristic. Similar to how ‘socialism’ was considered, pejoratively or 
not, as synonymous with ‘utopianism’, by the closing decade of the nineteenth century 
‘anarchism’ was interchangeable with ‘terrorism’. Unsurprisingly, the close 
relationship between crime and anarchism was found in the literary dystopian form. 
An anarchist uprising is depicted in Edward Douglas Fawcett, Hartmann the 
Anarchist; or, the Doom of a Great City (1893), and the revolutionaries are portrayed 
as bestial, lacking control of their emotions, ‘marauders with their vilest passions 
unchained’. Mob violence takes over the political act of the siege, and men – 
revolutionaries or not – are seen terrorising women, robbing, and murdering.181 It is 
questioned if the anarchist revolutionaries might be constitutionally criminal, ‘morally 
rotten’, each fitting a criminal ‘type’.182 Hartmann, the leader, is himself described in 
                                                 
178  Alfred Morris, Looking Ahead! A Tale of Adventure (London: Henry & Co., [1892]), pp. 150-158. 
179  Ernest Bramah [Smith], What Might Have Been: The Story of a Social War (London: John Murray, 
1907), p. 75. Republished as The Secret of the League; The Story of the Social War (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1909). 
180  William Morris to James Tochatti, Hammersmith, December 12 1893 in The Collected Letters of 
William Morris, Volume IV: 1893-1896, ed. by Norman Kelvin (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p. 113. 
181  E[dward]. Douglas Fawcett, Hartmann the Anarchist; or, the Doom of a Great City (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1893), pp. 173-4. First published periodically in The English Illustrated Magazine 
(June-September, 1893). 
182  Ibid., p. 82. 
60 
 
such terminology, with ‘a forehead physiognomists would have envied’.183 It is such 
criminal passions that bring the end of the anarchist’s coup – Hartmann is overcome 
with a frenzied madness as he learns of his involvement in his mother’s death, and 
commits suicide, blowing up his airship with him and his crew on board. Hume 
Nisbet’s The Great Secret. A Tale of To-Morrow (1895) treats anarchists similarly. Dr. 
Fernandez, trying to create an anarchist colony, is presented as a mad scientist: 
 
He was an enthusiast and poet in the art of murder and destruction. To 
be able to annihilate Europe—nay, the entire globe—with a single 
touch, leaving his own sympathisers unhurt as spectators, would be an 
achievement worthy of his brain if accomplished at the precise instant 
of his calculations.184 
 
After their many failures, the remaining anarchists are found at the end of the story as 
having abandoned their ideals of free, communal bliss, and have descended into 
savagery, sexual lust, and cannibalism.185 
 
Crime was a significant theme in the literary socialist utopias of late nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Britain. Simultaneously projecting moralised socialist spaces 
and inhabitants whilst critiquing the immoral societies in which they were composed, 
they continued the genre’s historical trend of speculating the methods by which the 
problem of crime and criminality could be solved. Generally following the approaches 
seen in More’s imagined society, these utopias emphasised how crime was 
ineradicably tied to the inequitable systems of property and wages. Such causes, 
however, were often framed by the newly emergent sociobiological theories of 
criminology. The abolition of capitalism, along with the diseased environments it 
created, is shown to cure the physiological afflictions that such a system had caused, 
remedying the debauched and degenerated moral and mental faculties of individuals 
that had once made them criminal. Yet with such vast moral improvement, immoral 
behaviour in utopia was a cause for serious concern. Those that continued to threaten 
society with their anti-social conduct – a category that would be extended to mere 
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idleness and disease – could not be excused as products of poor environments. Whilst 
this could, as in Thomson’s A Prospectus of Socialism, result in more humane attempts 
to reform the ‘natural failing’ of the criminal, solving the problem of crime would 
commonly be a matter, to use the phrase found in A Thousand Years Hence, of the 
‘extirpatory method’. Removing the criminal for the protection of the community and 
the state would be accomplished through indeterminate detention, exile, and death, and 
eugenic schemes would sometimes be employed to protect future generations from 
congenital criminality.  
 Eugenic schemes as a measure against the criminal are also found in the direct 
or satirical critiques in the anti-socialist dystopia, but attacks on socialism in this genre 
were more commonly found to follow two opposing lines. Socialism would largely 
lead to chaotic and inadequate attempts to tackle crime, seen in confused judicial 
systems or disordered social institutions that encouraged the free reign of immoral 
tendencies. Alternatively, it would create strict and authoritarian societies, wherein the 
rights of the collective or the state would lead to the excessive criminalisation of 
individuality or the diminution of one’s will, resulting in the inability to subdue any 
anti-social feelings. Such assaults were indicative of contemporary criticism of socialist 
politics as a whole. Indeed, they are found within the camp of socialism itself. The 
advocates of state socialism would censure anarchists on the grounds of chaos and 
disorder, whilst anarchists would return such opprobrium with the claim that any state-
system would lead to despotic rule.  
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Chapter Two: H. G. Wells 
 
Humanity has set out in the direction of a more complex and exacting 
organization, and until, by a foresight to me at least inconceivable, it 
can prevent the birth of just all the inadaptable, useless, or merely 
unnecessary creatures in each generation, there must needs continue to 
be, in greater or less amount, this individually futile struggle beneath 
the feet of the race; somewhere and in some form there must still persist 
those essentials that now take shape as the slum, the prison, and the 
asylum.186 
 
H. G. Wells, ‘Anticipations. III.—Developing Social Elements’ (1901) 
 
 
No other text by Wells has incited fiercer criticism – criticism that has continued from 
the time of publication to the present day – than has Anticipations, his infamous inquiry 
into humankind’s social and political conduct. Within this work was the detailed 
topography of the ‘New Republic’, Wells’ imagined state-system of the future. It is on 
his treatment of such contentious matters of social reform as the question of population 
growth, the reach of the state, and individual freedoms that Wells has, in the main, been 
questioned; his advocacy of eugenic policies and social engineering the primary 
accusations of his interrogators. Criticism which falls within this domain ranges from 
discontented contemporary opinion that Wells had not apportioned enough blame on 
women in matters of ‘unqualified’ childbirth187 to tenuous connections made in recent 
years between Wells and ‘the Hitlers, Stalins and other evil-doers’ in human history.188 
Though there can be found some serious shortcomings in both the original and recent 
charges made against these texts, many of the immediate objections – to which Wells 
was quick to reproach as misreadings – displayed contemporary concerns surrounding 
sociobiological questions on matters such as childbirth, the urban poor, and crime. For 
as Wells wrote a history for his predicted future state and society, his prophetic state-
cartography included the identification, punishment, and rehabilitation of the criminal. 
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 Mankind in the Making and A Modern Utopia have been interpreted as Wells’ 
attempts to move away from some of the positions expressed in Anticipations.189 
Though there are clear differences between the texts, which will not be ignored, I will 
emphasise specific areas of consistency on the matters of crime and anti-social 
behaviour. In particular, Wells was continually troubled by determinist theories, which 
would unsettle his support for eugenic intervention to remove the criminal threat of 
society’s ‘undesirables’. His approach was to emphasise the complexity of criminal 
causation whereby one falls victim to a combination of biological and environmental 
forces. Such a view, straddling the biological explanation of crime proffered by 
Lombroso and his followers and the sociological one presented by Lacassagne and the 
‘social milieu’ school, dismissed monocausal determinist ideas on crime in favour of 
those which stressed the elastic notions of tendency and predisposition: the criminal, 
like any individual, was moulded by both his biology and his environment in tandem. 
This position, also occupied in varying degrees and ways by Ellis, Kropotkin and 
Carpenter, allowed Wells to answer questions on crime by both proposing pragmatic 
sociopolitical reform, such as in the areas of child care and rehabilitation for young 
offenders, as well as speculating on new biological theories that constructed the object 
of the criminally predisposed body and professed its cure. Such a malleable approach 
would expectedly lead some – contemporaries and historians alike – to misinterpret his 
ideas. 
 This tension in Wells’ criminological discourse, between the biological and the 
social, which forms much of his stance towards crime and criminality, has been touched 
upon, albeit from a slightly different angle, by Frank McConnell, as he considers Wells’ 
dilemma, evident in his science fiction, with the dichotomy of Darwinism and 
individual willpower, presenting the concerns within the context of Victorian and 
Edwardian uncertainties of the modern condition.190 John Partington’s recent work on 
Wells’ statecraft, Building Cosmopolis: The Political Thought of H. G. Wells (2003), 
has provided a fresh approach to the relatively neglected area of the novelist’s 
sociopolitical thought considered in its global historical context, much needed since W. 
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Warren Wagar’s 1961 publication H. G. Wells and the World State.191 Partington’s 
views on Wells’ aforementioned trilogy will be scrutinised in this chapter, particularly 
his reading whereby Wells hurriedly revised his positions made in Anticipations after 
receiving a barrage of negative criticism. Richard Nate’s 2009 paper ‘Discoveries of 
the Future’ is an apt examination of Wells’ varying approaches to the question of 
eugenics, but by placing Wells into an intellectual culture that ‘favoured heredity above 
the environment as the shaping force of man’s identity’ the author, at times, reduces 
Wells’ commitments to reforming social institutions and practices as secondary to his 
belief in the normative function of the natural sciences.192 Whilst Justin Busch (2009) 
has provided a thorough exposition into Wells’ varied philosophical roots, he treats 
him as possessing a single, coherent oeuvre, which leads to Wells’ writing not being 
sufficiently situated within particular historical settings.193 An excellent example of 
scrutinising his thought as it developed through time is found in Robert M. Philmus 
and David Y. Hughes’ (1975) edited collection of Wells’ scientific articles, reviews 
and fictions of the 1880s and 1890s.194 
 
 
Crime and the criminal in Wells’ Fortnightly Review trilogy and early 
sociobiological thought 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Wells took a slight deviation away from his 
scientific romances and journalism in sociobiology to consider what changes awaited 
the world over one hundred years thenceforth. The writing of Anticipations. An 
Experiment in Prophecy began in 1900 and the text was completed in the second half 
of 1901. Publication commenced before completion of the text, and beginning in April 
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1901 chapters were printed in the Fortnightly Review in monthly instalments until the 
series’ conclusion in December.195 Opening with somewhat conservative forecasts of 
the twentieth century, Wells discussed in April the emerging technologies in travel and 
in May the newly mobile populations’ redistribution and city growth. 196  In June, 
however, Wells repositioned his focus from the changing structures of the physical 
world to the imagined infrastructural contours of the coming society. His categories of 
the social classes of the future reveal how he categorised the social classes of his 
present, and society was divided into four sections, comprised of the irresponsible 
property owners, the inefficient urban poor, the growing body of more or less 
productive workers (epitomised by the educator and engineer), and the body of non-
productive workers (such as the broker and the agent). Showing disdain for all but the 
productive class – that to which he belonged – Wells was particularly dismissive of the 
poor, describing this segment of society as being largely comprised of individuals who 
are ‘criminal, immoral, parasitic’, and essentially commenced an attack on those he 
deemed unsuitable or too unfit to be part of humankind’s development; an attack which 
was to continue throughout the Fortnightly Review trilogy. 197  He assigned to the 
members of this group a number of defining characteristics which emphasise their 
accountability and futility: their enrolment to the class is caused by their recklessness, 
weakness, and failure, and they are considered ‘inadaptable, useless, or merely 
unnecessary’. Wells continued his deprecatory trinity as he allocated their deserved 
surroundings in the slums, prisons, and asylums, insisting that the urban poor, the 
criminal, and the madman were largely synonymous.198 
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 Before Wells set out how these ‘People of the Abyss’, as he named them, would 
be dealt with by the future state, he addressed what he considered to be the current ill-
informed panic over the supposedly swelling ranks of the unfit: 
 
Since this class was not apparent in masses in the relatively static, 
relatively less eliminatory, society of former times, its appearance has 
given rise to a belief that the least desirable section of the community 
has become unprecedentedly prolific, that there is now going on a 
“Rapid Multiplication of the Unfit.” But sooner or later, as every East 
End doctor knows, the ways of the social abyss lead to death, the 
premature death of the individual, or death through the death or 
infertility of the individual's stunted offspring, or death through that 
extinction which moral perversion involves. It is a recruited class, not a 
breeding multitude.199 
 
Through the laws of natural selection, as Wells saw it, those men and women who fell 
behind the physiologically, mentally, and socially ‘fitter’ members of the species 
tended towards extinction. Even the shelter of the modern welfare state or the hand of 
charity was not enough to prevent the viciousness of the evolutionary process, for 
‘[w]hatever expedients may be resorted to, to mitigate or conceal the essential nature 
of this social element, it remains in its essence wherever social progress is being made, 
the contingent of death’.200 As is later shown to be a consistently held position of Wells, 
before the time came when society could intervene on the side of nature with the 
authority of scientific truth on its side, biological evolution alone would decide the fate 
of individuals. As such, the distinct gap between the failures and the successes of 
society would remain, undesirables would continue to be ‘renewed’ just as they would 
continue to perish, and the ascendant classes would have to proclaim that ‘there must 
needs continue to be, in greater or less amount, this individually futile struggle beneath 
the feet of the race’.201 
 The following four monthly chapters respectively concerned social relations, 
the demise of inadequate democracy, war, and the homogenisation of languages.202 
‘The Larger Synthesis’, the penultimate chapter printed in November, closed with 
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Wells’ revision of Plato’s utopian state-system as he introduced the New Republic, the 
future society which would be governed by scientific law and bound by an ethical order 
espousing broadly socialist principles.203 The score of these codes was to conclude the 
series, and within ‘The Faith, Morals, and Public Policy of the New Republic’ Wells 
allocated considerable space to the identification, punishment, and rehabilitation of 
those who would be classified by the newly-ascendant society as ‘criminal’.204 
 Wells began the article with an epigraph, citing Scottish physician George 
Archdall Reid (1860-1929): ‘If we do it not quickly and with mercy, Nature will do it 
slowly and with infinite cruelty’.205 This quote is to be found in Alcoholism: A Study 
of Heredity (1901), wherein Reid advocated, in opposition to the British temperance 
movement’s proposed reforms, the prohibition of procreation for alcoholics.206 Wells 
had recently discussed this text in a review printed in The Morning Post, and he went 
on to explore Reid’s views more thoroughly in Mankind in the Making the following 
year.207 Both critiques, and their significance, will be addressed later in this chapter. 
The epigraph, however, introduced Wells’ assertion that the New Republicans of the 
future, in possession of irrefutable scientific evidence, would undoubtedly use such 
knowledge to aid the ‘natural’ order of existence, and reduce the suffering it wrought. 
For, unlike their predecessors, whose incomplete, ‘experimental’ science forced them 
to leave many matters to follow an unimpeded course, they would use artificial 
selection in concert with natural selection so as to abate unnecessary misery of those 
undeniably destined for a torturous existence and death. As will be shown in this 
chapter, Wells would maintain such a position throughout the trilogy. The New 
Republicans would not be swayed by the eschatological determinations of right and 
wrong, but would know themselves to be free-willed and morally responsible for 
upholding the world-state’s ethical system, a system which would ‘favour the 
procreation of what is fine and efficient and beautiful in humanity’ and ‘check the 
procreation of base and servile types, of fear-driven and cowardly souls, of all that is 
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mean and ugly and bestial in the souls, bodies, or habits of men’.208 Their reconstructed 
code would be largely based on the theory and practice of negative eugenics, 
criminalising the conception of children who, as proven by the new science of 
biological inheritance, would suffer from physical or mental disease. The members of 
the New Republic would consider capital punishment as the appropriate measure 
against those who positively ensured their children’s lives would be wrecked with 
disease or disorder; individuals whose insanity was indisputably inheritable, Reid’s 
habitual drunkards, and those with transmissible diseases, would all be prohibited from 
parentage.209 Accordingly, the suicide of such individuals would cease to be regarded 
as a criminal act, but seen as a dutifully courageous one, whilst the pleas of insanity 
would not excuse criminals but enhance their guilt.210 But punishment in the New 
Republic would not result in bodily pain, unless the crime was violent conduct, 
particularly that perpetrated by men against women and children. The suffering 
afflicted in ‘deterrent punishments’ would be ‘good scientifically caused pain’ leaving 
‘nothing but a memory’ and the death penalty would be delivered by the opiate.211 The 
system of punishment in general – incarcerative, corporal, or mental – would in fact be 
disfavoured by the New Republicans, as those positioned to mete out such cruelties – 
the prison officials and asylum nurses – would become demoralised, their good natures 
debased.212 
 Anticipations was a commercial and critical success, and Wells finally found 
himself firmly situated amongst the scientists and ‘thinking men’ of the literary world, 
cementing his new position by presenting scientific ideas of the future to his intellectual 
peers at the Royal Institution’s Friday Evening Discourse of January 1902. 213 
Understandably, Wells continued with his new social-scientific programme of 
futurology. After cataloguing a ‘future with a history’ in Anticipations, Wells embarked 
on a new series of work to postulate how society could begin its path to the New 
Republic – by and large, observing his prophetic system by expressing contemporary 
problems through the lens of immediately-possible reform. Mankind in the Making, 
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again printed in the Fortnightly Review over the course of a year starting in September 
1902, outlined the achievable educational, cultural, and sociopolitical reorganisation of 
the state, the necessary reforms for humankind’s transition to the future. 
 Discussion of crime and the criminal is first taken up in the second instalment, 
printed in October. In this article, subtitled ‘The Problem of the Birth Supply’, Wells 
provided a critique of Francis Galton (1822-1911) and Victoria Woodhull Martin’s 
(1838-1927) advocacy of selective breeding.214 Although he clearly considered their 
eugenic principles to be the ideal approach to creating the utopia of the New Republic, 
Wells reiterated the point he made in Anticipations that without indisputable scientific 
evidence there could begin no such programme, for ‘one is immediately confronted by 
almost as complex an entanglement of difficulties in defining points to breed out as one 
is by defining points to breed for’.215 He made it clear, however, that he was more 
inclined to think that the prevention of procreation for some individuals possessing 
undesirable traits was, of the two options, far more likely to become a possibility in 
light of contemporary scientific understanding.216 Nonetheless, following what reads 
as a working-through of his ideas, Wells concluded that, despite the fine work of British 
scientists, such as that of Ellis, research into heredity must continue before a 
programme of selective procreation could be adopted. The particular conditions he 
considered (and subsequently dismissed) as the possible reasons for preventing 
parentage should come as no surprise: those whose criminality, alcoholism, or insanity 
might be transmissible to their offspring. 
 First discarding the ‘stupidity’ of Lombroso’s born criminal, Wells made it 
clear that ‘criminality’ is a condition too complex to prohibit parentage, and John 
Bradford’s (1510-1555) famous acknowledgement to the position of the criminal – 
‘There, but for the grace of God, go I’ – could still be uttered in modern society.217 
Although Wells does determine that ‘certain criminal (or at any rate disastrous) 
tendencies’ are possibly inheritable – alcoholism and insanity – he is again resigned to 
concede, after engaging with Reid’s hereditary drunkard and, more dismissively, 
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Nordau’s madman, that knowledge in these matters was not yet sound.218 The closest 
Wells got to supporting an active programme of criminalising parentage is with regard 
to hereditary disease: 
 
If in any case we are in a position to intervene and definitely forbid 
increase, it is in the case of certain specific diseases, which I am told are 
painful and disastrous and inevitably transmitted to the offspring of the 
person suffering from these diseases. If there are such diseases – and 
that is a question the medical profession should be able to decide – it is 
evident that to incur parentage while one suffers from one of them or to 
transmit them in any avoidable way, is a cruel, disastrous and 
abominable act. If such a thing is possible it seems to me that in view of 
the guiding principle laid down in these papers it might well be put at 
the nadir of crime, and I doubt if any step the State might take to deter 
and punish the offender, short of torture, would meet with opposition 
from sane and reasonable men.219 
 
Taking these comments as they are, such hopes are not to be seen in the light of negative 
eugenics, but that of euthanasia. Clearly finding the conception of an assuredly-
diseased child detestable, Wells admitted that he would follow any statement made by 
the medical profession on such matters.220 However, lamented once again are the limits 
of contemporary scientific knowledge, and Wells sullenly concluded his article: ‘For 
the rest of these papers we shall take the births into the world, for the most part, as we 
find them’.221 
 Wells’ following instalment, then, concerned the matter of child welfare, and 
he details the lengths to which the state could possibly start to ensure responsible 
parenting, and to criminalise neglect. This would, Wells hoped, not only protect the 
child who was born to the unfit parent, but could also deter those from parentage 
altogether.222 His proposals for the punishment of those who failed to provide for their 
children up to their teenage years adequate clothing, food, education and care extended 
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those found in the 1889 Prevention of Cruelty Act. The child would be cared for by the 
state until a teenager, during which time the parents would be made to make 
maintenance payments. Those unable to uphold their payments would be placed in 
‘celibate labour establishments’ until their debts were repaid through work. Wells made 
a final point by stipulating that such laws would most suitably target the recklessness 
of the habitual drunkard.223 Although Wells’ punitive guidelines regarding parentage 
were strict, he also maintained that the state was similarly responsible for providing 
better care to its citizens, for better socioeconomic conditions would improve social 
conduct, and a national minimum wage would reduce the extent of child neglect. Such 
welfare proposals had a darker side to them, however, and Wells made it clear that once 
economic conditions were raised, those who remained out of work would merely serve 
to prove what he believed to be true: that their unemployment was due to their ‘real 
incapacity in character, strength, or intelligence for efficient citizenship’.224 This line 
of thinking is reminiscent of that found in Hayes’ The Great Revolution of 1905, as 
discussed in Chapter One, whereby a sociological criminology posits that if crime is 
largely determined by unemployment and poverty, the alleviation of such social ills 
would leave no justification for subsequent offending. For Wells, as with Hayes, 
guaranteeing the social well-being of citizens would leave no excuse for those who 
remained in the ‘Abyss’, and the state’s punitive measures – in Wells’ case that of 
prohibited procreation and forced labour – would be undeniably warranted. 
 Concluding the Fortnightly Review trilogy, Wells returns to his novel writing. 
Although A Modern Utopia, printed monthly from October 1904 to April 1905, was, 
like its two predecessors, an attempt in reconstructing the ethical system of the present, 
the fictional narrative arguably provided Wells more space for experiment, and the state 
cartography was sketched through the observations and discussion of the two 
protagonists, the Owner of the Voice and his companion the botanist. In the second 
paper of the series, ‘Concerning Freedoms’, Wells introduced the reader to the matters 
of crime in Utopia by returning, once again, to the ‘Drink Question’. The Owner of the 
Voice describes how strict licensing laws help maintain order, and excessive public 
drunkenness would be, he ominously states, ‘dealt with in some very drastic 
                                                 
223  Ibid., p. 1091. 
224  Ibid., p. 1095. 
 73 
manner’. 225  Just as Wells anticipated that the New Republicans would find an 
individual’s insanity to exaggerate rather than diminish guilt, drunkenness in Utopia is 
treated in the same way.226 In this discussion of alcohol and public order, Wells briefly 
repeats his concern – introduced in Anticipations – of the uncertain psychological 
effects endured by judicial officers, which, as it comes to light in the ninth chapter, 
happens to be the area of study of the Owner of the Voice’s double.227  
 Describing the ‘failures’ of Utopia in the fifth instalment, Wells again grouped 
together the criminal, the insane, the drunk, and the congenitally diseased, and 
continued to pour scorn on the ‘useless’ idiot, the homeless and the unemployed. As 
Wells warned in Mankind in the Making, there would be no excuse for this second 
group of individuals in Utopia once the state had vastly improved socioeconomic 
conditions. They would be provided work that was ‘toilsome, but not cruel or 
incapacitating’, and whilst in such service they would, like the criminals of Wells’ two 
preceding texts, remain childless. But for the first group of individuals, the state of 
Utopia would be compelled to act more forcefully. The words ring with familiarity: 
 
So soon as there can be no doubt of the disease or baseness of the 
individual, so soon as the insanity or other disease is assured, or the 
crime repeated a third time, or the drunkenness or misdemeanour past 
its seventh occasion (let us say), so soon must he or she pass out of the 
common ways of men.228  
 
As mentioned above, Wells’ fictional narrative provided more space for experiment. It 
certainly provided a vast amount of geographical space which Wells utilised in his 
treatment of these criminals. The world-state of A Modern Utopia would not resort to 
killing these individuals (again referenced are the psychologically-debasing effects on 
those officials implementing such powers), although the sparing of life would not be 
granted to all, and it is resolutely predicated that ‘Utopia will kill all deformed and 
monstrous and evilly diseased births’.229 It is not clarified as to whether such killing 
would be part of a eugenic programme or merely as ‘benevolent’ euthanasia.  Showing 
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itself to be merciful to the criminal, however, the state would attempt to rehabilitate the 
first-time and young offenders in ‘disciplinary schools’, clearly inspired by the modern 
Borstal and American State Reformatory institutions.230 But for the more hardened 
criminal, the state would insist upon expulsion, and islands – places of celibacy, of 
course – would become their permanent domicile, wherein the criminal could enjoy 
‘just as full a liberty as they can have’.231 These islands of segregation were not the 
only new addition to Wells’ criminological discourse. A global index of fingerprints or 
other physical characteristics, modelled upon the work of Galton and Alphonse 
Bertillon, would include criminal convictions and ‘legally important diseases’, and be 
used for individuals’ identification and analysis (regarding questions, for instance, of 
spouse suitability).232  
 
 
Continuity and discontinuity in Wells’ writing on crime and punishment 
 
Before placing these views on crime amongst those found in other texts of both Wells 
and his contemporaries, and situating them in their cultural and historical settings, some 
discussion of John Partington’s treatment of the Fortnightly Review trilogy is 
necessary. Partington’s 2003 study Building Cosmopolis: The Political Thought of H. 
G. Wells, along with his quite staggeringly voluminous output of other texts on the 
author, has secured his position as one of the leading Wellsian scholars, and perhaps 
the leading when it comes to Wells’ sociopolitical outlook. In his portrayal of the three 
texts in question, Partington finds a clear revision of Wells’ views that took place after 
the publication of Anticipations, a stance which runs contrary to the contention found 
in this chapter.233 Though he does not deal solely with those views of Wells concerning 
crime, the subject matter he scrutinises is largely the same as that covered here. 
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Partington’s argument is twofold. First, he provides his own reading of the texts, 
finding dissimilarity in Wells’ treatment of the individual in Anticipations compared to 
that in Mankind in the Making and A Modern Utopia; such an interpretation clearly 
conflicts with the one articulated in this chapter, which follows this section on 
Partington. Second, he contends that Wells was forced to revise the assumed positions 
in Anticipations after he had ‘received a barrage of negative criticism in mainstream 
and specialist journals as well as from his personal associates’.234 Partington provides 
the following sources as examples of such criticism, his reading of which appears to be 
somewhat faulty. The sources are hereby treated in the same order as that selected by 
Partington.  
 The anonymous Daily Telegraph critic, reviewing Anticipations on 14 
November 1901, did indeed write ‘disapprovingly’, but also with considerable 
applause, stating admiration for ‘the scathing, biting satire which Mr. Wells uses with 
magnificent effect; the brilliant suggestiveness and fertility of his ideas; the closeness 
of his reasoning, and the audacity of his imaginings’.235 Partington’s use of J. E. Hodder 
Williams’ quote ‘it irritates, it exasperates, it offends’ from his review in The Bookman 
(1901) is somewhat contextually misplaced when the comment is clearly aimed at 
Wells’ derogatory descriptions of educationalists, soldiers, and publishers, the defence 
of whom takes up the majority of the reviewer’s critique.236 Hodder Williams did not 
specifically comment on Wells’ ‘murderous’ policies, as Partington terms them, only 
mentioning at the close of the review that there is ‘neither space nor inclination for a 
discussion of Mr. Wells’s anticipations of the religion and morals of the future’ and he 
is clearly uncomfortable with the author’s portrayal of the ‘new man’, finding him 
alien; ‘nothing more than a machine, with steel springs for a heart’.237 Though this can 
be typified as ‘negative criticism’ it does not appear robust enough – nor specifically 
directed at the eugenic principles espoused by the New Republicans – to imagine it 
being the cause of a reassessment by Wells of his ideas as suggested by Partington. But 
more damaging to his argument are the three examples which he suggests are ‘more 
significant’ in bringing about Wells’ ‘volte-face’. First, Partington uses a critical letter 
Wells received from his friend, the author Joseph Conrad (1857-1924), wherein cutting 
                                                 
234  Partington, Building Cosmopolis, p. 52. 
235  [Anonymous], ‘Anticipations’, Daily Telegraph (14 Nov. 1901), p. 11. 
236  J. E. Hodder Williams, ‘Provocations by H. G. Wells’, The Bookman (Dec. 1901), 91-92 (p. 91). 
237  Ibid., p. 92. 
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remarks are aimed towards, it is assumed, Anticipations. Partington considers the letter 
to be written in 1901 and not, as the early biographer and friend of Conrad Jean-
Frédéric-Emile Aubry asserted, 1904.238 However, the dating of this letter had been 
revised in 1985 by the late Conrad expert Martin Ray, who showed beyond reasonable 
doubt that it was written in late September 1903 and, in fact, concerns Mankind in the 
Making.239 Furthermore, in the fourth edition of Anticipations published in 1902, Wells 
added a note to the end of the first chapter, whereby he mentions the high-speed 
transport suggestions of ‘my friend Mr. Joseph Conrad’.240 He makes no revision of 
the text, nor does he mention any such suggestion or criticism from Conrad, in this 
edition’s final chapter. Secondly, Partington’s use of the Webb’s’ criticism of Wells’ 
Anticipations is somewhat undermined both by Sidney Webb’s naming of it in The 
Academy at the close of 1901 as one of his two favourite books of the year241 and, in 
the same month, Beatrice Webb’s diary entry where she describes it as ‘[t]he most 
remarkable book of the year: a powerful imagination finished with the data and 
methods of physical science, working on social problems’. Her criticism is not, as 
Partington suggests, a sympathetic, humanitarian defence of the poorer strata of 
society, but instead assumes an ideological critique based on organisation, whereby she 
contends that Wells’ understanding of a well-functioning social collective and the 
‘machinery of government’ is maligned by his disregard for manual and administrative 
workers.242 In 1914, reflecting on the first edition of Anticipations, Wells reiterates this 
as the reason for their antagonism: 
 
Their essential criticism of Anticipations was that it did not sufficiently 
recognize the need and probability of a specialized governing class, and 
they expounded to my instinctively shrinking intelligence that 
conception of a great bureaucracy which it has been their life-work to 
convey to the English intelligence.243 
                                                 
238  Joseph Conrad to H. G. Wells, Pent Farm, [1904] in Joseph Conrad: Life & Letters, 1, ed. by G. 
Jean-Aubry (London: Heinemann, 1927), pp. 328-9. Jean-Frédéric-Emile often used the aliases of 
Georges Jean-Aubry or Gérard Jean-Aubry. Partington appears to accept Norman and Jeanne 
MacKenzie’s revision of Aubry’s dating. See Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, The Time Traveller. 
The Life of H. G. Wells (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), n. 7, p. 455. 
239  Martin S. Ray, ‘Conrad to Wells: An Undated Letter’, English Language Notes, 23 (1985), 48-61. 
240  H. G. Wells, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress Upon Human 
Life and Thought, fourth ed. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1902) p. 32. 
241  Anticipations was listed three times in total, with Edmund Gosse and Clarence Rook both echoing 
Sidney Webb’s appreciation. ‘Favourite Books of 1901’, The Academy, 61, 1544 (1901), 567-569. 
242  Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership, ed. Barbara Drake and Margaret I. Cole (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1948), p. 226 
243  Wells, Anticipations of the Reaction of Mechanical and Scientific Progress Upon Human Life and 
Thought, eighth ed. (London: Chapman & Hall, 1914), p. vii. 
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The last example Partington uses in arguing that criticism of Anticipations led to a 
revision of Wells’ ideas which were expressed in Mankind in the Making and A Modern 
Utopia is Frederick Webb Headley’s review of the first book of the trilogy. 
Problematically, the article was printed on 29 December 1904, during the time A 
Modern Utopia was being published in the Fortnightly Review. Though this review 
predates the printing of Wells’ discussion of punishing ‘failure’ in Utopia, a chapter 
which Partington uses as the exemplar of Wells’ progression from Anticipations, it is 
only by four days, rendering the likelihood of any revision based on Headley’s criticism 
of Anticipations being found in A Modern Utopia as slim to say the least.244 In any 
event, in writing a history of Wells’ thought one could just as easily make a list of 
positive criticism – including reviews and letters from figures to whom Wells was close 
or whom he greatly admired, such as E. Ray Lankester (1847-1929), George Gissing 
(1857-1903), and Winston Churchill (1874-1965) – and claim such work was 
responsible for his consistency.245 
 It is contended, then, that Partington’s sources do not reiterate his assertion of 
a post-Anticipations revision of ideas on the subject of crime and eugenics, and that in 
fact, as will be contended below, the Fortnightly Review trilogy and a number of other 
texts by Wells can be seen to form a rather consistent discourse in his thinking about 
crime. One should also respect the sentiment expressed in the 1914 preface to 
Anticipations wherein Wells reflects ‘I am surprised to find how little there is in it that 
I would change were I to rewrite it at the present time’, and that ‘the “New Republic,” 
and the attempt to define the social classes of the new age, is, I think, the most 
permanently valuable part of this book’.246 Furthermore, when discussing in Mankind 
                                                 
244  F. W. H[eadley], ‘The Future of the Human Race’, Nature, 71, 1835 (1904), 193-94. Headley had 
already by this point made himself known to be a staunch anti-socialist who considered any form of 
social evolutionary theory that did not base itself around the notion of laissez faire competition as 
ruinous. Wells would have possibly seen criticism to be politically oriented, and not concerned 
himself with it too much. For Headley’s anti-socialist sentiment as applying to the subject of 
evolution, see F. W. Headley, Problems of Evolution (London: Duckworth & Co., 1900), pp. 275-
78, 315. 
245  E. Ray Lankester, ‘The Present Judged by the Future’, Supplement to ‘Nature’, 65, 1689 (1902), 
iii-v. Gissing wrote a letter to Wells full of his praise for the book on 21 November 1901. George 
Gissing to H. G. Wells, Fourchambault, Nièvre, France, 21 November 1901 in George Gissing and 
H. G. Wells, Their Friendship and Correspondence, ed. by Royal A. Gettmann (London: Rupert 
Hart-Davis, 1961), pp. 195-198. Two days before this letter was written, Wells was responding to 
one from Winston Churchill, thanking Churchill for his nine-page letter, and was ‘flattered & 
interested’ by it. See H. G. Wells to Winston Churchill, Spade House, Sandgate, 19 November 
1901 in Correspondence of H. G. Wells, 1, ed. by David C. Smith (London: Pickering & Chatto, 
1998), pp. 457-458. 
246  Wells, Anticipations, eighth ed., pp. vii, x. 
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in the Making Woodhull-Martin’s views, Wells admits that he continues to believe in 
the theory of preventing the ‘unfit’ from procreating as a means to improve the standard 
of humankind, but that such practice was impossible and irresponsible given the limits 
of his generation’s scientific knowledge. 247  Defending this position in 1910 in a 
rejoinder to Caleb Saleeby’s (1878-1940) comments that he had in the past advocated 
eugenic policies, Wells makes his stance clear: 
 
To treat my statement that it is only by the sterilization of failures, i.e., 
the lack of offspring, that a species progresses, into an admission that 
types can now be distinguished for deliberate sterilization, shows a real 
ingenuity in misconception.248 
 
This statement serves to highlight just how the conflicting interpretations of Wells’ 
position on eugenics arise, and also introduces herein the sine qua non of his tenets on 
the subject. For Wells, though the principles of ‘negative eugenics’ would ensure the 
evolutionary progress of humankind, helping to pave the path to a utopian future, any 
concerted action undertaken at the time of his writing would be arbitrary, scientifically 
unsound, and unjust, as he consistently states in texts wherein he is required to make 
such comment.249 
 As stated earlier in this chapter, Wells introduced the reader of Anticipations to 
his views on crime and the criminal in his final instalment of the series. Those who the 
New Republicans would deem as unsuitable for twenty-first-century Britain were the 
same people who Wells deemed unfit at the beginning of the twentieth century, and are 
familiar faces in the study of Victorian crime, deviance, and almost any area to concern 
sociobiological thought in and around that period. He listed those with contagious 
diseases, hereditary mental illnesses, and the incurable desire for alcohol as the 
problem, and for whom criminal law will refuse propagation – the death penalty 
                                                 
247  Wells, ‘Mankind in the Making. II.—The Problem of the Birth Supply’, p. 706. Wells makes it 
clear that he held these sentiments even before the period of The Humanitarian (1892-1901), a 
progressive periodical with a particular focus on questions such as heredity, degeneration, and 
eugenics, edited by the avowedly pro-eugenics and women’s rights activist Woodhull-Martin. See 
Solveig C. Robinson, ‘Victoria Woodhull-Martin and The Humanitarian (1892-1901): Feminism 
and Eugenics at the Fin de Siècle’, Nineteenth-Century Gender Studies, 6, 2 (2010). Accessed 
online at <http://ncgsjournal.com/issue62/robinson.htm> on 3 June 2014. 
248  H. G. Wells, ‘The Sham Science of Eugenics’, The New Age, 7, 3 (1910), 71. The dispute began 
two weeks prior, when Saleeby accused Wells of leaping back and forth in support or opposition to 
eugenics: C. W. Saleeby, ‘The Progress of Eugenics’, The New Age, 7, 1 (1910), 2-4 (p. 4). 
249  Years later, Wells’ proviso of the need for scientific authority in such matters would wane. See pp. 
89-91 below. 
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awaiting those who did not abide by these new codes of the future.250 Of course, it was 
Wells’ belief that these ‘types’ were already descending towards extinction, without 
the need for any human intervention, despite all the ‘nonsense’ and ‘uproar one hears 
about the Rapid Multiplication of the Unfit’. 251  Such a dismissal echoes Wells’ 
‘common-sense man’ in the original version of The Time Machine series (1894) who 
likewise does not believe in such a needless ‘scare’, and also the points he made in the 
1896 article ‘Human Evolution, An Artificial Process’.252 However, though there may 
be no greatly expanding swarm of undesirables, the people of the New Republic would, 
Wells insists, hold the same principle of the instalment’s epigraph: the ‘unfit’ could be 
‘benevolently’ disposed of quickly through the scientific method, or else nature would 
do it slowly and cruelly. Whether or not Wells was taking an ironic stance on scientific 
principles informing contemporary social development, the policies of the New 
Republic would be ratified by scientific absolutes, and when it came to the eradication 
of the undesirable, habitual criminal, all of those tending toward extinction, Wells made 
this proviso quite clear: 
 
[T]he men of the New Republic will hold that the procreation of 
children who, by the circumstances of their parentage, must be diseased 
bodily or mentally – I do not think it will be difficult for the medical 
science of the coming time to define such circumstances – is absolutely 
the most loathsome of all conceivable sins.253 
 
Importantly, the emphasis is Wells’ own. ‘Hideous’ habits and diseases had to be both 
‘indisputably’ proven and diagnosed as ‘incurable’ before laws on sterilisation and 
capital punishment could be enacted. Wells had already articulated this position on the 
possibility of eugenic programmes before the New Republicans’ capacity to kill had 
been described in this instalment of Anticipations. In his review of Reid’s Alcoholism 
Wells largely agrees with the contention that there exists in some humans an inherited 
predisposition for the craving of alcohol which is transmissible to offspring. But Wells 
ultimately objects to Reid’s conclusive proposals for the prohibition of procreation for 
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such hereditary drunkards, concluding that to act upon such theory by introducing 
criminal legislature was reckless: 
 
My present object is merely to point out how entirely any action in the 
matter should depend on the final establishment or disproof of Mr. 
Reid’s cardinal assumption. Until we have settled that we cannot decide 
whether any specific legislation whatsoever is likely to result in good or 
evil.254 
 
Wells was not alone in expressing such conditional support. The zoologist and 
evolutionary biologist Lankester, Wells’ friend and collaborator from 1900 to 1920, 
had previously said of Reid’s position on alcohol:  
 
Let the drunkard drink and perish, and his seed with him, is Mr. Reid’s 
motto […] However interesting and ingenious such speculations are, it 
is necessary to remember that the human mind, like the human body, is 
an extremely complicated mechanism, of which we are not justified in 
assuming that we have anything approaching to a complete 
understanding.255 
 
Such a stipulation ultimately meant for Wells, as it clearly did Lankester, to reject the 
practical applicability of the current science of eugenics. In the present-day fight 
against society’s undesirables, Wells maintained a focus on improving institutions – 
and not births – with the view to deter individuals from crime or to reform those who 
had slipped through the net. What Partington considers to be a revision in ideas is 
merely a change in narrative form; one deriving from a Speculative Hope, the other 
from the need for practical social reform. The previously-applied provisos of projected 
customs had to be abandoned, and in Mankind in the Making Wells writes his 
manifesto, his suggestions being only that which can legitimately be carried out. That 
is not to suggest that Wells did not hope for the biological sciences to one day provide 
humankind with the authority to legislate on such matters. But, as it is proven by his 
review of Reid, at the time of writing Anticipations Wells did not advocate the 
application of eugenics.  
 In Mankind in the Making, Wells provided a text which he later described as ‘a 
prospectus for the human enterprise’, and openly looked to the immediate future from 
                                                 
254  Wells, ‘The Temperance Question’, p. 2. 
255  E. Ray Lankester, ‘The Present Evolution of Man,’ Fortnightly Review, 60, 357 (1896), 408-15 
(pp. 413-14). 
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the perspective of the present, rather than as a ‘thing with a future history’ in 
Anticipations. 256  He was, then, somewhat more constrained in his futurological 
endeavours, and possible improvements in the biological and social condition of 
humankind had to be bordered by contemporary knowledge. Despite the change in 
narrative style much of the content remained the same as that of Anticipations, and in 
the second instalment the hereditary drunks, insane, and diseased were again put on 
trial. The first two of this trio were discussed with reference to authors who had 
commented on the inheritable nature of the respective conditions: Reid for drunkenness 
and Nordau for insanity. However, before he discussed such theory, Wells dismissed 
two other schools of thought which were firmly grounded in the discourses of 
degeneration in the period: Galtonian eugenics and Lombrosian criminal anthropology. 
Wells had previously criticised the ‘glib dogmatizing’ of Francis Galton and others 
who wrote on the science of inheritance in an article printed in the Saturday Review in 
late 1894. Entitled ‘Fallacies of Heredity’ it was directed at the claims made by those 
such as Galton, whose literature on the subject was, according to Wells, ‘barely worth 
the paper it is written on’ and whose experiments needed ‘many thousand observations’ 
before decisions on hereditary matters could be decided upon.257 In Mankind in the 
Making Wells made similar conclusions in reviewing Galton’s Huxley Lecture of the 
Anthropological Institute, delivered on 29 October 1901 and published in Nature two 
days later.258 Therein Wells argued that not only were the qualities deemed desirable 
by Galton entirely ambiguous, but that evolution does not work in such ways: 
 
Nature is not a breeder; she is a reckless coupler and – she slays. [...] 
Lord Salisbury was no doubt misled, as most people who share his 
mistake have been misled, by the grammatical error of employing the 
Survival of the Fittest for the Survival of the Fitter, in order to escape a 
scarcely ambiguous ambiguity. But the use of the word “Survival” 
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should have sufficed to indicate that the real point of application of the 
force by which Nature modifies species and raises the average in any 
quality, lies not in selective breeding, but in the disproportionately 
numerous deaths of the individuals below the average.259 
 
Just as the New Republicans’ elimination of the unfit would be an extension of natural 
processes, Wells insisted that Galton had misunderstood nature’s methods. These 
sentiments were repeated in the now oft-quoted (and misinterpreted) response to Galton 
after the 1904 Sociological Society lecture ‘Eugenics, its Definition, Scope and Aims’, 
260 whereby Wells again asserted, contrary to the notion of selecting and breeding 
superiority, that nature proves ‘[i]t is in the sterilisation of failures, and not in the 
selection of successes for breeding, that the possibility of the human stock lies’.261 
 Following the refutation of Galton’s positive eugenics and Woodhull-Martin’s 
scaremongering appeals for the practice of negative eugenics in the face of the ‘Rapid 
Multiplication of the Unfit’, Wells then condemned the ‘cruel and mischievous ideas’ 
of criminal anthropology, clearly ridiculing, albeit without naming, Lombroso and the 
positivist school’s identification of criminal appendages as the pseudo-scientific 
successors of phrenology. 262  Wells had already expressed what he thought of 
Lombroso’s criminological position, stating in Anticipations that his ‘extraordinary 
assertions’ could be considered a science as much as could palmistry.263 In Mankind in 
the Making Wells apportioned more space to this school of thought, and rubbishing the 
idea of born criminals, predetermined to break the law ‘ere ever a criminal thought has 
entered their brains’, he argued that crime was far more complex, a ‘varied chapter of 
accidents that carries men into that net of precautions, expedients, prohibitions, and 
vindictive reprisals, that net of the law’.264 His treatment here assumed the same ground 
occupied by the psychosocial determinism of Durkheim and Gabriel Tarde (1843-
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1904).265 People are not born immoral, or with an innate understanding of the legal 
notions of property and monogamy, Wells asserted. Instead their criminal actions are 
largely a product of the interaction between their faculties of mind and the complex 
social structures of modern society: 
 
[A criminal’s] personal disaster may be due to the possession of a bold 
and enterprising character, of a degree of pride and energy above the 
needs of the position his social surroundings have forced upon him. 
Another citizen may have all this man's desires and impulses, checked 
and sterilized by a lack of nervous energy, by an abject fear of the 
policeman and of the consequences of the disapproval of his more 
prosperous fellow-citizens.266 
 
Although criminality as a quality could not be found in a person’s constitution, Wells 
makes an important claim, one that bears similarity to the criminological perspective 
of the other figures observed in this thesis, contending that there nevertheless may be 
‘criminal tendencies’ in people which are hereditary. 267  This same psychosocial 
determinism was expressed in 1897 in a favourable review of Conwy Lloyd Morgan’s 
(1852-1936) Habit and Instinct (1896) wherein Wells asserted that criminal tendencies 
are probably inheritable, but that the ‘acquired factor’ of one’s ‘mental environment’ 
would be ‘impressed on instinct, modifying instinct, sometimes flatly opposing 
instinct, and even in some cases altogether overcoming and defeating it’.268 
 When Wells returned to Reid’s hereditary alcoholics in Mankind in the Making 
he made the same conclusions as he had done in his 1901 review on the question of 
preventing procreation in light of how little is known on the subject, now suggesting 
the unlikelihood of there existing an inherited trait of alcoholism. He did, however, 
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make it clear that the ideas of punishing the indisputably alcoholic from having children 
and allowing alcoholism to be included in the grounds for divorce were something 
about which he was more supportive. Wells, then, reiterated his antagonism toward a 
scheme of negative eugenics being implemented to eradicate a ‘type’, whilst 
simultaneously advocating stronger legal measures – including one which removed 
childbirth as an individual’s right – to prevent the possible damage alcoholism could 
inflict on the family.269 Wells’ objections to Reid’s theories on alcoholism were the 
same, albeit put less scathingly, as those to Nordau’s ideas on insanity which had been 
articulated in Degeneration (1892), describing the book as ‘pretentious and 
inconsistent’.270 Again, the belief that such a trait as insanity or madness was definable, 
let alone identifiable as hereditary, was utterly rejected by Wells. Despite appearing to 
be more confident in scientific authority as he started discussing the possible 
identification of hereditary diseases, Wells once again reaches the same conclusion as 
he did when addressing the previous two conditions – too much doubt remained in 
these inquiries to warrant the application of legislation or coercive action. As such, 
only two recommendations could be made on the matter, and Wells urged the likes of 
Reid, Karl Pearson (1857-1936), Walter Frank Raphael Weldon (1860-1906), William 
Bateson (1861-1926), and Ellis to continue with their research in the ‘missing science 
of heredity’ and appealed to the British public to uphold their contract as both 
progenitors of the next generation and integral constituents of the social body in their 
private lives.271 Over the course spanning from his earlier scientific journalism to the 
completion of Mankind in the Making, Wells had expressed a rather consistent theory 
on the matter of criminality, one that sits quite comfortably within his wider views on 
the study and application of science. Wells was often critical of what he saw as hasty 
conclusions in the inductive method, pointing out that the generalisations that followed 
observational study – of which he frequently claimed consisted of too small a sample 
– did not hold up to scientific standards.272 He had difficulty in accepting any theory 
which was not somehow provable or observable, a reason for why he was so reluctant 
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to accept Weismann’s germ-plasm theory, which he originally dismissed as 
‘metaphysical’, its hidden gametes giving rise to ‘dark speculations’.273  
 When it came to A Modern Utopia, Wells was able to readopt the narrative tools 
he had used in Anticipations, with which he could fashion a world different to his own 
(as occupied in Mankind in the Making) and, with regard to the focus of this thesis, 
have new values adopted by its population, vastly improve their scientific knowledge, 
and legislate on criminal matters. Different to Anticipations in that it is less a set of 
deductions, tongue in cheek or not, leading to a likely future and more a traditional 
utopian construction, A Modern Utopia was largely a topography of Wells’ desires.274 
In the fifth instalment, printed in January 1905, Wells addressed crime and anti-social 
behaviour, and created three classes of those he deemed ‘unfit’. There were those who 
had fallen behind the progress of humankind: the idle unemployed, the unteachable, 
the ‘rather incompetent low-grade man’, who would be provided work and homes if 
needed, and given every chance to better themselves.275 Then there were those who had 
fallen into crime: first-time criminals and juvenile offenders, who would be placed in 
reformatories and schooled in the values of utopia and recast into responsible 
citizens.276 And finally, Wells returned to figures he had dismissed as indefinable in 
Mankind in the Making: the indisputably diseased, insane, and alcoholic. As in 
Anticipations, these individuals would be refused parenthood based on the scientific 
proof that their bodily and mental conditions ruled out the chance for their reform or 
cure, but it was how Wells chose to deal with such criminals – in essence, what forms 
of punishments he imagined to be effective – where clear differences can be found. 
 Whereas in Anticipations the New Republicans would quicken nature’s 
eliminatory process by enforcing the penalty of opiate-induced death, the condemned 
of Utopia would be segregated onto prison islands, each island the permanent domicile 
of only those afflicted with a particular condition – not only would these incurably unfit 
types be segregated from society, but each type from the others. There, Wells 
contended, they would be left to organise themselves, under the watch, of course, of 
armed guards, who would only be there to enforce containment and prevent tyrannical 
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275  Wells, ‘A Modern Utopia. Chapter the Fifth. Failure in a Modern Utopia’, p. 169. 
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or cruel organisation, and in such a penal system Utopia would extinguish ‘the bleak 
terrors, the solitudes and ignominies of the modern prison’.277  Wells had already 
expressed his aversion to the death penalty in an 1890 article wherein he mocked both 
its origins and contemporary support.278 One finds continuation, then, in the following 
statement made in A Modern Utopia, which also shares the sociological reading of 
crime as that found in Mankind in the Making: 
 
There would be no killing, no lethal chambers. [...] Lives that 
statesmanship has permitted, errors it has not foreseen and educated 
against, must not be punished by death. If the State does not keep faith, 
no one will keep faith. Crime and bad lives are the measure of a State's 
failure, all crime in the end is the crime of the community. Even for 
murder Utopia will not, I think, kill.279 
 
The notion of segregating ‘undesirables’ – not simply those who had committed 
offences but those who were deemed likely to do so – was being seriously considered 
in the first years of the twentieth century, and after considerable discussion there 
emerged the Prevention of Crime Act in 1908, of which included the ‘dual track’ 
system, which is thus described by Bailey: 
 
In an awkward alliance of classicism and positivism, those deemed to 
be habitual criminals first paid for their crime in the coinage of just 
deserts (penal servitude), after which they were detained for their 
habitual criminality in the new currency of social defense (preventive 
detention).280 
 
But for Wells it was a far less balanced alliance in the prison-island sentences of Utopia. 
The provision of preventative detention in the 1908 Act largely depended on the 
number of crimes the individual had committed, and those undergoing no less than 
their fourth conviction were eligible for such sentencing. Not only did Wells reduce 
the qualifying number of convictions to three in A Modern Utopia, he also included as 
eligible for preventative detention individuals who had committed no criminal offence 
other than in suffering from transmissible diseases and insanity, and those who had 
been found drunk for the eighth time.281 
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 Wells would also have shown support for the other measure aimed at tackling 
the problem of the habitual offender, one which had been recommended by the 1895 
Gladstone Committee and became nationally-enforced under the 1908 Act: the 
indeterminate sentencing of those criminal offenders aged between sixteen and twenty-
one to Borstal ‘training’. In Utopia these would be ‘fair and happy places’ and would 
be more inclusive than their real-life counterparts: all first-time offenders and those up 
to the age of twenty-five would be eligible. There they would be schooled in morality 
and the value of humanity. ‘From that discipline’, Wells believed, ‘at last the prisoners 
will return’.282 The notions of the school and strict training as a place and means to 
provide a moral education to those convicted of crimes continued to be a paradigm of 
Wells’ thought throughout his life. In 1934, when discussing the problem of the 
‘recalcitrant’, his relation of school discipline to crime prevention is perhaps more 
literal than figurative: 
 
[Crime] is a question that can be addressed in precisely the same terms 
as a school disciplinarian. The problem of order in a society is one with 
the problem of order in the school.283 
 
This idealistic support for the modern detention centre aimed at bettering young 
offenders through moral and cultural education but also as a means of ‘social defense’ 
was popular amongst socialists and anarchists working in Britain and America in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as will be shown in the texts of Ellis, 
Kropotkin, and Carpenter. Another means of preventative action that Wells appeared 
to support is that of the vast extension of the state’s ability to ‘see’ its population, as 
found in A Modern Utopia. Wells certainly believed in the good that would come (or 
the bad which would be prevented) from such surveillance. Clearly anxious about the 
growing anonymity of individuals in soaring urban populations, he speculated that 
Utopia would create a comprehensive and wide-reaching system of registers to help 
keep in check those figures of his concerns, referring to the modern problem of the 
‘untraceable’ criminal, what he called ‘the Deeming and Crossman type’ that posed a 
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grave threat, especially to women.284 The compulsory photographing and registering of 
criminals as set out in the 1871 Prevention of Crime Act would be greatly extended, as 
he discussed with approval the idea of an all-seeing central index of every inhabitant 
of Utopia. 
 Wells’ critique of the contemporary inadequacies in dealing with the problem 
of crime also addressed the matter of officiating prisons, as he asserted that men are 
not ‘wise’ or ‘good enough’ to be warders of other men.285 Responding from the floor 
after Galton’s aforementioned lecture of 1904, Wells had similarly criticised the 
assumed ‘goodness’ of those working in the judicial system,286 and as he had done so 
in Anticipations287 he expressed concern in A Modern Utopia for the psychological 
ramifications of those responsible for the punishment of prisoners. Such concerns for 
the corruption of prison officers were expressed by a number of Wells’ contemporaries. 
Kropotkin, for example, had argued that the moral disease created by prisons was not 
only transmitted to those incarcerated, but that the warders and jailers, too, would suffer 
from the contagion: ‘The institution makes them what they are, petty and vexatious 
persecutors of the prisoners’.288 There was a growing understanding in late nineteenth-
century Britain that social determinism was not limited to society as a whole, but 
operational at the institutional level, and for the socialists and anarchists in particular, 
the corrupting influence of prisons on those who therein resided – regardless of the 
individual’s reason for being there or supposed moral constitution – was merely a 
microcosmic illustration of the corrupting influence of an unjust society.289  
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Wells’ criminological discourse 
 
Wells, then, occupied the space between what appeared to be two competing spheres 
of criminological thought of the period. He clearly expressed a somewhat sympathetic 
attitude to the criminal – particularly juveniles and first-time offenders – in his 
criticisms of capital punishment, his refutations of biological determinism, and his 
support for penal reform. At the same time, however, he seems to advocate the idea 
that if certain physiological ‘predispositions’ to criminal or anti-social behaviour were 
proven to exist in an individual, he would support indefinite segregation, prevention 
from procreation, and even enforced sterilisation. Even when, for instance, he claims – 
and it has been contended here that such claims can be authenticated – that Saleeby had 
misinterpreted his position on negative eugenics, it is not difficult to see why such a 
misreading occurred. Wells’ was, as has been stated earlier in this chapter, a 
criminological perspective which keenly observes the conditions of society and the 
prison with the intent to highlight injustice and possible reform, and yet remains 
concerned with the physiological make-up of the anti-social individual. The notions of 
‘predisposition’ and ‘tendency’ allowed him to straddle the sociological and biological 
schools of criminology. When in 1932 Wells made reference to Charles Goring’s 
(1870-1919) famous criminological treatise The English Convict (1913), 290  he 
reiterates his position: ‘The truth of the matter may lie in the fact that though there is 
no innate criminal quality there are probably certain distinctive qualities in the ideology 
established in the mind which resorts to crime’.291 In this respect Wells could, like 
Goring would do in 1913, criticise the thought of Lombroso, whose assumed biological 
determinism downplayed the need to reform an inequitable society, and at the same 
time continue in the vein of a scientist who, clearly, was very much part of the 
medicalisation of anti-social behaviour.  
 On the history of the epistemologies of crime in modern Britain, Davie has 
appealed for a perspective which emphasises the complex relationship between 
classical and positivist views on crime, the criminal, and punishment. Such an approach 
questions both the stress placed on theory-to-practice paradigmatic shifts (as seen in 
the work of Foucault and Garland) and the contentions of continuity in the British penal 
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system in the face of the new, positivist theories.292 Wiener, like Davie, has recently 
taken a similar perspective in his analysis of how the English judiciary inflected both 
‘scientific’ criminological theory and classical notions of the criminal as propounded 
by legal commentaries. Asserting that interpretations of ‘guilt’ and ‘legal 
responsibility’ began to be seriously contested in the late nineteenth century with the 
increased presence of the medical profession in matters of criminal law, Wiener 
provides the example of how the ‘McNaghten Rules’ yardstick of measuring a 
criminal’s ‘knowledge of right or wrong’ when determining their criminal 
accountability was gradually replaced in the eyes of the public and the state, though 
not completely, nor without considerable resistance, by the diagnosis of the ‘diseased 
mind’.293 Wells, too, seems to have occupied a site of such complexity and contestation, 
through which he presented rather classical notions of the criminal as well as modern 
scientific ones. For example, the figure of the violent offender seems out of place 
amongst Wells’ habitual drunkards and those suffering from insanity – the latter two 
always discussed with reference to the question of such conditions’ psychosocial 
makeup – as is the case in Anticipations when Wells asserts that the New Republicans, 
those whose criminal code, like all their values and conventions, would be shaped by 
scientific authority, would continue to use torture as a means of punishment and 
deterrence only for those convicted of ‘outrageous conduct to children or women, 
perhaps, or for very cowardly or brutal assaults of any sort’.294 Years later, in 1932, 
Wells proved that he still held such ambiguous views, disregarding the necessity for 
scientific diagnosis when condemning violent criminals: 
 
‘Nor is there any sound objection to the sterilization of criminals 
convicted of brutish violence. The balance of evidence tilts towards the 
conclusion that such qualities are transmissible and, even if that 
conclusion is unsound, nevertheless the suppression of offspring in 
these categories will eliminate the certainty of a number of children 
being born in unfavourable surroundings at a great social 
disadvantage’.295 
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The notion of criminal responsibility – whether informed by the test of knowing right 
from wrong or by the assessment of mental illness – did not appear to affect Wells’ 
position when it came to the matters of murder or assault: never did he stipulate the 
necessity of a ‘science of violence’, in the same manner as he did with those markers 
of crime which may be scientifically proven, before condemning such criminality. 
Violent tendencies seemed to elude Wells’ requirement of scientific truth when he 
assumed the optic of positivism, and remained closely tied to the classical perspective 
of crime, as sentiments of fear and disgust are evoked by abhorrent acts against women 
and children by the Deeming and Crossman ‘types’.  
 Continuing on this line of inquiry, there can be found an interesting 
development in Wells’ treatment of insanity and alcohol, and how they relate to legal 
responsibility. When discussing the New Republicans’ criminal code in Anticipations, 
Wells imagined that in the future ‘the plea and proof that a grave criminal is also insane 
will be regarded by them not as a reason for mercy, but as an added reason for death’.296 
No mention of criminal accountability arises in Mankind in the Making, but in A 
Modern Utopia Wells replaces insanity, insisting this time that drunkenness would be 
deemed as ‘an aggravation of, and not the excuse for, crime’.297 There might be little 
to say about such a transition, but there might also be a case to consider that it reflects 
a certain shift that was taking place in criminal law and attitudes at the time. At the turn 
of the century the admission of alcoholism, unlike the plea of insanity, was not a means 
to rid oneself of the legal responsibility of a criminal act on account of being incapable 
in making morally informed decisions. But by 1905 it had come to be accepted that 
alcoholism was a condition more permanently afflictive on the moral self, not only 
when one was drunk – a result of the growing authority of the medico-psychiatric 
discourse. Such a conceptual shift saw ‘habitual drunkenness’ appropriated by the legal 
lexicon of mental illness. As Weiner claims, ‘[d]runkenness, in itself not an acceptable 
defense, could now become one if reinterpreted [by the judge] as “alcoholic 
insanity”’.298 In 1905 a contemporary commentator on the developments in the legal 
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system noted such a transition, stating that recommendations of mercy for the habitual 
drunkard were frequently ‘recognition of an inherent weak-mindedness little short of 
insanity’.299 Anxieties, such as Wells’, concerning the flourishing phenomenon of the 
criminal plea of insanity – anxiety both about the assumed increase of lunatics in 
society and about their softer, ineffective sentencing – would only heighten once 
habitual drunkards began to be included in this paradigm. Wells’ decision to dismiss 
in A Modern Utopia the notion that the condition of alcoholism should be used, in the 
same way insanity was, to alleviate criminal responsibility might be reflective of these 
social and legal reconsiderations. 300  Such concerns, however, were certainly not 
allayed when the Mental Deficiency Act of 1914 included the habitual drunkard in its 
terms. 
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Chapter Three: Havelock Ellis 
 
As, indeed, we approach the treatment of criminals with a larger vision, 
we shall find ourselves anxious to help them, not alone for their own 
sakes, but in a still higher degree as symptomatic products of unhealthy 
and infantile stages in our psycho-social development as a whole. In 
learning how to deal with the criminal we are learning how to deal with 
society.301 
 
Havelock Ellis, ‘The Progress of Criminology’ (1919) 
 
 
In the first year of peacetime that followed the end of the First World War, Ellis, 
pioneer in the study of sex and sexuality, remained concerned with the subject he had 
introduced to the reading public of Britain three decades earlier with the publication of 
The Criminal. The progress of criminology, he thought, was integral not only to the 
matter of society’s safeguarding but of its evolution. Such an idea, that the ‘larger 
vision’ of criminology concerns much more than the criminal, that it is a question of 
‘how to deal with society’, can be traced back over the thirty years to the 
aforementioned text, found in a rather ominous forewarning. Whilst it is inarguably 
important, Ellis had insisted, to examine the genealogical relationship between the 
criminal and his savage primogenitors, it nevertheless remained an essential concern 
that ‘he is at the same time related to those more or less civilised persons who tolerate 
killing with equanimity when it is called war’. 302  The question of criminality 
encompassed a wider enquiry, one that was all the more pertinent after total war, but 
one that Ellis had engaged with throughout his professional life: simply that of the 
relationship between humans. 
 At the end of the 1880s, criminological thought in Britain was markedly 
dissimilar to that which had been developing on the continent. A somewhat crude 
summary of the fundamental difference between the two is that, whereas the work 
undertaken in the latter was largely preoccupied with the genesis and constitution of 
the criminal, British criminology was tied to the practices of penal and psychiatric 
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treatment of offenders and those classified as insane.303 Although the criminal was as 
much a scientific object in Britain as he was on the continent, his delineation was being 
defined by a number of different, but not separate, disciplines and institutions. Ellis 
was dissatisfied that the promising studies in the 1860s and 1870s conducted by prison 
medical officers and psychiatrists had failed to give rise to a homogenous school of 
criminology, like those that could be found in Italy and France. It was high time, he 
thought, that a critical engagement with the new anthropological knowledge of crime 
and the criminal was provided to the British people. 
 It has been opined that The Criminal is an uncritical text,304 regarding it as 
either an anthology of the most poignant criminological ideas of the time or as an 
English variant of Lombroso’s L’uomo delinquente. 305  It is, however, somewhat 
difficult to consider Ellis as composing The Criminal without a critical mind. He was 
a physician and an educationalist, a burgeoning scientist of sex psychology who 
scrutinised the object of sexuality and, specifically, the assumed realities of its 
deviancies, and had engaged and would continue to engage with a spectrum of 
scientific approaches in a number of different languages to the question of crime. 
Though it should not by any means be historically regarded as a pioneering text of 
criminology, nor considered as anything but heavily influenced by Lombroso’s studies, 
The Criminal reveals Ellis to be engaging with, scrutinising, and inflecting 
criminological-related scientific theory, and was twice revised over four editions.306 In 
his new preface to the 1901 edition he would reiterate his intention to contribute to the 
young and tumultuous field of criminology: 
 
What is a criminal? Is he—according to the old legal assumption on 
which our criminal law is still mainly built up—a normal person who 
has wilfully committed an abnormal act? Is he the victim of acquired 
disease, such as some form of epilepsy? Is he an atavistic reappearance 
of the savage in modern society? Is he a “degenerate”? What is the 
“criminal type”? In this book I attempted to answer these questions with 
all the caution demanded by the existence of conflicting views and the 
imperfection of our knowledge.307 
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As it will be shown in this chapter, his enquiry into the criminological concepts and 
methods of the day, as well as those of prominent forerunners, led Ellis to situate 
himself, in a similar way to Wells, in a reconciliatory position between the congenital 
theories tied to Lombroso and those that stressed the influence of injurious social 
conditions associated with Lacassagne and Tarde. Such an interpretation is rather 
different to that of those who see Ellis only as a follower of Lombroso when it came to 
the matter of crime.308 
 
 
The Criminal (1): Instinctive Criminality 
 
Ellis considered the particular types of criminal so regularly defined by criminal 
anthropologists. 309  He initially outlined four, drawing on Lombroso and Ferri’s 
classification of criminals: the political criminal; the criminal by passion; the insane 
criminal; and the occasional criminal (who, if utterly failed by society and its 
institutions, would fall into recidivism). Yet much of his concern was directed at 
another site adjacent and connected to that where madness resided, a domain occupied 
not by those who were insane in the strictest sense of the term, but by individuals who 
appeared to be suffering from moral insanity. This was the land of the moral monster, 
the home of Deeming and Crossman, all those whose capacity for cruelty and moral 
insensibility was thought to be betrayed by definable mental and physical traits. Such 
characteristics would be scrutinised by Ellis as he traversed through the various 
stigmata, features, and habits that Lombroso’s school in particular had identified as 
marking the instinctive criminal. Such insignia of criminality were of considerable 
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interest and importance to Ellis, and made up the majority of the prose in The Criminal. 
In this respect, his text could be easily placed alongside the criminological texts of the 
biological-positivist school. 
But the shape of the object in Ellis’ sight was not merely there for showcasing. 
As a ‘natural phenomenon’, the criminal would be understood as the product of a 
lineage of causes and origins.310 Criminology, as he saw it, was an aetiological enquiry 
into the set of relations that resulted in the criminal’s becoming. Such relations could 
be divided into three groups, as Enrico Ferri (1856-1929) had first asserted in 1881: the 
cosmic, the biological, and the social.311 Ellis championed in Lacassagne the vital 
message of nature and nurture symbiosis, that the criminal organism is cultivated in its 
physical and social environment, a biological process that only ‘ferments’ once specific 
conditions are in place.312 As seen in the thought of Wells, and which will be shown in 
that of Kropotkin and Carpenter, Ellis would think about crime as an unsettled site 
between the body and the environment in which it existed. The object of criminality 
could be explained, at least partially, by its surroundings. First, however, the bodily 
and mental characteristics of the criminal had to be examined, measured, and known, 
Ellis believed, before one could understand the processes that brought about such 
phenomena: 
 
It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of the social factor in 
crime. To some extent it even embraces the others, and can be made to 
regulate and neutralise them. But we cannot deal wisely with the social 
factor of crime, nor estimate the vast importance of social influences in 
the production or prevention of crime, unless we know something of the 
biology of crime, of the criminal’s anatomical, physiological, and 
psychological nature.313 
 
Knowing the physical and mental organisation of ‘criminal man’ was the 
epistemological basis on which to both build an understanding of the environmental 
causes of crime and to justify social action. First had to come a thorough diagnosis of 
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the criminal’s corporal and mental make-up. Only then could follow prescription, 
whether that took the form of curative or preventative treatment. 
As he looked to delineate the differences between those exhibiting signs of a 
pathological or morbid condition, Ellis relied on the method of using case studies of 
criminals and their crimes, searching through their actions, environment, and history 
for clues that would help account for the displaying symptoms, just as a physician 
might seek in a patient’s historical narrative for any obvious signs of contagion that 
might direct the diagnosis of disease. That Ellis utilised such a method in order to 
explain the object of criminality – a method which he would employ to a great extent 
in his sexological studies – is instructive, and it is important to examine the pathological 
case study and its historical construction to secure a broader understanding of how Ellis 
thought about crime. Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) was the first to present a 
nosographical study into pathological conditions by focusing on the narratives of 
patients’ histories as a means for diagnosis and subsequent institutional treatment of 
those subjects deemed to be abnormal. 314  In his Traité médico-philosophique sur 
l'aliénation mentale, ou la manie (1801) there was born, Richard Lewis Holt asserts, 
the ‘clinical medical gaze’, a perspective ‘that takes both the individual patient and the 
disease state as its subject’ and ‘introduces the patient narrative as a legitimate object 
of medical inquiry’. 315  The pathological case study provided a form of social 
knowledge whereupon a formation of causal possibilities of ‘abnormal’ conditions is 
erected, justified, and evaluated by the physician who then prescribes the suitable 
course of treatment.316 
Ellis credited Lambert Adolphe Jacques Quetelet (1796-1874) as a pioneer of 
the sociological school of crime.317 But whereas Quetelet sought the social laws of 
                                                 
314  ‘At or very near the birth of the modern conceptual arrangement of psychiatric medicine is the 
figure of Philippe Pinel. La Bicêtre and Salpêtrière were among the first institutions in which the 
patient narrative was considered at all, much less outside a demonic or mechanistic context. Pinel 
unchained his patients, but more importantly he listened to them. In doing so, he introduced the 
patient utterance as a legitimate object of study, with all of its attendant epistemological 
quandaries’. Richard Lewis Holt, ‘Pinel and the Pendulum’ in Psychoanalysis and Narrative 
Medicine, ed. by Peter L. Rudnytsky and Rita Charon (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2008), pp. 61-82 (p. 80).  
315  Ibid., p. 64.  
316  Foucault remains the prefatory theorist for the idea of the emergence of the clinical case and the 
production of the individual-as-object existing within a typological field of a population. See 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New York, NY: 
Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 184-194. 
317  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 44. Ellis refers to Quetelet’s seminal Sur l'homme et le développement de ses 
facultés, ou essai de physique sociale (1835), but such a criminological approach was first 
demonstrated in his 1831 study Recherches sur le penchant au crime aux différens ages. 
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deviancy in statistical observation and arrangement, the case study as an 
epistemological apparatus was distinct from that which professed the authority of 
numbers. That is not to say that the two bodies of knowledge were oppositional in use. 
The two can be mutually complementary, each validating the truth claims of the other 
in its support.318 But as Robert E. Stake explains, unlike the propositional, explanative 
truths of social phenomena excavated through the statistical method, the case study 
provides a tacit knowledge of understanding. As particularities of phenomena and 
experience are recognised in new and often unfamiliar contexts, a body of both 
empirical and intuitive knowledge develops, a system composed of what Stake calls 
‘naturalistic generalizations’.319 In the history of psychopathological science, the case 
study located abnormality not in the product of measurable, quantifiable phenomena 
afflicting the social or physical body, but in the processes that surrounded a patient’s 
actions, feelings, and thoughts, a narrative of the causal possibilities that formed one’s 
life experience. Ellis certainly seemed more inclined to look to the method of the case 
study rather than that of statistics when it came to planning the course of recovery:  
 
It is only the arm-chair statistician who can rest comfortably when he 
has shown that in some other age or in some other land the amount of 
disease or death due to this or that cause has been even greater than it is 
among us to-day.320 
 
In the same way that he would use it for his enquiries into sex and sexuality, the case 
study was the perfect canvas on which Ellis could explore the topography of criminality 
and delineate the specific ‘types’ of offender, tracing the contours and interconnected 
features that could form a conclusive narrative of one’s abnormal behaviour. He would 
scrutinise the case studies undertaken by medical professionals and scientists who, 
though writing from different disciplines and national backgrounds all attended to those 
unsettled demarcation lines, such as the likes of British asylum physician and lecturer 
                                                 
318  See Ernest W. Burgess, ‘Statistics and Case Studies as Methods of Sociological Research’, 
Sociology and Social Research, 12 (1927), 103-20. 
319  Robert E. Stake, ‘The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry’, Educational Researcher, 7, 2 (1978), 
5-8 (p. 6). 
320  Havelock Ellis, The Nationalisation of Health (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1892), pp. 8-9. 
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on insanity Henry Sutherland (1841-1901)321 and French philosopher and psychologist 
Prosper Despine (1812-1892).322 
It is in these case study narratives that Ellis plots his diagnoses, often attempting 
to determine whether or not the offender tends either towards the instinctive criminal 
or the lunatic. Those deemed to be occupying this well-known borderland were 
individuals ‘liable’ to criminal impulses, with non-pathological but nevertheless innate 
propensities for anti-social behaviour, who could be propelled to commit heinous 
offences by the smallest change of circumstances.323 Such inchoate individuals were 
categorically different from those found across the border. There he would place the 
rather unexpected figure of Marie Schneider, a twelve year old who killed a girl of the 
age of three with little distress and no remorse. Where the case history of an offender 
illuminated ‘the absence of guiding or inhibiting social instincts […] accompanied by 
unusual development of the sensual and self-seeking impulses’,324 Ellis would identify 
the condition of ‘instinctive criminality’ or ‘moral insanity’ or any other synonymous 
term with which he would use to describe that permanent causal background of 
abnormality.325 Its aetiological base was invariable, and anti-social feelings could erupt 
into anti-social acts at any time.  
The diagnosis of ‘moral insanity’ for Marie Schneider could be seen as a rather 
difficult one for Ellis to make. The viciousness of her actions and lack of contrition 
encouraged Marie’s case to be filed under such a category, but it was problematised by 
                                                 
321  From his work on the case histories of patients’ at West Riding Lunatic Asylum, Sutherland would 
distinguish a particular class within the boundaries that demarcated the more indistinct region of 
insanity, composed of those with corrupted and inoperative moral faculties. Henry Sutherland, 
‘Cases on the Borderland of Insanity’, in The West Riding Lunatic Asylum Reports, 6, ed. by J 
Crichton Browne and Herbert C. Major (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1876), pp. 108-19. 
322  In his Psychologie Naturelle (1868), a seminal work on the subject of criminal insanity, Despine 
grounded the idea that the borderland was occupied by those who suffered from infirmities or the 
absence of their moral senses. 
323  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 5. 
324  Ibid. 
325  Ellis would, in the third edition of The Criminal, also classify the ‘moral imbecile’ as identical with 
the instinctive criminal, and stated in the new preface that since 1890 ‘the facts have only served to 
deepen my conviction as to the real nature of that relationship’. Ellis, The Criminal, third ed., pp. 
292, xiv-xv. Such a development of ideas should be read in light of the dominating public 
discourse concerning ‘feeble-mindedness’ at the turn of the century (laws). See Mark Jackson, The 
Borderland of Imbecility: Medicine, Society and the Fabrication of the Feeble Mind in Later 
Victorian and Edwardian England (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000).   
100 
 
her being a child. And yet Ellis would, as many others did,326  see in the general 
constitution of all children similarities to that of adult criminals and lunatics: 
 
[T]here is a certain form of criminality almost peculiar to children, a 
form to which the term “moral insanity” may very fairly be ascribed. 
[…] [It] is characterised by a certain eccentricity of character, a dislike 
of family habits, an incapacity for education, a tendency to lying, 
together with astuteness and extraordinary cynicism, bad sexual habits, 
and cruelty towards animals and companions. […] There can be no 
doubt that many of these develop into instinctive criminals. […] It is a 
very significant fact that these characters are but an exaggeration of the 
characters which in a less degree mark nearly all children. The child is 
naturally, by his organisation, nearer to the animal, to the savage, to the 
criminal, than the adult.327 
 
Such ideas made it all the easier for Ellis to conceptualise the child as naturally 
occupying the criminal borderlands, prone to acting on anti-social impulses without the 
guiding influence of the moral faculties. In the 1901 edition of The Criminal he would 
add an appendix on the issue, reiterating the view that there exists a natural tendency 
towards immorality and criminality in childhood. Without intervention to inhibit the 
development of anti-social impulses, the child was at risk of gravitating towards the 
border and crossing over it, the anti-social tendencies becoming a fundamental part of 
its organisation. This was Ellis’ articulation of and contribution to the pervading 
Victorian concerns about urban youth, a relatively new class that was suffering from 
(and threatening society with) a lack of fitness, education, and moral faculty.328 As it 
has been shown in Chapter One, such anxiety could be expressed in socialistic literary 
speculations wherein the arms of the state were greatly extended to supervise all 
children’s upbringing so as to prevent the development of anti-social tendencies, as 
seen, for instance, in Quintura and The Great Revolution of 1905. Alternatively, these 
concerns were articulated in projections of eugenic schemes, and a socialist state could 
                                                 
326  See, for instance, Lombroso, Criminal Man, p. 218. James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848), whose 
Treatise on Insanity (1935) was a seminal early text in the gradual medicalisation of morality, 
argued that unless the child’s emotions were checked they could develop into mania. For a broader 
discussion of the development in the Victorian era of psychiatric knowledge as applied specifically 
to children see Sally Shuttleworth, The Mind of the Child: Child Development in Literature, 
Science, and Medicine, 1840-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). See in particular pp. 
90-92 for Prichard’s criminalisation of children. 
327  Ellis, The Criminal, pp. 211-212. 
328  For the public discourses that surrounded criminality in Victorian children, see Jane Abbott, ‘The 
Press and the Public Visibility of Nineteenth-Century Criminal Children’ in Criminal 
Conversations: Victorian Crimes, Social Panic, and Moral Outrage, ed. by Judith Rowbotham and 
Kim Stevenson (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2005), pp. 23-39. 
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stem criminality in children through the prevention of procreation, as seen in A 
Thousand Years Hence and satirised in Erchomenon and Across the Zodiac. In Marie 
Schneider, Ellis saw a child who had been failed by society, her criminal tendencies 
having been allowed to develop into moral insanity, the specifics of such a transition 
revealed in her case study. If criminological enquiry was to be directed anywhere, it 
was in the prevention or identification and treatment of those whose anti-social 
impulses were in danger of propelling them across the border. The possibility of 
salvation hung in the haze of the borderland. If the threshold was crossed, the best one 
could hope for was palliative care. Criminal tendencies had to be detected and treated 
at the earliest possible age.329 
 Ellis repeatedly demonstrates that there existed fundamental differences 
between anti-social feelings or moral perversions and the idea of a fatally marked 
criminal constitution, that an individual can be afflicted with certain predispositions to 
aberrant behaviour without suffering from a somatic or pathological abnormality. 
Existing in all children, he considered such feelings were also ‘far from uncommon’ 
amongst adults.330 The idea that anti-social sentiments in the individual could engender 
anti-social acts was not merely the result of reading and constructing aetiological 
narratives of crimes. On a conceptual level, Ellis would question why society related 
the criminal to the vicious savage or the pathological degenerate when it could turn a 
blind eye to the atrocities committed by individuals in the name of war. In the same 
way that Tarde’s sociological perspective saw criminal actions result naturally from 
the typically unstable matrix of social relations, only to be labelled ‘criminal’ in their 
contradiction of collective dominant values, Ellis would assume a position that can 
easily be applied to his studies into sexuality, positing that if society considered the 
killing of a fellow citizen ‘murder’ and the killing of an enemy soldier ‘warfare’, our 
relationships with one another needed serious reconsideration.331 
 
 
 
The Criminal (2): The Anti-Social Society 
                                                 
329  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 300. 
330  Ibid., p. 7. 
331  Ibid., p. 206. For a recent interpretation of Tarde’s sociological understanding of crime, see Sergio 
Tonkonoff, ‘Crime as social excess: Reconstructing Gabriel Tarde’s criminal sociology’, History of 
the Human Sciences, 27, 2 (2014), 60-74. 
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In introducing the first criminal type in the opening of his text, Ellis presented an 
important figure, one that we will later encounter in Carpenter’s thought, and one that 
bears similarities to Thomas Carlyle’s (1795-1881) and Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844-
1900) morally transcendent Hero and Superman, an individual who is ascribed the 
status of ‘criminal’ by an antagonistic society, and who may have been ‘the hero, 
martyr, saint, of another land or age’. It is here that Ellis introduces his understanding 
of the notion ‘anti-social’, an integral concept to his criminological and sociopolitical 
thought. The political criminal, to which we now turn, could not be reduced to one who 
raged terror against the social situation of which he reviled, but had to be understood 
as the antithetical agent of a society ‘which may itself be anti-social’.332 Such a figure 
was both formed in and responsible for creating the waves of political violence at the 
end of the nineteenth century. 
Following the birth and brutal death of the 1870/1871 Paris Commune, and 
reinforced by the misery of the Long Depression and growing public feeling of social 
injustice, sociopolitical unrest and agitation became an almost inherent component of 
life. At the end of the 1870s and beginning of the 1880s political violence in Europe 
had become more frequent, injurious, and momentous, reaching a climax in the 
assassination of Alexander II in 1881. Political terrorism and violent propaganda by 
the deed commonly looked to write a bloodied message proselytising that the 
illusionary natural order of things could be demolished, so as to allow for new worlds 
to grow amidst the ruins. Such semantics, however, were easily lost in translation, the 
violent, visceral reality of the act subsuming much of the ideological substance. 
Alexander II’s killing was the first of a number of significant events and affairs that 
would strongly tie bloodshed and bomb plots to the anarchist movement, helping to 
provoke the medicalised discourses of deviancy to portray individuals sympathetic to 
anarchic ideas as congenitally degenerate, criminally insane, at all times prone to 
violent behaviour.333 Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century the anarchist was so 
                                                 
332  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 1.  
333  Edward J. Erickson considers the psychopathologisation of anarchists by criminologists in France – 
and the hostility that such a model received by jurists – in ‘Punishing the Mad Bomber: Questions 
of Moral Responsibility in the Trials of French Anarchist Terrorists, 1886-1897’, French History, 
22, 1 (2008), 51-73. For how psychopathology and the anarchist was united in Italy, but less so in 
Spain, see Richard Bach Jensen, ‘Criminal Anthropology and Anarchist Terrorism in Spain and 
Italy’, Mediterranean Historical Review, 16, 2 (2001), 31-44.  
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closely associated with the terroristic political villain the two were almost 
synonymous.334 
Though Ellis did not explicitly associate the political criminal with the anarchist 
in 1890, he would in later editions of the text. In the 1901 edition he discussed Charles 
Perrier’s (1862-1938) study of prisoners incarcerated in Nîmes, 335  reiterating the 
findings that the majority of those condemned for crimes under the name of anarchy 
were not anarchists at all, and that the related acts of terrorism were predominately 
committed by ‘ordinary criminals professing to be anarchists in order to frighten the 
authorities’.336 Ellis also mentions that of the 859 prisoners Perrier studied, only two 
were regarded as ‘real anarchists’, who had no disorder of intellect, were studious, 
reserved, and rather estimable figures.337 In the next edition of The Criminal, in 1910, 
Ellis writes a rather extensive note to his introduction of the political criminal. Over 
six pages, he discusses the two opposing schools of thought that contemplate the 
anarchist assassin. Whereas some presented anarchist offenders as political criminals 
impelled by ideological fervour, such as French jurist Louis Proal (1843-1900)338 and 
neurologist Edward Spitzka (1852-1914),339 physicians operating in the domain of the 
                                                 
334  For a history of the relationship between anarchism and terrorism in this period, including the 
contemporary perceptions of such a relationship, see Richard Bach Jensen, The Battle against 
Anarchist Terrorism: An International History, 1878–1934 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014).  
335  Charles Perrier, Les Criminels (Lyon: A. Storck, 1900).  
336  Ellis, The Criminal, third ed., p. 191. 
337  Ibid. In 1900 Ellis had written a short review of Les Criminels for the Journal of Mental Science. 
As expressed in The Criminal, his main interest in Perrier’s lengthy and highly detailed work is its 
brief refutation of supposed anarchist criminals and ‘defence’ of truly anarchist prisoners. 
Havelock Ellis, review of Les Criminels by Charles Perrier, Journal of Mental Science, 46, 194 
(1900), 537 (p. 537). 
338  Louis Proal dedicated a chapter to anarchist crime in La Criminalité Politique in 1895 (an English 
translation appeared in 1898). He saw the anarchists’ political ideology and social malcontent as 
generating the criminal intent and act. With that said, he also considered further explanation to be 
found ‘in the fanaticism that animates them and in the vanity by which they are eaten up’. Louis 
Proal, Political Crime (New York, NY: D Appleton and Company, 1898), p. 79. 
339  Edward C. Spitzka would express animosity to the scientific assertions that anarchist assassins and 
other ‘regenticides’ should by definition share the same space occupied by criminals suffering from 
insanity or degeneracy. See, for example, E. C. Spitzka, ‘Regenticides not Abnormal as a Class. A 
Protest Against the Chimera of “Degeneracy”’, Philadelphia Medical Journal, 9, 6 (1902), 261-68, 
and idem, ‘Political Assassins: Are They All Insane?’, The Journal of Mental Pathology, 2, 1 
(1902), 69-82. 
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mental sciences – Emanuel Régis (1855-1918)340 and Eugene Talbot (1847-1925),341 
for example – unsurprisingly grouped them into the same class of criminals as those 
driven by insanity.342 Ellis would place himself amongst the former group, which 
occupied a middle ground, he thought, between those that erroneously believed all 
anarchist assassins surely suffered from insanity and those that believed they are merely 
ordinary criminals who offend for personal gain:  
 
The genuine anarchist attacks rulers or leaders in the social state; far 
from seeking personal gain he knows that he is almost certainly 
devoting his own life to the cause he has at heart, and he seeks to justify 
his act by regarding it as a protest against a social system which is 
responsible for an incalculable amount of misery and death. No doubt it 
may be maintained that such acts of violence and such a standpoint are 
not strictly compatible with anarchism; the anarchist holds that the evils 
of the present social state are due to its violence and its forcible 
suppression of spontaneous social activity. Therefore by adopting the 
method of assassination he is accepting in its very worst form the evil 
he condemns.343 
 
Ellis’ criminological understanding led him to the conclusion that the anti-social 
environment against which the anarchist rebels is directly responsible for the anti-social 
actions the anarchist commits, even if those actions betray the agent’s ideal. Shown by 
statistics to be young and relatively uneducated, the anarchist regenticide’s heinous 
deeds are born out of ‘the most exalted and self-sacrificing altruism’. Such a motivation 
convinces one that to eradicate the suffering and poverty wrought by this life there is 
but one solution: ‘the present social system must be destroyed to give way to a 
better’.344 
                                                 
340  Emanuel Régis took the opposing view to Spitzka. For him, the regicide was a particular criminal 
type. Though separated in their proclaimed dogmatic proclivity, be it of a religious, political, or 
racial countenance, regicides were united in that they were ‘[d]egenerates of a mystic 
temperament’, suffering from ‘delirium, complicated sometimes by hallucinations’, who will 
‘under the influence of an obsession that is irresistible, kill some great personage, in the name of 
God, the country, Liberty or Anarchy’. E. Régis, ‘The Regicides’, The Journal of Mental 
Pathology 1, 3 (1901), 135-45 (p. 145). 
341  Eugene S. Talbot, an American physician and professor of dental surgery, was a strong proponent 
of ideas that saw degeneration and atavistic stigmata as central markers of criminality. In 
‘Degeneracy and Political Assassination’ he attested that the frequency of degenerative markers 
observed in regenticides casts doubt on the view that such crimes are environmentally engendered. 
See Eugene S. Talbot, ‘Degeneracy and Political Assassination’, Developmental Pathology 
(Chicago, IL: [S.n.], 1905). First published in Medicine (1901).  
342  Ellis, ‘Appendix E. Additional Notes to Fourth Edition’ in The Criminal, fourth ed. (London: The 
Walter Scott Publishing Co. Ltd., 1910), pp. 412-432. 
343  Ibid., p. 413. 
344  Ibid., p. 417. 
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Ellis turned on its head the commonly held belief that the political criminal was 
a figure devoid of reason or will, frenziedly acting upon his maniacal impulses to maim 
and kill. Instead, his actions were a conscious (albeit uneducated) response to his 
perceived destructive, anti-social environment, founded upon altruistic principles. 
Similarly defended was the ‘criminal by passion’. Passion and crime was a popular 
pairing in the Victorian press and fictional literature, reflecting and generating the 
public enthusiasm for sensationalism. As it began to be encircled by the psychiatric 
discourse of insanity, the basis of one’s impassioned moment of criminality could be 
conceptualised as a psychological condition. 345  Ellis again presented the idea that 
strong social feelings could result in criminal acts, this time erupting from one’s 
unbalanced emotions in a largely involuntary response to a set of unfortunate 
circumstances. Here, an honest individual ‘possessed of keen, even exaggerated 
sensibilities [… would] under the stress of some great, unmerited wrong […] wrought 
justice for himself […in] sudden madness’. 346  Whereas the political criminal, 
possessing strong social sentiments, would wilfully respond to his circumstances with 
unlawful action, the impassioned criminal, overcome by the same feelings, would 
commit an offence in momentary insanity. In the first instance, sociopolitical 
circumstances act upon the individual to generate criminal thought. In the second, more 
personal, private affairs invoke underlying predispositions to violent outbursts. 
Affecting one’s psychological constitution, passion was to relate to crime in the same 
way that insanity did when it came to the question of criminal responsibility. 
His sociological reading of crime, largely informed by his critical readings of 
Lacassagne, Quetelet, and Tarde, would underpin Ellis’ understanding of ‘occasional 
crime’. Though the political criminal and the ‘criminal by passion’ both fit into such a 
typological variant, the occasional criminal could remain distinct from the two, not 
necessarily possessing nor characterised by heightened social instincts. In fact, the 
examples of occasional criminals provided by Ellis are in common in that they resort 
                                                 
345  The crime of passion is one of the few subject areas that saw widespread consensus amongst 
criminological schools of thought. Lombroso and Ferri would join Lacassagne and Tarde treating 
such a category as ‘less criminal’, the criminal by passion almost indistinguishable from their non-
criminal counterparts. This shared anthropological depiction that diminished such a criminal’s 
criminality or anti-social character was to appear with increasing frequency in criminal trials in the 
nineteenth century, perhaps most notably in France, where cases of ‘crimes passionel’ were seen, to 
the alarm of some, to increasingly result in acquittal. See Eliza Earle Ferguson, ‘Judicial Authority 
And Popular Justice: Crimes of Passion in Fin-de-Siècle Paris’, Journal of Social History, 40, 2 
(2006), 293-315.  
346  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 2. 
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to crime out of necessity, each individual is found stealing to feed oneself or one’s 
children. Once again, the anti-social environment is depicted as a source of such 
criminal behaviour. Furthermore, there was a significant risk that the deleterious effects 
of punishment would transform the occasional criminal into the recidivist, the evils of 
one’s surroundings again being charged as influencing their actions.347 With each of 
these three ‘types’ – the political, impassioned, and occasional – the individual is made 
to concede considerable agency to the social: inharmonious sociopolitical conditions 
give rise to the terrorist as it does the martyr who wilfully rages against the status quo; 
unfortunate circumstances often concerning the relationships between men and women 
bring about frenzied psychological episodes that can lead to acts of brutality; and the 
iniquitous socioeconomic world rears the criminal who steals out of necessity for 
survival. The social conditions of life were themselves guilty. They could blacken 
rational thought, aggravate good-natured passions, and remove the choice to act 
socially. Ellis traced crime not only to its psychopathological roots in the figure of the 
morally insane, but to all areas of human life. Crime, he insisted, when analysed 
thoroughly and scientifically, ‘will be found not to stand alone’ but ‘made up of fibres 
that extend to every part of our social life.348 
 
 
Utopian Impulses 
 
Crime was of course not the only subject that encouraged widespread concerns about 
decline and disorder in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. War, race, labour, 
health, population, private lives – such were but a handful of the issues that revolved 
around that extensive discourse of social (dis)organisation. Right across the northern 
hemisphere pervaded the notion that large-scale efforts of national reform had not 
brought about universal well-being, and disorder, strikes and riots saturated the 1880s 
and early 1890s. The economic and industrial boom in America was found to be a mere 
‘gild’ that lay over underlying social deprivation. Russia’s era of Great Reform had if 
anything encouraged the growth of malcontent directed at the sociopolitical situation. 
From country to country radical and revolutionary movements mobilised and grew, 
                                                 
347  Ellis, The Criminal, pp. 18-19. 
348  Ibid., p. 302. 
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both in number and in influence. Their calls for social change varied from the modest 
to the far-reaching, their methods from political reform to political terror. And yet, 
although the social conditions were a cause of the widespread discontent, a new way 
of life glittered on the horizon, pinpointed by the approaching threshold of the twentieth 
century. Ellis’ criminological concerns did not dampen his spirits: 
 
The problem of criminality is not an isolated one that can be dealt with 
by fixing our attention on that and that alone. It is a problem that on 
closer view is found to merge itself very largely into all those problems 
of our social life that are now pressing for solution, and in settling them 
we shall to a great extent settle it. The rising flood of criminality is not 
an argument for pessimism or despair. It is merely an additional spur to 
that great task of social organisation to which during the coming century 
we are called.349 
 
Ellis’ hopes and calls for change were optimistically directed towards wide-reaching 
social reorganisation. Though his panorama was occupied by a multitude of various 
subject areas, one must no longer misinterpret his political outlook as disparate, merely 
reactionary.350 Joining Carpenter at the Fellowship of the New Life, Ellis presented a 
‘new politics’ that looked to penetrate both private and public life with the authority of 
secular naturalism, the epistemological frame through which he would look to find the 
solution that would secure the health and well-being of both the individual and 
society.351  He would much later profess that his ideal view of society was indebted to 
that of Rousseau who, in Ellis’ reading, rightly saw the individual as both a 
distinguishable, sovereign unit whose unique set of colours were as natural as the next 
                                                 
349  Ellis, The Criminal, p. 297. Such oscillation between hope and despair, expressed here in rather 
utopian terms, is the focus of Pick’s 1989 study of what he calls ‘the interlocking languages of 
progress and degeneration’. Pick, Faces of Degeneration, p. 3. 
350  Phyllis Grosskurth’s position that Ellis’ politics is rather translucent and fleeting is perhaps the 
strongest of its kind, but Nottingham has rather comprehensively put these interpretations to bed by 
convincingly presenting his work and thought as belonging to that progressive ‘new politics’ of the 
late nineteenth century. Nottingham The Pursuit of Serenity, in particular pp. 173-218. For 
Grosskurth’s comments on Ellis’ apolitical stance, see Phyllis Grosskurth, Havelock Ellis: A 
Biography (London: Allen Lane, 1980), p. 61. Crozier, too, warrants credit for placing Ellis’ 
sexology in its sociopolitical context. Ivan Crozier, ‘Introduction: Havelock Ellis, John Addington 
Symonds and the Construction of Sexual Inversion’ in Ellis and Symonds, Sexual Inversion, pp. 1-
86. 
351  Carpenter became a good friend of Ellis and would help him with his sexological enquiries by 
providing case studies, not only of himself, but of friends and acquaintances. 
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and, at the same time, an embodiment of a collective whole. 352  Though Ellis 
unsurprisingly criticised what he saw as Rousseau’s elevation in the Second Discourse 
of the passions at the expense of reason as the fundamental force for good in social 
organisation, he nevertheless found in ‘the champion of the rights of passion’ the roots 
of a revolutionary ‘no’ to the artificiality of Victorian social mores that retarded natural 
individuality.353 
Ellis fictionalised his critique of Victorian ethics in The Nineteenth Century: A 
Dialogue in Utopia (1900) in the first year of the new century. Therein the reader 
encounters a discussion held in the far-off future between a historian – the voice of 
Ellis – and a young, inquisitive traveller; the flawed practices, institutions, and 
‘mentalité’ of the nominal age the object of their conversation. The historian describes 
three conditions existing in the nineteenth century that distinguishes it from his and his 
interlocutor’s era: the violence of nationhood; the misdirection of science and the 
misunderstanding of its role; and the lack of varied, ‘natural’ individuality. Each 
criticism could be comfortably placed within most reformist programmes of Ellis’ time, 
respectively corresponding to anti-war and anti-imperialism sentiments, the fears that 
surrounded the use and misuse of science and technology, and a romantic individualism 
that yearned for a bygone way of life. Yet those very individuals who were most likely 
to have made such condemnatory evaluations of their age were also subjected to Ellis’ 
censure. The reformer who expressed excessive ‘moral force’ sought only to impose 
on the individual another set of ‘sacred’ values. In its suppression of natural freedoms, 
‘moral force was just as dangerous and anti-social as physical force’.354 Any social 
code that did not allow for the free play of individual thought and predilection was at 
once anti-social. Ellis looked towards a vibrant, diverse society wherein all of 
humankind’s varied natural impulses could be brought into harmonious activity: 
 
The fundamental instincts and aptitudes of men can never change, nor 
the joys and sorrows they bring, but we can allow them to play in this 
direction or in that; we can bar the roads that make for inhumanity; we 
                                                 
352  The anarchistic individualism that Ellis saw in Rousseau was that found in his Second Discourse 
(entitled ‘A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality’) and the qualities of socialism in The Social 
Contract. Havelock Ellis, From Rousseau to Proust (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1936), 
pp. 97-98. For the Second Discourse, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘A Discourse on the Origin of 
Inequality’ in The Social Contract and Discourses by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp. 155-246. First 
published in 1754. 
353  Ibid., pp. 107-08. 
354  Havelock Ellis, The Nineteenth Century: A Dialogue in Utopia (London: Grant Richards, 1900), p. 
71. 
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can smooth those that make for humanity […] [Eventually,] artificial 
barriers fall, and men are free to develop their own impulses in infinite 
diversity.355  
 
The natural inclinations of individuals had to be freed from the fear of Victorian 
recrimination, and stable, supportive banks had to be built to encourage their natural 
and varied flow. This remains the most consistent paradigm of Ellis’ sociopolitical 
thought. Eradicating the artificial immoralisation of aberrant personal impulses and 
harmonising all life with the natural sciences would form the basis of a new morality. 
Just as he had stressed when writing about dealing with the criminal, and as he would 
do so throughout his sexological studies, Ellis concluded his utopian novel by 
remarking that such a way of life was possible only once human relationships were 
fully understood and valued.356 
Pursuing a knowledge of human relationships, Ellis began the twentieth century 
occupied with investigating the matters of sexual psychology, a passage of his scientific 
thought he had first introduced in Man and Woman: a Study of Human Secondary 
Sexual Characters (1894). The analysis of sexual drives and sexuality as scientific 
objects had emerged in Europe in the 1880s, and sexology as a discipline born in 1886 
with the publication of Austro-German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s (1840-
1902) Psychopathia Sexualis.357 His opening sexological work, Sexual Inversion, was 
the first of his seven-volume series Studies in the Psychology of Sex.358 Introducing the 
text, he explained that his reason for devoting a whole volume to the subject of 
homosexuality was that those who were the ‘congenital subjects’ of what was a ‘natural 
and normal’ instinct were the victims of English law and social stigma.359 Ellis, in 
agreement with Carpenter, believed that while homosexuality was a deviation from the 
‘normal’ impulses, it was nevertheless ‘natural’: 
 
                                                 
355  Ibid, pp. 123-124. 
356  Ibid., pp. 123-124. 
357  For Krafft-Ebing’s sexological thought and influence on the discipline’s emergence and 
development, see Harry Oosterhuis, Stepchildren of Nature: Krafft-Ebing, psychiatry, and the 
making of sexual identity (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2000). For the emergence 
and development of sexology in Britain in the period of this thesis’ focus, see Lesley A. Hall, Sex, 
Gender and Social Change in Britain Since 1880, second ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012), pp. 1-69. 
358  Though completed in 1897, the nominal first text of Studies in the Psychology of Sex was The 
Evolution of Modesty, first published in 1899. The complicated history of the initial publication of 
Sexual Inversion is covered in Crozier, ‘Introduction’ in Ellis and Symonds, Sexual Inversion, pp. 
53-60. 
359  Ellis and Symonds, Sexual Inversion, p. 92. 
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When I review the cases I have brought forward and the mental history 
of inverts I have known, I am inclined to say that if we can enable an 
invert to be healthy, self-restrained, and self-respecting, we have often 
done better than to convert him into the mere feeble simulacrum of a 
normal man. […] The method of self-restraint and self-culture, without 
self-repression, seems to be the most rational method of dealing with 
sexual inversion when that condition is really organic and deep-rooted. 
It is better that a man should be enabled to make the best of his own 
strong natural instincts, with all their disadvantages, than that he should 
be unsexed and perverted, crushed into a position which he has no 
natural aptitude to occupy.360 
 
The healthy individual who was able to restrain anti-social impulses and yet ‘make the 
best of’ his instinctual nature – whether homosexual or otherwise – did not warrant the 
treatment they received from the Victorian moralists. It was an outrage to Ellis that the 
private conduct of individuals could be brought into the domain of the law, as the 1885 
Criminal Law Amendment Act had done so with sexual activity between men. His 
belief in the free play of individual instincts, whilst ensuring they were not directed 
towards anti-social ends, was prevalent in his sexology as it was in all of his thought. 
Homosexual instincts were as abnormal as those congenital variations that constituted 
genius or the exaggerated impulses that predisposed one to ‘criminal’ behaviour.361 
Feelings and emotions were not to be eradicated or repressed. Instead they were to be 
understood through scientific education, freed from the counterfeit currency of ‘vice’ 
and ‘virtue’, and brought under the individual’s control. This was Ellis’ priority in his 
manifesto for social organisation of the future. It was on this matter alone that in 1904 
Ellis would praise Wells in his review of Mankind in the Making, commending his 
advocation of a ‘sane, wholesome, frank’ sexual education that would leave behind 
what Wells called ‘the age of nasty sentiment, sham delicacy, and giggles’.362 
Ellis’ position on sex and sexuality is related to his support for what he sees in 
Rousseau’s collectivist-individualism,363 tied by the stressed importance of both the 
individual’s passions and his reasoned, socially directed thought, to the benefit of all. 
                                                 
360  Ibid., p. 214. My emphasis. 
361  Ellis and Symonds, Sexual Inversion, pp. 204-7. 
362  Havelock Ellis, ‘Another Prophet: H. G. Wells’ in Views and Reviews: A Selection of Uncollected 
Articles 1884-1932 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1932), 204-12 (p. 212). First published in Weekly 
Critical Review (1904). 
363  The reconciliatory interpretation of Rousseau as promulgating the idea that man was (or capable of 
being) both individualist- and collectivist-minded – as Ellis seems to have seen him – has been 
adequately put forward in recent years. See Jonathan Marks, Perfection and Disharmony in the 
Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 54-88. 
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It was also anchored by his engagement with the thought of Nietzsche. Even though 
the immoralist’s reputation in Britain would be accounted more by his supposed 
philosophical connections with Nazism, Ellis played a central role in introducing his 
ideas in Britain.364 Ellis represented such thought as a meeting of that of Rousseau and 
the ‘man of moral force’. He saw in him both Rousseau’s elevation of the individual 
but discredit of reason and the man of moral force’s fight against convention but 
insistence on his own moral code. As such, Ellis would on the one hand pour acclaim 
onto Nietzsche for his proclamation of the individuality in man and for his contempt 
for social mores and custom,365 but on the other disdain for his ‘third stage’ of unreason 
(admittedly complicated by mental illness) and the imposition of his own ‘master-
morality’. 366  Such immoralism, as Ellis saw it, would allow for the unrestrained 
unleashing of the passions, dangerously uncoordinated by reason. Nietzsche’s master-
morality would be nothing but a monster’s morality, that of the instinctive criminal 
whose absence of the inhibiting, socially directed impulses allow for the self-seeking 
instincts to run amok and bring ruin.367 At the same time, the master-morality appeared 
to Ellis as yet another decreed set of principles, thus antagonistic to individual human 
thought and conduct. Freedom and fluidity continually defined his utopian impulse. 
The Nietzsche he celebrated and with whom he identified was that of the middle period, 
‘a freethinker, emancipated from every law save that of sincerity’ and though ‘often 
impassioned, as yet always able to follow his own ideal of self-restraint’.368 Though it 
was a difficult balancing act, Ellis consistently held both freedom and self-restraint as 
the necessary conditions of all social organisation, needed to remedy ‘the relationship 
between men’. It can be found in his criminological perspective, whereby instinct-
repressing secular and religious codes merely weaken an individual’s constitution, who 
instead needed the social, psychological and biological support to allow for innate 
morality to ‘hold its opposing immorality in check’. 369  It can be found in his 
                                                 
364  Dan Stone, Breeding Superman: Nietzsche, Race and Eugenics in Edwardian and Interwar Britain 
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368  Ellis, Affirmations, p. 35. 
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sexological views, whereby all impulses, normal and abnormal, must be permitted free 
expression, so long as one’s fellow men and women did not suffer harm. And it can be 
found, in its most troublesome form, in his writing on eugenics. 
 
 
Eugenics 
 
Largely lacking in the faculties of reason or restraint, prone to impulsively acting on 
the rush of passions or strong belief, the criminal and his behaviour would be a product 
of biological and psychosocial conditions. Moral and legal responsibility of one’s 
actions was a difficult notion to define, understand, and locate, existing as it did 
somewhere on that uncertain borderland between unreason and malice.370 For Ellis, 
however, it did not have to be an uncertainty upon which to dwell too long. Writing in 
1900, perhaps with thoughts of utopian statecraft still fresh in his mind, he would 
address the problem of responsibility rather curtly in the new preface to the third edition 
of The Criminal: 
 
The antiquated traditions concerning “responsibility” which rule in our 
law courts make it necessary to waste an extraordinary amount of time 
and energy, and to pile up many metaphysical absurdities, in deciding 
whether a criminal is or is not “responsible”;—a state of things long 
since satirised by the brilliant author of Erewhon. It is really all very 
unnecessary. “Responsible” or “irresponsible,” sane or insane, it is still 
necessary, alike in the interests of society and of the criminal himself, 
that the criminal should be brought into a condition in which he will no 
longer be injurious to society, or, failing that, be secluded from society. 
Doubtless it must remain the primary business of law to ascertain the 
facts of the crime. But it must become the business of science to deal 
with the criminal.371 
 
A rather illiberal shadow of Ellis’ criminological thought comes into the foreground. 
Criminal responsibility was to be disregarded by ‘the business of science’. The question 
                                                 
370  Wiener’s historical purview of the origins, development, uses, and effects of the notion of criminal 
responsibility in this period remains in my opinion the soundest. See Wiener, Reconstructing the 
Criminal, in particular pp. 83-91, 122-41, and 143-224.  
371  Ellis, The Criminal, third ed., pp. xvii-xviii. Samuel Butler’s 1872 satirical utopia Erewhon turns 
the Victorian notion of criminal responsibility on its head in an attempt to expose its inadequacies. 
In Erewhon those who willingly offend are treated with compassion and helped to recover from 
their ‘malady’, whilst those who suffer from illness and misfortune are found guilty and punished 
accordingly. 
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of how and to what extent the interests of society would come to limit the individual’s 
behaviour bubbled under Ellis’ words, and would increasingly disturb that ideal picture 
of individual freedom.372 
 Ellis’ enquiries into sex and sexuality were directed towards developing the 
epistemological field of deviance and abnormality. They were also of a sociopolitical 
pursuit in that he believed they would have a fundamental use in the social organisation 
of future generations. His studies very soon became preoccupied not with deviance, but 
with the matter of procreation. Long had he been preoccupied with the study of 
heredity, and in 1901 produced a series of articles entitled ‘A Study of British Genius’ 
printed monthly in Popular Science Monthly, an investigation ‘to start from the point 
where Mr. Galton’s [Hereditary Genius] left off’.373 The first time these two areas of 
enquiry, sex and heredity, explicitly met in Ellis’ writing was in his response to 
Galton’s eugenic paper ‘Restrictions in Marriage’, read before the Sociological Society 
at the University of London on Valentine’s Day, no less, in 1906. The movement for 
eugenic legislation had gained momentum two years earlier, which saw Galton’s 
inaugural lecture at the Sociological Society in 1904 and the government’s appointment 
later that year of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feeble-Minded. 
In his response, Ellis agreed that it would be to society’s benefit if those that could be 
described as ‘bad stocks’ were to not propagate. But he was critical here of Galton’s 
ideas in a similar vein as he was to those of Lombroso in The Criminal: theirs were 
noble, scientific pursuits but their conclusions were, as Wells had found, perhaps a little 
premature, lacking in the same scientific rigour with which they carried out their 
investigations. In particular, Ellis was not an advocate for the ‘artificial manipulation’ 
in human progeny. And yet there was an ambiguity in this position of his that would 
repeatedly emerge in his writing on eugenics throughout his life: 
 
It would be something, however, if we could put a drag on the 
propagation of definitely bad stocks, by educating public opinion and 
so helping forward the hemigamy, or whatever it is to be called, that Mr. 
                                                 
372  This questionable aspect of Ellis’ social philosophy is perhaps well represented in his new 
appendix on the Elmira prison. Despite investigations during the 1890s into the physical and 
mental abuse of prisoners, he would still staunchly defend the methods and goals of the institution. 
See Ellis, ‘Appendix C. Elmira’, in The Criminal, third ed. (London: Walter Scott, 1901), pp. 392-
95, 400-02. For the ‘benevolent repression’ of prisoners at Elmira during these years, see 
Alexander W. Pisciotta, Benevolent Repression: Social Control and the American Reformatory-
Prison Movement (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 33-59. 
373  Ellis, A Study of British Genius (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1904), p. viii. First published as a 
series of articles in 1901. 
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Galton foresees. When two stocks are heavily tainted, and both tainted 
in the same direction, it ought to be generally felt that union, for the 
purposes of procreation, is out of the question. There ought to be a social 
conscience in such matters. When, as in a case known to me, an epileptic 
woman conceals her condition from the man she marries, it ought to be 
felt that an offence has been committed serious enough to annul the 
marriage contract.374 
 
Ellis fell short of supporting the idea of legislative means to pursue eugenical ends in 
marriage. It begged the question, nevertheless, of what possible form of coercive 
powers a ‘social conscience’ would be able to generate and, regarding the annulment 
of marriage to which he refers, exactly whose feelings would be representative of such 
sentiment? This question of legality would run through his career when it came to the 
social question of marriage, sex, and parentage. In ‘Eugenics and St. Valentine’, an 
article that extends his written response to Galton’s lecture, Ellis categorically stated: 
 
In considering this question, therefore, we are justified in putting aside 
not only every kind of human breeding resembling the artificial 
breeding of animals, but also, at all events for the present, every 
compulsory prohibition on marriage or procreation. We must be content 
to concern ourselves with ideals, and with the endeavour to exert our 
personal influence in the realisation of these ideals.375  
 
Rather than enforced through arbitrary, legal prohibitions, the eugenic ideal would ‘be 
absorbed into the conscience of the community like a kind of new religion, and would 
instinctively and unconsciously influence the impulses of men and women’.376 Rather 
than hasty legislative reform, Ellis hoped for a gradual revolution of universal thought 
towards such matters, a sexual enlightenment. This was not entirely directed at the 
working or unworking poor, the target of so many eugenic agendas, that which has 
been shown to have formed the bulk of Well’s definition of the ‘unfit’. Ellis was 
particularly concerned with the ‘fatal influence of wealth and position’ that made 
prospective suitors attractive, those couples that would never partner ‘were love and 
eugenic ideals left to go hand in hand’. Just as Kropotkin would argue at the 1912 
                                                 
374  Ellis, ‘Written Communications’, Sociological Papers, 2 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1906), 27-28 
(p. 28). 
375  Ellis ‘Eugenics and St. Valentine’, The Nineteenth Century and After: A Monthly Review, 59, 351 
(1906), 779-87 (p. 781). 
376  Ibid., p. 786. 
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Eugenics Congress in London, Ellis expected the ‘eugenic ideal’ to grapple with the 
poor, with the criminal ‘and still more resolutely with the rich’.377 
It was another question altogether, however, for that class of individuals whose 
impulses would in all likelihood be unresponsive to the enlightenment of eugenic 
thought. Those members on the edges of the community who would not, he perceived, 
be in control of their reason and instincts were of significant concern for Ellis. By 1901, 
we must remember, he had classified the ‘mentally deficient’ as closely related if not 
identical with the instinctive criminal. By 1910 he clearly expressed support for the 
Royal Commission’s promotion of segregating the mentally deficient. Such procreative 
restraints would be a means, in his opinion, to assist the task of criminology.378 Such 
advocacy for legislative means for institutions to segregate the mentally deficient 
would be the furthest Ellis would go when it came to compulsory measures of 
prohibiting procreation. He would repeatedly state that the enforced sterilisation of the 
unfit – an idea that was gaining some popularity in early twentieth-century British 
discussions that concerned the treatment of the mentally disabled, and infamously 
advocated by Churchill – though a noble idea when adopted voluntarily, was 
tyrannical.379 But mirroring the lack of clarity in his views on marriage restrictions, 
with unstable notions of ‘social conscience’ and coercion, Ellis’ position on 
sterilisation would also become somewhat unsettled, perhaps affected by the horrors of 
war. Amongst his concluding remarks in ‘Birth-control and Eugenics’, published in 
The Eugenics Review in 1917, the tyranny of involuntary segregation and sterilisation 
does not anymore appear to him so unfavourable: 
 
[W]e need not trouble over-much concerning hasty eugenic legislation 
and the legal regulation of marriage. No doubt such legislation and 
regulation will from time to time be attempted, with whatever success, 
in new and crude communities. They have brought on eugenists the 
charge of being faddists and cranks. They may be disregarded. The lines 
of eugenic progress are clear. There will be time to invoke compulsion 
and the law when sound knowledge has become universal, and when we 
are quite sure that those who refuse to act in accordance with sound 
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knowledge refuse deliberately or because they are congenitally 
incapable of doing anything else. These constitute the irreducible 
nucleus of the incapable group. They are at one a real anti-social danger 
and a focus of racial poisons. But they are a comparatively small and 
entirely manageable number of persons. It is on this nucleus that we not 
only may but must apply such degree of pressure as may be necessary, 
alike in the interests of the community of to-day and the race of to-
morrow. This pressure may in the mildest degree consist of such 
elementary social inducements as the group may be amenable to, 
proceeding to sterilisation when these inducements fail, and in the 
ultimate and extreme degree to complete segregation.380 
 
Though Ellis made apparent there would be no ‘fatuous and futile methods of imposing 
[eugenic] compulsion on the community at large’, the endorsement of forcibly 
sterilising or segregating the ‘real anti-social danger’ is alarmingly clear here. 381 
Though he would later revert back to opposing all enforced sterilisation, even in the 
case of the institutionalised mentally deficient, Ellis clearly had trouble negotiating the 
line between his championed society of free, self-controlled individuals and the very 
real requirements of social order, complicated by the figure who lacked the faculties of 
reason and restraint. At the foundation of his sociopolitical pursuits he is caught in a 
struggle between, on the one hand, his utopian idealism and, on the other, his radical 
reformism. The belief in a higher, naturally collective conscience emerging through 
both education and the eradication of artificial restraints was in Ellis challenged by the 
demands of a more practical outlook on social reform directed at ridding society of its 
criminal and anti-social elements. 
 Crozier has interpreted Ellis’ positions on eugenics in light of his scientific 
naturalist principles.382 Nottingham reads them as part of his new politics in social 
organisation. 383  They are, of course, both correct. Scientific epistemology and 
methodology underlies all of Ellis’ writing on eugenics, crime and sexuality, and at the 
same time his political vision ran through his life’s work. Social organisation required 
the tools that scientific pursuit would provide, just as scientific enquiry was to be 
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directed by sociopolitical vision. Ellis saw society and its citizens as objects that could 
be explained and defined by the natural sciences, whilst the human body and its 
sociobiological relationships with those bodies that surrounded it could be penetrated 
and changed by politics. Society lived, and life had to be socialised. In ‘Individualism 
and Socialism’ (1912), a sequel of sorts to Grant Allen’s 1889 article of the same title 
and included as a chapter in The Task of Social Hygiene (1912), he would wed the 
biological and the social in no uncertain terms:  
 
Just as the animal is, as Hegel, the metaphysician, called it, a “nation,” 
and Dareste, the physiologist, a “city,” made up of cells which are 
individuals having a common ancestor, so the actual nation, the real 
city, is an animal made up of individuals which are cells having a 
common ancestor, or, as Oken long ago put it, individuals are the organs 
of the whole. Man is a social animal in constant action and reaction with 
all his fellows of the same group—a group which becomes ever greater 
as civilization advances—and socialism is merely the formal statement 
of this ultimate social fact.384 
 
In this view, the ideology of socialism was merely a sociobiological observation. 
Society was to the human individual what the latter was to the single cell, the 
development of cities and nations merely a matter of cellular multiplication. As each 
cell naturally worked collectively to secure the good health of the human body, the 
individual reproduced such cooperative tendencies towards the well-being of the social 
body. For Ellis, the natural sciences formed the epistemological basis of socialism. 
From this position, he would assert that the sociopolitical poles of individualism 
and socialism were separated along sociobiological lines, and their dichotomy was the 
conflict between the determinism of, respectively, hereditary design and that of the 
environment. Ellis saw in individualism the eugenic ideal; each stressing that well-
being is only ensured through self-regulation and self-improvement, and that the 
quality and robustness of individuals was integral to a strong and successful society. 
Equally, he interpreted socialism as an environmentalism that looked to ensure the 
welfare of the individual through harmonised social order, and a well-arranged society 
would guarantee the health and happiness of all. But Ellis believed that rather than a 
conflict between the two there was an ‘underlying harmony’ that needed to be 
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evoked.385 Though socialism was the ‘formal statement’ of the natural order, if it was 
pursued at the expense of the principles of individualism, he feared, it would result in 
the ‘unfit’ classes living comfortably, recklessly extending their blighted bloodlines, 
bringing ruin to society. For Ellis, the eugenic principles of individualism were needed 
to counter this susceptibility of socialism. In the task of social hygiene, ‘each is key to 
the other’. 386  The results of a harmonious individualism and socialism directing 
sociopolitical endeavours would result in healthy human bodies, freely acting on both 
impulse and reason, naturally directing their conduct towards social means. 
Ellis’ hopes for the consonance between individualism and socialism, 
replicated in that of the eugenic ideal and environmentalism, is founded on his wider 
sociobiological views. When he interacts with the thought of Nietzsche and Rousseau, 
he sees in their political ideas the same tensions that he encounters in his criminological 
and sexological studies. The individualism Ellis so admired in Nietzsche – that found 
in his middle period – stressed both impulsive self-expression and restraint of excess, 
wild and free movement but always control.387 The same advocacy of self-regulated 
passion has already been seen to flow through his writing on sex and sexuality. If such 
freedom was unaccompanied by temperance it would cause the ‘ignominious 
collapse’ 388  of the individual’s self-control and develop into a mania that would 
threaten the safety of society. Such was the danger of Nietzsche’s third-stage 
immoralism, and also of the excessive egoism of Max Stirner (1806-1856), who Ellis 
saw treading the borderland of insanity.389 Similarly, when Ellis reads in Rousseau’s 
The Social Contract the idea that social organisation shapes otherwise freely born men, 
he encounters the problem of sociobiological determinism, remarking how ‘disease, 
lunacy, prostitution, criminality are all the results of bad social and economic 
conditions’ unless congenital health is ensured.390 He approached the question of social 
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organisation in the same way that he would direct his criminological and sexological 
studies. In each case, at all times, Ellis was conducting a sociobiological enquiry into 
human relations. And from whatever line of enquiry he stood at, when he encountered 
the poor function of such relations he would find social and biological imbalances in 
reciprocity. ‘Unchecked’ socialism would result in the propagation of ‘the weak, the 
incompetent, and the defective’,391 whilst both rampant individualism and a sexually 
repressive society could lead to maniacal and hysterical behaviour. Anti-social passions 
could be invoked by an unjust and tyrannical society, and crime could be the result if 
the ‘natural’ criminal tendencies were not arrested in the young. For Ellis, addressing 
the problem of human relations was a matter of resolving both social and biological 
imbalances. 
Ellis saw the social reform of the nineteenth century as divided into four stages, 
each successive stage reinforcing its predecessor. The first was the attempts at making 
cities more hygienic and ordered, seen in for instance the creation of drainage and 
lighting systems, and the restructuring of policing. The second saw the legislation for 
and regulation of working conditions. Third came systematised and wider-reaching 
education. The fourth stage concerned the protection and support of the child from 
birth. Ellis’ eugenic ideals would form what he hoped to be the fifth stage of social 
organisation, ensuring the congenital health of the population. The purification of the 
stream of life at its source would rely on the previous stages; strong banks that would 
allow it to run its many, varied courses. Poorly organised, unsupportive banks would, 
of course, only muddy the waters. It had long been Ellis’ conviction that such a dual 
nature of social organisation, supporting both the environmental and hereditary 
domains of life, of which were the respective concerns of socialism and individualism, 
was necessary to stop the flood of criminality and anti-social behaviour: 
 
There are two factors, it must be remembered, in criminal heredity, as 
we commonly use the expression. There is the element of innate 
disposition, and there is the element of contagion from social 
environment. […] Practically, it is not always possible to disentangle 
these two factors; a bad home will usually mean something bad in the 
heredity in the strict sense.392 
 
                                                 
391  Ellis, The Task of Social Hygiene, p. 399. 
392  Ellis, The Criminal, pp. 91-92. 
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It would not be sufficient to rely solely on the environment or on heredity to prevent 
crime. A good environment could not prevent the birth of those with anti-social 
inclination, nor could good births prevent the making of criminality. A mutually 
reciprocal relationship existed between the two, a belief which led Ellis, like it did 
Wells, to think about the complexity of crime in that unsettled space that exists between 
the body and the environment. A bad home could not only encourage one to act 
criminally, but could infect the gene pool with criminality. And those with the ‘innate 
disposition’ of criminality could not only reproduce its kind, but build a bad home. This 
idea is inherent to Ellis’ dismissal of eugenic pursuits if done at the expense of the 
environmental conditions of life, and is surrounded by his unifying perspective of 
socialism and individualism. It is also, as has already been mentioned and will be 
elaborated later, very similar to the ideas expressed by Kropotkin at his speech at the 
Eugenics Congress of 1912. Indeed, Ellis’ belief in the harmony between individualism 
and socialism, articulated within a sociobiological discourse, is strikingly close to what 
Richard Morgan has shown to be Kropotkin’s biopolitical anarchist socialism.393 In an 
article in 1887 that would later be included as a chapter in The Task of Social Hygiene, 
discussing how nineteenth-century social organisation has seen some success in 
supporting both individual freedom and social cohesion, Ellis would state: 
 
These two tendencies, so far from being antagonistic, cannot even be 
carried out under modern conditions of life except together. It is only 
by social co-operation in regard to what is commonly called the physical 
side of life that it becomes possible for the individual to develop his own 
peculiar nature. The society of the future is a reasonable anarchy 
founded on a broad basis of Collectivism.394 
 
It can be assumed that the balanced, free play of passions, coordinated by reason, would 
in Ellis’ opinion flourish in a ‘reasonable anarchy’. Such a phrase describes the best of 
what he saw in Nietzsche and Rousseau. A ‘reasonable anarchy’ was Ellis’ utopia, 
portrayed as such in his 1900 novel: a free, expressive and accepting existence, devoid 
of sexual repression, congenital disease, and crime. 
 
 
                                                 
393  Richard Morgan, ‘The Interplay of Politics and Science in the Making of Petr Kropotkin's Modern 
Anarchism’ (unpublished PhD, University College London, 2015). 
394  Ellis, The Task of Social Hygiene (London: Constable & Co., 1912), p. 55. First published as an 
article in the Westminster Review (1887). 
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Chapter Four: Peter Kropotkin 
 
The contrast in tone between the wild anarchism of Prince Kropotkine’s 
French speeches and the studied moderation of his English magazine 
articles on Russian and French Prisons is very striking. In his speeches 
he is a wild dreamer and revolutionist of the most advanced type. In his 
articles he is a sober historian, narrating his own or his friends’ 
experiences; a moderate reformer, fully alive to the limits within which 
reforms are possible, and to the difficulties which beset, and too often 
defeat, the very best intentioned efforts at reform.395 
 
John Chapman, ‘Politics, Sociology, Voyages and Travels’ (1887) 
 
 
John Chapman (1821-1894) held in opposition the ‘wild dreaming’ of Kropotkin’s 
sociopolitical views and the ‘moderate reformism’ exhibited in his criminological 
work. Editing and writing for the Westminster Review whilst residing in Paris, having 
moved there in 1874, Chapman was in a suitable position to deliver to the British public 
a portrait of the man. And yet though he was depicted by Chapman as both a fierce 
anarchist who had three years earlier been arrested and tried by the French authorities 
and a measured social scientist who wrote a ‘sober’ account of crime and punishment 
whilst imprisoned in Lyon, the spaces in which Kropotkin simultaneously participated 
have been shown by those who have sought to understand his ideas to be rather less 
distinct. Ruth Kinna, in particular, has legitimatised the perspective that Kropotkin’s 
revolutionary political aims directed his anthropological studies on human biology and 
behavioural ecology. 396  And, more recently, Morgan has shown how Kropotkin’s 
political thought is to be seen as a site of ‘the fluid interplay of science [and] his 
understanding of anarchism’, wherein the transformative interaction between 
sociobiological knowledge and method and anarchist critique and projection allowed 
for Kropotkin to form a new, biopolitical anarchism. 397  The tone of his speeches 
compared to that of his articles on crime and prisons might well have been strikingly 
dissimilar. Yet that is not to say that Kropotkin’s sober endeavours into history, his 
                                                 
395  John Chapman, ‘Politics, Sociology, Voyages and Travels’, Westminster Review, 128, 1 (1887), 
498-504, p. 501. 
396  Ruth Kinna, ‘Kropotkin's Theory of Mutual Aid in Historical Context’, International Review of 
Social History, 40, 2 (1995), 259-83.  
397  Morgan, ‘Petr Kropotkin’s Modern Anarchism’, p. 171. 
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case studies and observations integral to an inductive-deductive method, and his 
reasoned, realistic conclusions devoid of utopian dreaming – all to which Chapman 
refers – were missing from his anarchist lectures. His revolutionary politics was 
intimately related to the epistemological assumptions and methodological approaches 
he had borrowed from the natural and social sciences. When Kropotkin conducted his 
sociobiological studies into crime, criminality, morality, and punitive technologies, it 
was at all times a political enquiry. There were instances, presumably unbeknownst to 
Chapman, when the two spaces – that of the criminological and that of the political – 
were more obviously coalescent: 
 
Burn the guillotines; demolish the prisons; drive away the judges, 
policemen and informers […] No more laws! No more judges! Liberty, 
equality, and practical human sympathy are the only effectual barriers 
we can oppose to the anti-social instincts of certain among us.398 
  
Kropotkin’s discussion of crime and punishment could at times ring of his ‘wild 
anarchism’.  
 
 
In Russian and French Prisons 
 
Kropotkin’s first writing on prisons appeared at the beginning of the eighties, timely 
reflections of the previous decade’s swell in revolutionary activity and political trials, 
of which his own experience included two years’ detention in St Petersburg’s Peter and 
Paul Fortress following his arrest in 1873 for political agitation. ‘An Appeal to the 
Young’ (1880), written with the intent to ignite the revolutionary spirit amongst the 
youth of Europe, included an overview of his objections to the prison system: such 
punishment is unfair to the individual who is forced to steal to feed family members; it 
is unsuitable for those whose criminal behaviour is caused by mental illness; and 
penalising the ill-fated members of an inequitable society with imprisonment is 
illogical, for it is the very environment itself – wherein there reverberates the mantra 
                                                 
398  Peter Kropotkin, Law and Authority. An Anarchist Essay (London: International Publishing Co., 
1886), p. 23. First published in French as ‘La Loi et l’Autorité’ in Le Révolté (1882). 
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of all-against-all individualism – that is accountable.399 Following ‘To The Young’, 
and after briefly discussing the deplorable conditions of Russia’s prisons in an article 
that addressed the treatment of revolutionaries during Alexander II’s reign, 400 
Kropotkin extended his criticism of penal servitude in general in ‘Law and Authority’ 
(1882). Perhaps more worrying than those failures listed in his previous castigations, 
incarceration, Kropotkin insisted, was harmful to individuals’ moral and mental 
faculties.401 Rather than a punitive measure that both deters individuals from acting 
immorally and rehabilitates those who have already done so, the prison is an incubator 
of crime, dehumanising its inhabitants, begetting the habitual criminal.402 Soon after 
‘Law and Authority’ was first serialised in Le Révolté, Kropotkin contributed his first 
prison-focused commentary, while incarcerated, no less, in Lyon’s Maison d'Arrêt as 
he was sentenced for being a member of the outlawed First International.403 ‘Russian 
Prisons’ (1883), printed in Britain in The Nineteenth Century, was largely written in 
response to Reverend Henry Lansdell’s (1841-1919) favourable accounts of the 
Russian and Siberian prison system.404 Lansdell quickly answered the article with one 
of his own in The Contemporary Review which was, in turn, countered with another 
from the imprisoned anarchist, then residing in Clairvaux’s Maison Centrale, having 
being transferred from Lyon.405 Kropotkin’s two articles in The Nineteenth Century 
began a series of his scolding portrayals of the institution of detention to be printed in 
the periodical, the last coming shortly after his release from Clairvaux and focusing, 
naturally, on French prisons.406 These were then revised and collated, along with five 
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new chapters, for his On Russian and French Prisons, on which this chapter now 
focuses. 
 As he recounts, Kropotkin’s first experiences with prisons were in an 
administrative role. As a Lieutenant of the Amúr Cossacks posted in the Transbaikal 
region in 1862, he was appointed secretary to the local government committee tasked 
with drawing up a manifesto for the improvement of Russia’s penal system. In 
agreement that the institution of Siberian exile was ‘a disgrace to humanity’ and needed 
eliminating, Kropotkin and the committee appealed for law-breakers to be justly treated 
without expulsion.407 They called for the abolition of solitary confinement and the use 
of prison cells altogether, while short sentences and fair labour were endorsed – the 
latter suggestion for improvement also having the pragmatic element of being a means 
to support prisons’ financial sustainability. In general, it was concluded that penal 
institutions should be re-modelled as modern reformatories. However, though 
socioeconomic reform promised to be the defining paradigm of the age, Kropotkin’s 
proposals were silenced as they passed through the obdurate ears and bureaucratic 
disharmony of Alexander II’s Russia.408 Years later, writing In Russian and French 
Prisons, Kropotkin would come to realise that such an approach made radical reform 
impossible. The system of incarceration as punitive discipline was an ideological canon 
so culturally ingrained as essential to the sociopolitical functionality of European 
nations that, no matter the proposal or the era in which it was made, remedy would not 
come from the inaudible recommendations made within the machinery of government:  
 
I must confess that at that time I still believed that prisons could be 
reformatories, and that the privation of liberty is compatible with moral 
amelioration ... but I was only twenty years old.409 
 
The answer to the issue of crime and criminality in Russia would emerge only through 
the fundamental reorganisation of society:  
 
[T]o see a new departure in the Russian penal institutions we must wait 
for some new departure in Russian life as a whole.410 
 
                                                 
407  Kropotkin, In Russian and French Prisons, p. 17. 
408  Ibid., pp. 17-20. 
409  Ibid., p. 18. 
410  Ibid., p. 23. 
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Here flows the undercurrent of Kropotkin’s criminological tract. No humanitarian 
reform of the criminal justice system would come to the good of both the individual 
and society alike as long as there remained practices within it that subjected those who 
were deemed to have acted immorally with harm or loss (particularly, with regards to 
the latter, loss of their freedom). Modern reformatories would be built on rotten 
foundations; the two pillars of the institution of criminal law, discipline and 
punishment, had to be altogether felled. Furthermore, as Kropotkin suggests, very little 
success would come from removing these two strategies of power from the command 
of law-makers, policemen, judges, and jailers alone if discipline and punishment 
remained to be fundamental mechanisms of society as a whole. Those striving for 
radical reform were fighting a losing battle if criminology remained a narrow inquiry 
centred on changing laws and modifying systems of incarceration, for such treatment 
would lead merely to symptomatic remedy, and the pathogenesis of the disease 
extended far beyond these environments. 
 Kropotkin closed the introduction by alleging that the current state of Russia’s 
penal system, after the failed attempts of reform in the sixties, which were repeated in 
the seventies, was very much in the same condition as it had been for over two decades. 
In the following chapter, a slightly revised version of the initial refutation of Lansdell’s 
accounts of Russian prisons, he set about describing and evaluating the extent of their 
ruin. Expressing the view that society shares the blame for the criminal behaviour of 
its constituents,411 Kropotkin contends that the prison fails in its modern objective to 
‘purify and improve’ those who have committed criminal acts. Not only does the 
incarcerative ideal fail in practice – for the jailers and prison officials, corrupted by 
their positions of disciplinary authority, act inhumanely (a sentiment expressed by 
Wells) – but by its very principles it can only ever instil in those whom it deprives 
                                                 
411  Such a view was epitomised and popularised by Lacassagne’s expression ‘In our times, justice 
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freedom feelings of resentment.412 For how can the individual’s sentiments of sociality 
be improved, asks Kropotkin, when one is denied basic human needs through lengthy 
imprisonment, health-afflicting living conditions, forced and unrewarding labour, 
tyranny, and ridicule?413 Such treatment awaits those sent to Russian prisons and penal 
settlements. The moral degradation generated by bad labour is perhaps worse in 
Western Europe, he somewhat controversially surmises, if one considers the effects of 
the indefensible practices of oakum-picking and treadmill-climbing. Nevertheless, the 
system in Russia is merely the lesser of two evils.414 The penal system as a whole 
damages the prisoner’s moral, mental, and physical constitution to the extent that the 
individual soon has fewer human qualities than they did on arrival. Tragically, the 
resentment grows into vindictiveness, and broadens in its direction, until the prisoner 
‘learns to hate the section of society to which his humiliation belongs, and proves his 
hatred by new offences against it’.415 
 If the foundational principles of incarceration and discipline remained there 
could be no penological reform, Kropotkin concluded. Widening his purview, he 
accounted for the failures of the criminal justice reform movement in Russia: either the 
good intention dissipated; the proposal was paralysed after being implemented; or any 
success was quickly negated by newly-emerging corrupt practices. The case of the 
latter, of which Kropotkin is more interested, can be seen in the court rooms. One can 
see the importance of the court grow throughout the nineteenth century as criminal and 
legal codification continued to develop with new administrative, centralised processes 
solidifying the court as the official state arbiter of order. Further magnifying its status 
and presence was the explosion of the periodical press and its readership eager for 
sensational stories of crime, as Kropotkin remarks at the very beginning of his thesis.416 
And finally, once the processes of modernisation in the second half of the nineteenth 
century saw the emergence in Russia of open courts and trials by jury, the courtroom 
                                                 
412  Kropotkin, In Russian and French Prisons, pp. 24-25. 
413  Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
414  Ibid., p. 26. 
415  Ibid., p. 25. 
416  Ibid., p. 1. 
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had become firmly embedded in the public arena.417 Such a setting had always been a 
place wherein stories of daily lives are recounted, as the routines and conditions of 
society are documented by the testimonies of the accused, the prosecutors, and the 
witnesses, all in which is judged, reasoned, and then concluded by the court officials. 
The presiding narrative far more often than not takes on the form of the story of poverty 
and desperation, a testament to inequity within society. The public nature of the trials 
and their growing audience brought about a new dimension. They became an 
amphitheatre of sociopolitical discourse – individuals were not only judged but society 
itself, and the accused had a mouthpiece through which they could damn the unfair 
conditions of their existence. Though such a place could, of course, be used to garner 
wider support for one’s social grievances and rally dissent, it could also be used, 
asserted Kropotkin, as the instrument through which governmental positions were 
amplified, whereby political attempts could be made to persuade society of the 
existence of dangerous individuals, their type, and the company they keep. In Russia, 
as in France, such political trials became more common in the last third of the 
nineteenth century, and famously assumed the narrative of the monstrous nature of 
anarcho-terrorism, a story wherein Kropotkin played no small role. The reforms, he 
recounted, gave only the illusion of justice: judges were puppeteered by the Minister 
of Justice; jurors intimidated; those found innocent at the dismay of local authorities 
arrested after verdict; and, if it was pre-empted that an individual would receive the 
jurors’ verdict of innocence, surreptitiously exiled by the Third Section. 418 
Furthermore, to ensure the mouthpiece of the accused did not reach too many ears, 
attempts were often made to prohibit the press from discussing court proceedings, and, 
as to which Kropotkin alludes, this culminated in the 1881 law of Measures for the 
Protection of State Security and Public Order, banning almost anyone from witnessing 
the trial.419 The justice system failed for the same reasons as did that of the prisons: it 
remained an institute of disciplinary authority, whereby the illusion that it upheld 
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fairness and social cohesion only masked the institutional goal of withholding liberty 
from the population. 
 In chapters three to six, Kropotkin constructed a detailed cartography of 
Russia’s penological landscape, from Russian prisons (including Kropotkin’s account 
of his own experience), to the journeys of exiled prisoners and the dreadful étapes, to 
exile in Siberia, and finally exile on the eastern-most region of Imperial Russia, 
Sakhalin Island. Incorporating a mixture of anecdotal and statistical evidence, the 
terrain merely extends that which he has already covered. The second article he had 
penned in response to Lansdell forms the seventh chapter. It contributes little to 
Kropotkin’s overall thesis, mainly substantiating his previously-made points and 
highlighting the problems with Lansdell’s account by employing a number of other 
authors who had written on the subject. The main criticisms were that Lansdell had 
seen very few prisons in Russia, of those that he did the visits were brief and 
inadequate, his own portrayals of prison writings were inaccurate, and, most damaging, 
his accounts of his experiences were dishonest. Of interest, however, is that the 
following paragraph from the original 1883 article was missing from the chapter:  
 
[T]he jailors in England are not omnipotent, the inmates are not flogged 
on a mere caprice of the jailor, and their coppers are not stolen by him; 
a man would not order a prisoner to be flogged who had not saluted him, 
and those to be kicked down who protest against this measure. The 
Trepoffs have disappeared from England.420 
 
Writing in his cell in Lyon’s Maison d'Arrêt, Kropotkin had not yet conducted the in-
depth research into the conditions and tyrannies found within Britain’s penal 
institutions which would inform the final treatise of In Russian and French Prisons. 
Though he knew of the treadmill and oakum-picking, it appears that only after 
conducting the considerable research needed to complete his thesis that Kropotkin 
would come to conclude that one could, in fact, find Trepoffs in English prisons. His 
account of his stay in the prisons of Lyon and Clairvaux composes the eighth chapter. 
Though he claims that of all the penal institutions in Europe Clairvaux ‘ranks among 
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the best’,421 Kropotkin cannot but stay true to the premise of his thesis, that ‘[i]n France, 
as elsewhere, the whole prison system rests on a false foundation and demands a total 
re-examination, an honest, serious, thoughtful re-examination from the social 
standpoint’.422 The final two chapters are original, both in that they had not been printed 
in essay form prior to the book’s publication and that they are unequivocally discernible 
from the preceding ones. Rather than accounts and analysis of the abhorrent conditions 
of prisons, étapes, and the journeys and centres of exile, ‘On the Moral Influence of 
Prisons on Prisoners’ and ‘Are Prisons Necessary?’ portray Kropotkin’s engagement 
with the epistemologies and methodologies which constructed contemporary inquiries 
into crime and imprisonment. It is here that Kropotkin’s criminological perspective 
finds coherence. 
 Kropotkin’s references in these two sections show the breadth of his research 
into the science of criminology. Specifically regarding crime in Britain, Kropotkin’s 
reading ranges from governmental reports on prisons to the diaries of the incarcerated, 
from the testimony of prison medics to the anthropologists who approached criminal 
behaviour itself as an illness. Kropotkin’s research told him exactly what he would 
have already expected, that the prison system in Britain was failing. His conclusion 
was enough to dissuade him from extending his prison map and detail the contours of 
replica prisons. The focus in his penultimate chapter surrounds the extent to which the 
deleterious effects of prison serve to demoralise its inhabitants. Demoralising are those 
feelings of injustice that fills the incarcerated individual when there is fraudulent, 
corrupt and criminal behaviour outside and inside the prison walls that goes 
unpunished. But feelings of unfairness do not attest to the depth of the problem. 
Demoralisation would still occur if reforms helped prisons to become fairer, for 
demoralisation is part of the institution’s very nature, ‘which cannot be got rid of as 
long as a prison remains a prison’.423 For Kropotkin, criminal acts arise from one’s 
inability to resist anti-social feelings. Such is the result when an individual lacks a firm 
will – the faculty which helps temper those passions and impulses which oppose the 
principles of social behaviour. The destruction of one’s will is part of what Kropotkin 
refers to by the term ‘demoralisation’ – the two are inextricably linked – and ‘the will’ 
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is always weakened when one’s freedom is deprived. The confined living space and 
suppressed activity of prisons, the imposed routine and regulation, impair one’s ability 
to exercise one’s will and utilise moral strength.424 Notwithstanding the condition of 
those entering such institutions, the systematic processes of demoralisation, along with 
the degradation and cruelty so often inflicted, reduce the imprisoned individual to a 
mechanistic, less-than-human state of existence, less likely to be able to choose right 
from wrong, and all the more at risk of executing inhumane behaviour. If they are ever 
released from such an environment ‘it is not to be wondered at’, deplores Kropotkin, 
‘that men accustomed to be mere machines do not prove to be the men whom society 
needs’.425 
 Kropotkin’s concluding inquiry in In Russian and French Prisons concerns the 
determinants of ‘criminality’, whereby he questions what causes this reduction of one’s 
will to the extent that such a condition manifests as criminal activity. The problem of 
crime in the nineteenth century, he acknowledges, has assumed a physiological form, 
and particularly prominent is the medical optic of such a perspective: the ‘prevention 
of the disease’ is the focus of the new school of criminology.426 Though Kropotkin 
mentions a number of those participating in the anthropological school of criminology, 
he singles out Lombroso. Commending him for popularising the discipline, he asserts 
that following Lombroso’s conclusions it must be admitted ‘that most of those whom 
we treat as criminals are people affected by bodily diseases’.427 Maudsley, too, is 
deemed in the right to make the connection between ‘diseased minds’ and crime.428 
But, crucially, their conclusions are found wanting in that they fail to place enough 
emphasis on the fundamental role played by social conditions in the complex narrative 
filled with criminal bodies, motivations, and acts. Kropotkin claims that it is only with 
the development and exercise of the naturally occurring social instincts, which will 
only come about through increased efforts to improve the social and health-bringing 
elements of the environment, that society can help those whose anti-social feelings will 
likely lead to crime and imprisonment. As seen in the thought of Wells and Ellis, 
‘immoral’ thoughts can be kept in check by a mind untainted by certain criminal 
predispositions, and it is only a healthy individual’s ability to utilise their moral 
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faculties and repudiate those anti-social thoughts, which can occur in any human being, 
that will prevent one from undertaking a criminal act.429 
 
 
Kropotkin’s Sociopolitical Theory 
 
To understand Kropotkin’s positions on crime and the criminal individual, one must 
first become familiar with the epistemological and ontological bases of his 
sociopolitical philosophy. Though sociologists Tifft and Stevenson surmise that the 
relatively little attention paid to Kropotkin’s criminological views could be due to the 
perception that anarchist theory has no place in the study of criminal behaviour, or that 
a perspective which takes into account the emotions and feelings of individuals 
likewise has no place within the field, it is possible that they themselves understate the 
scientism of Kropotkin’s ‘feelings-based’ criminology.430 
 Kropotkin’s conceptualisation of an anarchist way of life gained significant 
detail in the few years preceding his imprisonment in France. At the 1880 congress of 
the Jura Foundation, he and others endorsed their doctrine of anarchist-communism, 
and a few months prior to this, Kropotkin had illustrated in an article printed in his 
journal Le Révolté the contours of such a social existence. Therein he proclaimed that 
after the dissolution of the centralised state via revolution, ‘the society of the future’ 
would emerge.431 Communes of free individuals would naturally ‘sprout’432 and in all 
likelihood form mutually dependent relationships with other such communes, creating 
federalist networks of industry, commerce, and leisure, united by modern transport and 
communication. The growth and development of such a system would result in the 
formation of a ‘one and indivisible’ federation.433 Capitalism as well as statism would 
be a doctrinal relic of the past, as the anarchist way of life would be ‘not just 
communalist, but communist’, and there would be procured the ‘collective enjoyment 
of social capital, the instruments of labor and the products of the labor performed’.434 
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For Kropotkin, the realisation of anarchist-communism would see every individual’s 
need for well-being satisfied and freedom from oppression – including economic and 
political compulsion – enjoyed. His contribution at the 1880 Jura congress signified the 
point at which Kropotkin led the movement away from the idea that social revolution 
required limitations placed on the establishment of common ownership, and 
thenceforth promulgated his advocation of the total elimination of all social structures 
of coercion and systems which restricted one’s liberty.435 As it became increasingly 
clear, his sociopolitical revolt stood against not only the traditionalists who defended 
hereditary and militaristic institutions of power, or the property-owning classes and 
beneficiaries of an unequal division of wealth, but also against his fellow adherents of 
socialism who proposed drastically different means to the revolutionary cause. The 
‘governmental fetichism’ to which such socialists were willing to submit was, 
Kropotkin lamented, one of the fundamental failures of the 1871 Paris Commune.436 
His antipathy to the belief in the need of replacing one authority with another formed 
the basis of his opposition to the proponents of state socialism and the Marxian 
dialectic.437 If the lessons of the Paris Commune had been learnt, the social revolution 
of the future would not result in the reimposition of an autonomous structure of power, 
and Kropotkin envisioned a birth of a society whereby 
 
the people will no longer feel the need to give themselves a government 
and expect revolutionary initiatives from that government. After having 
swept out the parasites that feed upon them, they will seize hold of all 
social wealth to own it together according to the principles of anarchist 
communism. And when they have completely abolished property, the 
government and the State, they will freely constitute themselves 
according to the necessities dictated by life itself.438 
 
As much as those doctrinaires of ‘scientific socialism’ claimed otherwise, the need for 
government was not a necessary condition of existence, nor a necessary tool for 
revolution. These early writings hint at the epistemological underpinnings of the 
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principles of Kropotkin’s anarchist-communism that he would develop throughout his 
life. He had emerged from Jura maintaining that mutualism and subsequent federalism 
was instinctual, that there was a scientific foundation to his theory of anarchist-
communism whereupon, in opposition to a materialist eschatology of revolutionary 
organisation, ‘union sprouts by itself, in accordance with natural needs’.439  
 At the time of his arrest in France in 1883, Kropotkin’s anarchist-communist 
revolutionary politics were inscribed in his mind, coordinated into arrangement during 
his time at Jura. His thought, of course, was also that of a geographer and zoologist, his 
education in the natural sciences having begun at the Corps de Pages and put into 
practice as he led scientific expeditions in the eastern-most provinces of Imperial 
Russia. His experiences in Siberia had prepared Kropotkin for life as an anarchist in 
two ways. Firstly, the distressing experience of authority and discipline and his reading 
on radical politics and ethics, including that of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), 
led Kropotkin to declare in his memoirs, ‘I lost in Siberia whatever faith in state 
discipline I had cherished before’.440 Secondly, his scientific observations of the natural 
instinct of intraspecific cooperation within the animal kingdom would bring him to 
reject the idea that struggle between individuals was the natural state of existence for 
the theory that the intrinsic propensity for mutual aid was the dominant principle of 
humankind.441 As he had stated in 1880 in ‘La Commune’, social collectives would 
‘sprout’ according to ‘natural needs’ as would a biotic growth. His sociopolitical 
perspective was certainly inflected with his indigenous language of scientific 
naturalism, but it was when imprisoned in France that Kropotkin began to develop his 
understanding of human nature as intrinsically compatible with his political 
philosophy. It was there that he began his work into anarchy’s scientific foundations.442  
  Concurrent to In Russian and French Prisons’ publication was the printing of 
Kropotkin’s article ‘The Scientific Bases of Anarchy’ (1887), James Knowles’ (1831-
1908) The Nineteenth Century again being the original outlet of circulation. 443 
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Kropotkin asserted that the anarchist thinker saw society in its biological composition, 
a phenomenon that, like all others, could be scrutinised from the optic of the natural 
sciences. When it came to the matter of improving civil and individual life, the political 
perspective would not rely on ‘metaphysical conceptions’ but scientific observation.444 
Such metaphysical conceptions were those that informed the traditional discipline of 
political economy, such as ‘natural rights’ and ‘duties of the State’.445 Kropotkin did 
not counterpose his scientism only to this discourse, and later made it clear that his 
anarchism stood against all those ‘metaphysical fictions of old’ which informed 
sociological theory, as exemplified in the following passage: 
 
In the domain of philosophy of law, in the theory of morality, in political 
economy, in history, (both of nations and institutions), Anarchism has 
already shown that it will not content itself with metaphysical 
conclusions, but will seek, in every case a natural-scientific basis. It 
rejects the metaphysics of Hegel, of Schelling, and of Kant; it disowns 
the commentators of Roman and Canon Law, together with the learned 
apologists of the State; it does not consider metaphysical political 
economy a science.446 
 
Such opposition to metaphysics was based on Kropotkin’s aversion to any school of 
thought which proclaimed pre-established, categorical principles and ‘Immanent (in-
dwelling) Laws of the Spirit’. 447  Such self-assured absolutism and metaphysical 
essentialism did not hold up to the scrutiny of the inductive-deductive methodology of 
the natural sciences. Occupying such a domain, the anarchist thinker observed society 
as ‘an aggregation of organisms trying to find out the best ways of combining the wants 
of the individual with those of co-operation for the welfare of the species’.448 Under 
the auspices of the life sciences’ epistemological framework and empirical method, the 
study of past and present societies’ life and well-being would legitimately establish the 
best possible means to secure that of humankind throughout time.449 In contrast to the 
‘science’ of historical materialism, which provided only ‘metaphysical schemes of 
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economic evolution’, 450  Kropotkin’s sociopolitical philosophy was to follow the 
modern science of bio-evolutionary theory.  
 ‘The Scientific Bases of Anarchy’ is one of the earliest examples of Kropotkin 
expressing his opposition to the idea of intraspecific struggle for resources as 
expounded by Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), following Thomas Malthus’ (1766-1834) 
dismal conclusions in his studies on populations. 451  In contrast to the view of 
individuals competing for the means of subsistence, that which Kropotkin had 
encountered from his observations of animal groups in Siberia was the increased 
tendency to cooperate in environments of scarce resources. This idea developed during 
his time at Clairvaux, particularly after reading Russian zoologist Karl Kessler’s (1815-
1881) 1879 lecture wherein the importance of mutual aid in the evolutionary process 
was asserted.452 Following Kessler, Kropotkin proposed that mutual aid facilitated 
human evolution. Such a mechanism was all the more prevalent in humankind since 
the cultivation and reaping of natural resources grew at an exponential rate with the 
increasing density of populations, and at a still greater rate with the development of 
scientific knowledge. ‘[T]he law is quite the reverse to that of Malthus’, Kropotkin 
concluded.453 
 The year after Kropotkin had clarified that anarchist-communism would follow 
the true course of evolution, Thomas Huxley (1835-1895) delivered to British 
audiences a drastically dissimilar view of Darwin’s theory. ‘The Struggle for 
Existence: A Programme’ (1888), appearing in the same periodical which had granted 
so much space to Kropotkin’s ideas, famously painted a picture of the animal 
kingdom’s ruthless individualism and gladiatorial, fight-for-survival evolutionism.454 
This was anathema to Kropotkin and, in a similar fashion to his rebuttal of Lansdell’s 
testimony on prisons, he disputed Huxley’s position in a series of articles on the role 
of cooperation in existence and in the process of evolution, developing those ideas he 
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had touched upon in ‘The Scientific Bases of Anarchy’. 455  Culminating in the 
publication of Mutual Aid the series of work was Kropotkin’s counter-theory to a 
particular set of assumed realities and mechanisms found in interpretations of Darwin’s 
zoological and evolutionary theories, exemplified in this case by Huxley but 
increasingly dominant in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Britain. 
Specifically, Kropotkin railed against the approbation and application of both the 
Malthusian theory of population struggle and Thomas Hobbes’ (1588-1679) portrayal 
of the savagery of humankind’s natural state of existence.456 
 Both Malthus and Hobbes were discussed in the first few pages of the 
introductory article, printed in 1890. Kropotkin repeated how the interpretation of the 
term ‘struggle for existence’ had become distorted, narrowed by the Malthusian view 
of ubiquitous competition for resources.457 But perhaps of more concern to Kropotkin 
than Malthus’ mathematical and theoretical fallacies was the prevailing paradigm of 
the aggressive, ‘each-against-all’ nature of humankind, epitomised in the thought of, to 
which Huxley himself referred, Hobbes. Opposing the dominant narrative of biological 
evolution was only one side of Kropotkin’s charge against the hegemonic value-system 
of competition. This side was, as he confirms, the chief point of his Darwinian treatise: 
to scientifically validate ‘the importance of the Mutual Aid factor of evolution’.458 But 
the flank on which Kropotkin also felt the need to engage was directed against the 
Hobbesian view that humanity’s social cohesion is fundamentally owed to the 
institutional superstructure of the state. Cooperation may have been an important factor 
of humankind’s evolutionary progress, but what role did an artificial authority play in 
human relations? This question formed the backdrop to Kropotkin’s enquiries into ‘the 
Mutual Aid instinct in Nature’459 that occupied much of his ideas throughout his life, 
culminating in Ethics: Origin and Development which, though unfinished when 
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Kropotkin died in 1921, was posthumously published in English in 1924. It is these 
sociobiological enquiries into human morality that can particularly attune one’s 
understanding to those ideas expressed by Kropotkin in In Russian and French Prisons 
concerning criminality and anti-social behaviour. 
 In Ethics, Kropotkin again confronts Huxley’s portrayal of the nature of 
humankind’s origins. Such a perspective finds 
 
that the lesson taught by Nature is in reality a lesson of evil […] but as 
soon as men combined into organized societies there appeared, we know 
not whence, an ‘ethical process,’ which is absolutely opposed to 
everything that nature teaches us. Later, the law, customs, and 
civilization continued to develop this process.460 
 
For Huxley, Kropotkin finds, the ethical process was set apart from the order of nature, 
an artificial appendage to the cosmical processes of human existence. In the 
introduction to the subsequent publication of his famous 1893 Romanes lecture, 
Huxley’s portrayal of the state of nature in the ‘heroic childhood’ of humankind, ‘when 
good and evil could be met with the same ‘frolic welcome’ [and] the attempts to escape 
from evil [...] have ended in flight from the battle-field’461, bears striking resemblance 
to that presented by Hobbes in Leviathan (1651), whereby all individuals fight one 
another so as to survive the naturally raging war. Whereas in Mutual Aid Kropotkin’s 
focus was on the mechanisms of evolution, in Ethics he specifically encounters Hobbes 
on the subject of humankind’s original state of existence. On such a battlefield, Hobbes 
proclaims, 
 
[t]he notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no 
place. […] Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. 
Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor 
Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, 
as well as his Senses, and Passions. They are Qualities, that relate to 
men in Society, not in Solitude. […] And thus much for the ill condition, 
which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a 
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possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in 
his Reason.462 
 
The Hobbesian view made the concepts of ‘Right and Wrong’ and the accompanying 
moral codes a softening influence bestowed on humankind through the teaching or 
coercion of ‘Society’, which allayed the natural tendencies from developing into 
unrestrained violence and anti-social behaviour. Such thought opposed that of 
Kropotkin. His scientific observations into mutual aid amongst animals and his 
historical studies into human relationships forged a perspective that rejected the theory 
whereby social institutions coerced individuals into acting morally amongst each other, 
the only safeguard that prevented them from acting like their savage predecessors. 
‘Man did not create society’, Kropotkin had already declared soon after the concluding 
article of the Mutual Aid series had been printed, ‘society existed before Man’.463 The 
ethical process, of which for Huxley appears out of nowhere, had to be found in 
humankind’s origins. Scientific reasoning had to overcome metaphysical assumption. 
 
 
Moral Evolution 
 
Kropotkin determined that in contrast to the given narrative of Huxley and Hobbes, 
there has existed, since the earliest stages of life, the dualistic impulses of egoistic self-
assertion and altruistic self-denial, the reciprocal proclivities that Ellis saw in 
individualism and socialism. These complementary tendencies have always played a 
joint role in the animal kingdom, underlying the mutual aid instinct in the struggle for 
existence. Growing in proportion to the extent of which these survivalist impulses 
become habitual, Kropotkin believed, a parallel set of tendencies develop. Such 
feelings would encourage the ‘identification of the individual with the interests of the 
group to which it belongs’.464 Encompassing sentiments of equity and self-restraint, 
this constitutes a more conscious development of a ‘social mentality’. Subsequently, it 
can be observed in the ‘higher animals’ that these feelings have continued to improve 
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and refine, leading to the point at which humankind has arrived: the third stage of the 
progression. Herein,  
 
man understands and feels so well the bearing of his action on the whole 
of society that he refrains from offending others, even though he may 
have to renounce on that account the gratification of some of his own 
desires, and when he so fully identifies his feelings with those of others 
that he is ready to sacrifice his powers for their benefit without 
expecting anything in return.465 
 
This final stage is what Kropotkin defines as ‘morality’. Standing on the borderline 
between the mutual aid instincts and the social sentiments of justice, this is the nature 
of human ethics. Developing out of an individual’s innate desires alongside the ideas 
of equity, it offered an alternative to the dichotomous relationship inherent to the 
Hobbesian perspective wherein artificial social institutions are pitted against the natural 
instincts, a diametric opposition that had pervaded late nineteenth-century discourses 
on the epistemology of ethics. Kropotkin’s order of ethical evolution, Mutual Aid – 
Justice – Morality, had found the origins of life were ‘already endowed with the 
rudiments of morality’.466 The moral existence to which humankind had ascended was 
not brought about by institutional intervention – the paragon of which was the modern 
state – but through a bio-ethical evolutionary process. ‘It developed gradually’ from 
the origins of humankind’s existence, Kropotkin insists, ‘it is developing now, and will 
continue to grow’.467 This statement not only attested to Kropotkin’s belief that social 
existence encourages social behaviour, but also that humankind’s moral development 
continues to be subjected to the mechanism of evolution. 
 Kropotkin’s scientific understanding of the evolutionary processes had another, 
vital aspect to it. As he stated in 1890 at the very beginning of his Mutual Aid series, 
the theory of evolution, of which Darwin had made a science of the general notion that 
all life developed through the ‘struggle against adverse circumstances’, included the 
vast array of ‘adaptations of function and structure of organic beings to their 
surroundings’.468  And in the same year Kropotkin had lamented the fact that the 
Darwinian ascendency had retarded the development of the evolutionary theory of 
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variation through the direct action of the environment that was headed by Lamarck.469 
The influence of Kessler, who too had stressed the theory of environmental direct 
action as a mechanism of evolution, and the explorations in Siberia encouraged 
Kropotkin’s conviction of the importance of the direct effects that external conditions 
can have on the bio-evolutionary processes of organisms, a conviction which 
culminated in his avowed and explicit defence of the propositions of Lamarckian 
variation from 1910. 470  Kropotkin’s general belief in the direct action of the 
environment and the inheritance of acquired characteristics grounded his optimistic 
assertion that moral tendencies, ‘at once inherent and the product of evolution […] will 
continue to grow’.471 But such a perspective had its pessimistic counterpart. For he had 
also insisted that morality, having arisen in the latest stage of humankind’s bio-ethical 
evolutionary order (Mutual Aid – Justice – Morality), is the weakest of the three.472 
Kropotkin presaged that if moral tendencies continually eroded under certain 
environmental conditions 
 
the group necessarily begins to fail in the struggle for life; it marches 
towards its decay. And if it perseveres in the wrong direction, if it does 
not revert to those necessary conditions of survival and of progressive 
development, which are Mutual Aid, Justice, and Morality – then the 
group, the race, or the species dies out and disappears.473 
 
A decline in the moral condition carried with it a biological threat. 
 Kropotkin’s belief in anarchist-communism meant that he held, to some extent, 
a belief in a Marxian conflict-criminology whereby the inequities and relative 
hardships of one’s environment would be determinants of crime. Unfairness in the 
wage-system, the inequitable distribution of property, and the unpunished fraudulence 
of business owners 474  are certainly accountable, as Kropotkin would invariably 
maintain, when it comes to explaining an individual’s desire to steal: 
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First of all, as to so-called “crimes—assaults upon persons—it is well-
known that two-thirds, and often as many as three-fourths, of such 
“crimes” are instigated by the desire to obtain possession of someone’s 
wealth. This immense class of so-called “crimes and misdemeanours” 
will disappear on the day on which private property ceases to exist.475 
 
Such a perspective is characteristic of the anarchist-communist. Though the incitement 
to criminal behaviour is augmented in a capitalist society, Kropotkin rejected the idea 
that it is the determining factor of the criminal act. Even honest men, he claimed in his 
thesis on crime and punishment, have had the motives for criminal activity enter their 
mind as ‘an imperceptible wave traversing the brain, like a flash of light’. But, he 
continued, it is only when such reprehensible thoughts 
 
had the opportunity of recurring again and again; if they were nurtured 
by circumstances, or by a want of exercise of the best passions, love, 
compassion, and all those which result from living in the joys and 
sufferings of those who surround us; then these passing influences, so 
brief that we hardly noticed them, would have degenerated into some 
morbid element in our character.476 
 
It would be accurate to reason that the environment provides the grounds on which 
crime can be committed and is therefore a causal factor, but this alone as an explanation 
did not explain the internal processes which induce one to act criminally. At this height 
of the evolutionary process, what are the biological conditions, Kropotkin would ask, 
which allow for humankind’s internal borderline of morality, whereupon at one end 
one finds the instinct of mutual aid and at the other the habitually-developed feelings 
of Justice, to be entirely surpassed? His answer lay in the form of degeneration.477 
 Degeneration is the assumed reality that decline is a central or even definitive 
trait of a stage of existence within a formalised field of activity.478 It describes the 
perception of a worsening condition, an approaching end, a nearing death. Historically 
polysemous, degeneration could be perceived in the aesthetic deterioration of the arts, 
a collapse of an empire, or the gradual extinction of a species. A conceptual shift 
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occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century, however, and the referential 
domain of the term narrowed and became more specific. Pick summarises: 
 
Degeneration moves from its place as occasional sub-current of wider 
philosophies and political or economic theories, or homilies about the 
horrors of the French and the Industrial Revolutions, to become the 
centre of a scientific and medical investigation. […] The potential 
degeneration of European society was thus not discussed as though it 
constituted primarily a religious, philosophical or ethical problem, but 
as an empirically demonstrable medical, biological or physical 
anthropological fact.479 
 
Degeneration began to be inscribed almost exclusively on the body-as-organism, and 
marked its conception, its life span, its death, and its progeny. And just as historians 
looked for the symptoms of a civilisation’s collapse in the stages of its rise or the 
turning point of its decline, so the medical and biological practitioners studied 
degenerative conditions with a keen eye for the signs of their pathogenesis. A natural 
phenomenon, it dwelt in the corners of bio-evolutionary discourse: the problem of 
degeneration concerned its biological origins, location, and mechanism. Kropotkin’s 
warning of moral degeneration joined a large company of similar accounts received by 
British audiences around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Novels of 
science fiction, gothic horror and realism; studies in psychiatry and criminal 
anthropology; critiques of modern culture; sociopolitical expositions on the threat of 
foreign nations and races; all were pervaded with evocations of moral illness which 
threatened the well-being of populations. 
 Despite Kropotkin’s assertion in Russian Literature (1905) that ‘[d]egeneracy 
is not the sole nor dominant feature of modern society’,480 his accounts on the subject 
of crime, immorality and anti-social behaviour are inflected with the vocabulary and 
tropes of such an assumed condition of existence. In the same 1905 text, he explores 
Dostoevsky’s portrayal of Raskolnikoff’s incitement to murder. Raskolnikoff 
explained his crimes, indirectly through his article and directly to Sofia, by reasoning 
that just as Napoleon Bonaparte would have justified his murderous actions by 
claiming the authority to surpass traditional codes of rights and legislature in order to 
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attain his goals, so he killed Lizaveta because his own objective justified the means. 
Yet Kropotkin finds this reasoning for the motive of such a crime insufficient: 
 
I will permit myself to remark that the very profusion of accidental 
causes accumulated by Dostoyévskiy shows how difficult he felt it 
himself to prove that the propaganda of materialistic ideas could in 
reality bring an honest young man to act as Raskólnikoff did. 
Raskólnikoffs do not become murderers under the influence of such 
theoretical considerations.481 
 
For Kropotkin, Dostoevsky had found it difficult to portray his protagonist’s criminal 
motivations. The premise of Raskolnikoff’s murderous actions was not only hard to 
believe, but the idea of an ‘honest young man’ interpreting Napoleon in such a way as 
Dostoevsky had presented was entirely unpalatable. Napoleon committed such terrible 
deeds, Kropotkin stated as a fact, because he was a maniac.482 
 Napoleon appears in a number of Kropotkin’s writings, his person often 
endowed with particular deficient properties. Consequently, the constructed image is 
that of a being in the earlier stages of human evolution. In Ethics, the characteristic of 
‘military predatoriness’483 one sees in individuals such as Napoleon is identified with 
those narrowly personal tendencies which had played a lesser role in humankind’s 
evolution and thus diminished in comparison to the development of the social habits. 
Comparatively diminished as they may be, the egoistic impulses necessarily survive; 
there always remains the possibility of survivalist tendencies to resurface. The 
‘rapacious instincts’484 exhibited by Napoleon, though more active in humankind’s 
original stages, had re-emerged to the fore. Kropotkin held that in particular 
circumstances such bygone characteristics could find impetus, convalesce, and 
reanimate to the extent that they ‘interfere with the recognition of the feeling of 
sociality and the consciousness of equity as the fundamental principle of the moral 
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judgments’.485 An environment that encourages the elevation of the narrowly self-
interested instincts can be harmful, then, to the individual’s ability to act in favour of 
the social group. But of particular concern for Kropotkin was the combined effect of 
such impulses with other deleterious factors, a recipe for depraved behaviour. In 
‘Anarchist Morality’ (1889), Kropotkin intimated that the excessive desires of 
Napoleon only amounted to his heinous behaviour by being accompanied with the 
added factors of his ‘poverty of feeling’ and unsound intellect.486 And in In Russian 
and French Prisons, it was asserted that Napoleon’s narcissism might have been kept 
in check had he possessed intellectual guidance or social sentiments. 487  The 
pathogenesis of his maniacal condition, that which enabled his atrocities, was clearly 
multifaceted. Each separate element – instinct, feeling, intellect – was a player in 
Kropotkin’s diagnosis. The crux of the matter was clear; once identified, the conditions 
which led to the debasement of these elements had to be prevented from pressing upon 
the organisation of the individual. Such a method of ensuring the well-being of 
humankind was borrowed directly from the nineteenth-century science of preventative 
medicine and social hygiene, to which Kropotkin explicitly referred: 
 
Instead of merely curing diseases, medicine tries now to prevent them 
[…] Hygiene is the best of medicines. The same has to be done with the 
great social phenomenon which has been called Crime until now, but 
will be called Social Disease by our children.488 
 
If such a remedial approach was not taken up, if deleterious conditions were allowed 
to press upon the health of the individual, if specific circumstances continuously 
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488  Ibid., p. 339. 
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encouraged the growth of degenerate qualities, the disturbance of one’s human nature 
would result, like it had with Napoleon, in the state of criminality. 
 The discourse of degeneration in which Kropotkin participated clearly touched 
on a number of sites. The location was sometimes that which was occupied by disease 
and sickness, sometimes by atavistic behaviour, sometimes by psychological and 
intellectual capacity. But in each site, at all times, Kropotkin turned towards the 
environment as a key factor. Just as it was the primary determinant in evolution, so it 
was the root cause of degeneration. Minimise the deleterious effects of one’s 
surroundings, improve the external conditions of life, and individuals would find well-
being. Dismissing Lombroso’s claims that criminality could be placed on defective 
bodies, Kropotkin asserted that an individual with an abnormal physiology did not 
make a criminal, the difference between the two ‘being only a difference of the 
circumstances under which they were born and have grown up’.489 Good hygiene, safe 
dwellings, and the sharing of resources would fight against disease. The continued 
effects of such a healthy environment along with the inheritance of acquired traits 
would encourage the well-being of future generations. And fraternal help and education 
would continue to help those who continued to struggle with impulses.  
 
 
The Susceptible Body, Fragile Will, and Dangerous Society 
 
Kropotkin’s understanding of immorality and criminal behaviour was framed within 
the epistemological boundaries of that knowledge regime which discovered, defined 
and based its legitimacy around what Foucault described as ‘the dangerous individual’, 
a figure which was to ‘give rise on the one hand to the anthropology of criminal man 
as in the Italian school, and on the other to the theory of social defense first represented 
by the Belgian school’.490 Kropotkin openly disengaged with the classical conception 
of crime, even criticising Maudsley, who can rather safely be historically placed within 
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the anthropological school, for holding on to notions of ‘sin’ and ‘bad will’.491 And yet 
Kropotkin’s position somewhat complicates the neat division Foucault provides. It is 
clear from his writings that when it came to crime and anti-social behaviour he placed 
an emphasis on degenerative tendencies, physiological disturbances, and ill-health. But 
a fundamental point he continually makes is that such bodies were not destined to be 
dangerous. ‘[A]ll idiots’ he pointed out, ‘do not become assassins’. 492  Indeed, 
blemished bodies could be located throughout society, leading law-abiding lives. Those 
anthropological abnormalities which Lombroso found in prisons and ascertained as 
constituent elements of criminality were also found, Kropotkin asserted in Prisons, in 
‘respectable homes’ and even palaces.493 Such a perspective was held throughout his 
career, and he made the same point twenty-five years later, at the first International 
Eugenics Congress in 1912, rhetorically asking if ‘those who produced degenerates in 
palaces’ should too be put forward for sterilisation along with the more popular targets 
of those living in slums.494  
 Yet Kropotkin admitted that biological tendencies might encourage criminal 
behaviour. The causes of such conditions, however, were social. The modern state’s 
disregard for its constituents had seen disease permeate the city slums, spreading from 
the home, to the school, to the workplace, and finally to the prison, that ‘nest of 
infection’.495 Nowhere were the state’s pestilential influences more strongly felt that in 
the prison. Gone were the days when the greatest harm inflicted upon the penal 
institutions’ occupants was from the traditional methods of physical punishment and 
domination. As Morgan eloquently puts it, within the prisons of which Kropotkin 
discusses with experience, ‘[s]tate power shifts from an infliction, an act of political 
domination, to an infection, a power that reaches into the depths of humanity’s organic 
structure’. 496  It was not in the bodies exhibiting the signs of ill-health whereto 
criminologists needed direct their attention, but the environmental conditions within 
which such sickly bodies existed: ‘Prevention of the disease is the best of cures’.497 
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 And so it is for these reasons why, for Kropotkin, criminological inquiry would 
achieve nothing if only directed at prisons, courts and laws. Not only were they each 
just one of many infectious environments, they were ‘institutions based on a false 
principle’.498 Even if one was to ignore the fact that prisons harboured disease, or that 
punishment failed to deter individuals from committing crimes, for if it did anti-social 
behaviour would have been eradicated long ago, Kropotkin argued that discipline, the 
idea of forcibly instilling in individuals the lessons of their failures with the hope that 
future thought and conduct is bettered, is damaging, let alone despicable. The modern 
prison is directed to ‘purify and improve’499, an exercise in providing moral direction. 
But he believed that prison systems across Europe did the exact opposite to their 
inhabitants than that which was claimed. ‘[T]hey are demoralized’, he contends of 
prisoners, by ‘the systematic suppression of the will’.500 Though the will has always 
been a rather ambiguous concept, used in different ways throughout the history of 
philosophy, Kropotkin champions Jean-Marie Guyau’s (1854-1888) emphasis that it 
holds a significant place in human morality: 
 
In general, there are two kinds of tendencies in man: those of one kind 
are still unconscious tendencies, instincts, and habits, which give rise to 
thoughts that are not quite clear, and on the other hand, there are fully 
conscious thoughts and conscious propensities of will. Morality stands 
on the border line between the two.501 
 
Offering an alternative take on Maudsley’s ‘borderland between crime and insanity’,502 
Kropotkin places the will amongst the distinct, conscious energies of thought and 
action necessary to make moral judgement. Human morality, that quality which has 
emerged only in humankind’s bio-ethical evolution ‘as the joint product of instinct, 
feeling, and reason’,503 was dependent on the capacities of the will. Without such 
faculties, the individual lacked the prerequisites to act through moral deliberation, 
unprotected from the influence of impulse and desire. Unchecked, the anti-social 
tendencies in humans had the potential to rise to the fore if nurtured, as Kropotkin’s 
Lamarckian perspective assumed, by certain environmental conditions. 
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 Particularly concerning for Kropotkin, participating as he did within the 
nineteenth-century epistemologies of the mind that assumed a clinical gaze on the 
matters of thought and behaviour, was that such conscious prerequisites of human 
morality were themselves conditioned by physical health. As German E. Berrios 
explicitly states, ‘[n]ineteenth century psychopathological thinking dictated that, if the 
will was an autonomous mental function, it should also be subject to disease’.504 For 
Kropotkin, the deleterious influence of infection and sickness on those ‘higher 
faculties’ of human individuals could have disastrous consequences, as seen in the state 
of mind of the violent criminal, ‘itself a consequence of some physical disease’.505 The 
conditions to which one is subjected in prison continually dismantle ‘the will’: forced 
and unproductive labour prevents the freedom to express oneself creatively; total 
servitude thwarts any attempt to think or act for oneself; and physical harm, particularly 
through that transmitted from the pestilential conditions, diminishes the health and 
energy necessary to exercise the higher faculties. ‘All transgressions against the 
established principles of morality can be traced to a want of firm Will’, warns 
Kropotkin. In prison the strength of one’s will, impoverished as it may have been before 
one enters, is utterly destroyed. The qualities which make one human are lost. The 
prisoner becomes a machine, without will, ‘quite unfit to live afterwards in a society of 
free fellow-creatures’.506 
 Such criticisms are of course also directed at the state. As Kropotkin asserted 
in ‘Anarchist Morality’, the state is the ‘inveterate enemy’ of the will, ‘profiting by the 
servility of thought and of character’. 507  The poverty, subservience, antagonistic 
hierarchies, and forced labour, all of which promoted the feelings of jealousy, 
aggressive individualism, indignity, and enmity, are mirrored, as are the germs of 
infection, between life outside the walls of the prison and that within.508 Born into a 
‘psychopathic generation’,509 the prisoner finds little purification and improvement in 
the modern reformatories. Only a society wherein liberty is enjoyed by all, free from 
governmental, religious, economic, and all disciplinary constraints, can prevent 
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individuals from unwillingly descending into crime. And even where ‘insufficient self 
control, or a want of firm will’ is inherited, good social conditions, education, and 
fraternal care will help to avert such a fall. 
 At the close of Foucault’s 1974-1975 Abnormal lectures one finds him 
considering the psychiatric nosography created in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, whereby abnormalities were consolidated under the notion of syndrome, under 
a re-evaluated understanding of delirium, and under the concept of condition. On the 
latter, on the condition, which is what he describes as the ‘permanent causal 
background’ or the ‘abnormal basis upon which illnesses become possible’ he makes 
a brief comparison – only to consolidate this idea of condition – with the notion of 
predisposition. ‘The difference is’, Foucault explains 
 
that a predisposition was first of all a simple virtuality that did not mean 
that the individual was not normal: it was possible to be normal and 
predisposed to an illness. Second, predisposition meant that someone 
was predisposed to a particular type of illness and not another.510 
 
The individual with a condition, in contrast, could not be normal, and could break out 
into any form of pathological disease or deviant behaviour; he would do so 
unpredictably and would not be able to utilise will power or direct his mental energies 
to control the condition. This difference between the two assumed essences, located by 
Foucault as a space whereof psychiatry attempted to define its object, can similarly be 
observed in adjacent sciences – particularly that of criminology – in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Amongst other things, it seems to pinpoint two opposing 
viewpoints: on the one hand, whereby a scientific discipline claims all rights and all 
powers over an individual who cannot be helped unless brought under supervision; and 
on the other, the claim that individuals can always be helped by means other than 
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overpowering them, which is clearly the side on which we find Kropotkin.511 Whereby 
Foucault’s ‘dangerous individual’ pinpoints the historical figures of both the biological 
criminal and the abnormal individual from whom society needs protection, one could 
say that Kropotkin saw only the ‘dangerous society’, wherein there is spawned the 
individual who is biologically predisposed to anti-social behaviour, and it is such an 
individual, particularly those with ‘degenerate’ qualities, who must be protected from 
the very environment in which they live. The semantic features of the dangerous 
individual – deviant, insane, abnormal, biologically and physiologically immoral, 
atavistic, degenerate – are all transferred by Kropotkin from the individual’s body to 
society’s. Society, that entity he could conceive of ‘as something living’,512 must be 
fundamentally reformed by radical means, or crime would continue to be part of its 
very constitution. 
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Chapter Five: Edward Carpenter 
 
The real value of the modern Socialist movement—it has always 
seemed to me—has not lain so much in its actual constructive 
programme as (1) in the fact that it has provided a text for a searching 
criticism of the old society and of the lives of the rich, and (2) the fact 
that it has enshrined a most glowing and vital enthusiasm towards the 
realization of a new society. It is these two points which have always 
drawn and attached me to it.513 
 
Edward Carpenter, My Days and Dreams (1916) 
 
 
There are a number of events concerning both criminal law and the socialist movement 
in England, occurring during the years that separated Kropotkin’s In Russian and 
French Prisons and Carpenter’s 1905 publication Prisons, Police and Punishment, that 
might help to introduce some of the ideas put forward in this chapter. On 13th 
November 1887 the strong arm of the law was vividly observable in the violent 
clampdown of demonstrators taking part in the socialist-led march on Trafalgar Square. 
Carpenter wrote of the blows he and his friend received.514 On 4th April 1892 severe 
sentences passed on the Walsall Anarchist bomb-plotters, who had been conspired 
against by a police agent provocateur, saw Carpenter’s contemporaries including one-
time fellow Sheffield Socialist, Fred Charles (c.1860-c.1934), condemned to long 
periods of incarceration. And on 6th April 1895, three months after Carpenter’s 
Homogenic Love, and Its Place in a Free Society was circulated to a reception of ‘no 
little fluttering and agitation’, 515  Oscar Wilde (1854-1900) was arrested for 
homosexual intercourse under the charge of ‘gross indecency’. The reason for this 
selection is that the three events can be seen as connective threads which touch upon 
Carpenter’s thought on crime, law, punishment, and morality – the components of 
criminological enquiry. In the first event, one finds Carpenter experiencing first hand 
the intemperate excess of force that the state could use against its constituents who 
demanded an alternative to the socioeconomic iniquity. The second was an example of 
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how the perceived threat of terrorism in England and abroad was proving to pervert the 
name of anarchist-communism itself, whereby utopian ideals were being warped into 
violent, chaotic futures. And in the third, Carpenter saw how the public could 
misunderstand, sometimes deliberately, questions on morality, the basic assumptions 
of what is right and wrong in human nature.516 His ‘searching criticism’ of Victorian 
society and his enthusiasm for a new one underlies these three sites. Carpenter’s 
thoughts on crime intersected with his concerns about the deleterious growth and 
development of the state in modern civilisation; with his anticipations for a voluntary 
collectivism that was moral and just; and with his belief in his own call of duty to 
educate the world on matters of deviance and immorality. 
 When he presented his views on English criminal law and its penal system in 
what would be published in 1905 as Prisons, Police and Punishment, Carpenter’s 
experiences could be seen to contribute to the tone of his work. Prisons would have a 
very different message to that of Towards Democracy (1883-1902) or England’s Ideal 
(1884-1887), two texts unmistakeably utopian in form and function. In fact, Prisons 
followed a distinct line of work that Carpenter began to tow in the mid-1880s, in which 
he would directly confront specific issues that troubled Victorian society, such as 
criminality, sex, and women’s rights.517 His 1905 treatise exhibited a notably practical 
position on the ills of the current penological system and a rather measured approach 
to continuing misunderstandings of criminality. It recommended viable reform whilst 
stressing the importance of law and order for the protection of the social whole and its 
individual constituents, and stressed a scientific approach to the question of morality, 
encouraging the view criminals may have aberrant drives and impulses which were in 
need of rebalancing. In comparison to Towards Democracy and England’s Ideal, the 
stance of Prisons can also be interpreted as a product of the ‘slowing down’ or 
dissipation in Britain of revolutionary socialism as the dawn of the new century 
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approached, replaced by the growing faith for the Marxist social democratism of the 
Social Democratic Foundation and for parliamentarianism in general, as seen in the 
foundation of the Independent Labour Party in 1893 and the Labour Representation 
Committee in 1900. With that said, Carpenter would always hold on to his utopian 
vision of a self-governing, communal society, and it can be found in his most pragmatic 
of texts – even Prisons ended with the essay ‘Non-Governmental Society’, a slightly 
revised version of his 1897 essay ‘Transitions to Freedom’.  
 
 
Prisons, Police and Punishment 
 
 Carpenter’s Prisons addressed the following dilemma: attempts to find for the 
criminal a meaningful place in society and to put a stop to his reoffending had been 
unsuccessful. His priority, then, started not with the prevention of crime, but with 
addressing the reality of anti-social behaviour. A constant backdrop in Prisons, and a 
referential point to which he explicitly turns, was the 1895 ‘Gladstone Report’ of the 
Home Office Departmental Committee on Prisons. Carpenter’s inquiry should largely 
be interpreted as his rejection of the basic premise on which the Blue Book’s 
penological perspective was founded, ‘that prison treatment should have as its primary 
and concurrent objects deterrence and reformation’.518 The harmony of these objectives 
was entirely unpalatable for Carpenter. It becomes apparent that his position in Prisons 
is that the convention of punitive incarceration can only be used for either deterring 
criminals or reforming them. The fear of punishment ‘may make a man conform to the 
respectabilities’, he admitted, echoing Kropotkin, ‘but it never yet made him a good 
citizen’.519  Though he was more welcoming of the proceedings of the 1903-1904 
‘Report of the Commissioners of Prisons and the Directors of Convict Prisons’, 
Carpenter remained convinced of the inadequacy of the lens through which the subject 
of crime was viewed. To correct this defective framework, he slightly shifted the 
position of penological enquiry so that it stood on the following two-sided premise: the 
social whole must protect itself from being harmed by anti-social behaviour, whilst at 
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the same time provide remediable support to its anti-social constituents. In such an 
apparatus he found little place for punishment. 
  Carpenter, in Rowbotham’s words, ‘had a horror of capitalism and of its 
distortion of all human social relationships’.520 He believed that capitalism resulted not 
only in inequality, poverty, avarice – the usual suspects that come to mind – but in the 
harm of all relations between people. In Love’s Coming of Age (1896) he would argue 
that the system of private property was largely to blame for the malformation of the 
natural union between men and women, and that commercialism had made man reduce 
woman to the lady-to-be-looked-at, the stay-at-home slave worker, and the 
prostitute.521 And in Prisons, Carpenter would locate the foundations of anti-social 
behaviour in the sociopolitical principles of the capitalist system, a system designed to 
serve the propertied classes at the expense of those from who they wrested cheap labour 
and expensive rent, with discriminatory laws implemented for its maintenance.522 Such 
inherent inequity had inevitably resulted in neediness, homelessness, and 
resentfulness.523 Under ‘The Sources of Crime’, Carpenter states that the vast majority 
of offences are directly attributable to the presumed significance of possessions: ‘The 
first [cause of crime] undoubtedly in influence and importance is Property’. 
 
[T]hefts, burglaries, highway robberies, fraudulent commercial 
operations, adulteration, forgery, swindling, illegal gambling, begging, 
betting, bribery, and all sorts of deceit, violence and threats of violence 
arising out of the desire for property or the disappointment at being 
deprived of it.524 
 
Carpenter hosted the same view that property resulted in crime as that which was seen 
in the literary socialist utopias. The ‘desire’ in the quote above did not refer to a specific 
nosographic condition, an inborn deformation of character. It was but an emotional 
reaction, a natural product fomented by an environment of economic inequity. 
Although, as discussed below, he scrutinised the mental conditions that could enable 
criminal propensities, Carpenter did not seek the germs of crime in the host’s 
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unprincipled passions, but in the pathogenesis of property. This should not by any 
means be seen as Carpenter articulating his belief in causative driving forces that 
engender criminal acts, but as his genealogical understanding as to the location of the 
roots of crime. To examine Carpenter’s criminological stance, in the same way as that 
maintained in the other previous three chapters, one must contemplate his wider 
ontological and aetiological assumptions that informed his understanding of causation 
and determinism, which will also be addressed later in this chapter. At this point it is 
only necessary to show that Carpenter found the primary cause of crime in the 
inequitable environment. Furthermore, not only was the property system responsible 
for creating the conditions that pushed one to steal, beg, and fight, it was also the source 
from which the modern matrix of law – which formally criminalised and incarcerated 
the destitute progeny of property – was founded. As Carpenter had said to the Fabian 
Society in 1888 in a lecture that would form the first chapter of Civilisation; Its Cause 
and Cure (1889), law, class division, and government are the final outcomes of private 
property, all of which are systematic schemes to ensure that the inequitable 
environment remains in place.525 In this sense, property begot inequality, inequality 
begot crime, and the apparatus of law and power finally legitimised such a genealogy.   
 Carpenter had long been discussing the connection between property and crime. 
In 1889 he had expressed the view that the general jurisprudential principle of the day 
was based on and defined by the ‘respectability of property’. As he claimed in ‘Defence 
of Criminals’, with property and possession the ruling code of what can be referred to 
as the ‘Commercial age’, the common thief is made to be the foremost social threat: 
‘when, as to-day, Society rests on private property in land, its counter-ideal is the 
poacher’. 526  Reiterating this argument in Prisons, Carpenter details the inherent 
unfairness of having an ethical and legal system based on protecting those who have 
acquired – at the initial expense and exploitation of the worker – material gain. With 
assistance from Kropotkin’s 1882 article ‘Law and Authority’, he makes the case that 
crimes against property are ‘but a kind of fringe and spray of reaction and protest 
against the central and monumental inequity of our social arrangements’. 527 
Carpenter’s justification follows a traditional anarchist line. Perhaps first posited by 
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Godwin in 1793 – ‘the first offence must have been his who began a monopoly, and 
took advantage of the weakness of his neighbours’528 – it was Proudhon who voiced it 
most famously in his exclamation ‘property […] is theft’. 529  A Proudhonian 
criminology posits that social organisation with the rights of property at its base would 
lead to social dissonance. 
 
[M]oral evil, or, in this case, disorder in society, is naturally explained 
by our power of reflection. The mother of poverty, crime, insurrection, 
and war was inequality of conditions; which was the daughter of 
property.530 
 
Writing at the dawn of the following century, Carpenter’s stance in Prisons stepped in 
the footprints of that of the father of anarchism: the seed of crime was born from the 
property system. The poor, the unemployed, and the homeless are irrevocably drawn 
to crime, pushed by the deleterious social conditions of life, and Carpenter could only 
but wonder why the number of those criminals generated from such conditions was not 
higher.531 
 The close relationship between crime and poverty is a relatively unexceptional 
observation. The assumed essential qualities of such a relationship, however, shape a 
specific approach in criminological enquiry. In Prisons, Carpenter quoted Dr. Robert 
Gover’s testimony from the 1895 Home Office Report, whereby it is stated that the 
criminals in England and Wales’ prisons ‘are recruited from strata or classes of society 
not far removed from paupers’, and that of these many were found to be insane. 
Carpenter continues to excerpt from Gover’s testimony: 
 
A ratio higher than that [of prisoners who are insane] prevailing among 
the population in general is only what might be expected, when regard 
is paid to hereditary influences, and to influences of a degrading, 
demoralizing and morbid character surrounding, from infancy onwards, 
the children of the classes from whom criminals are chiefly recruited.532 
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530  Ibid., p. 191. For a discussion on Proudhon’s ‘mutualist’ criminology see Jeff Shantz and Dana M. 
Williams, Anarchy and Society: Reflections on Anarchist Sociology (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 
2013), pp. 70-99. 
531  Carpenter, Prisons, Police and Punishment, pp. 52-53. 
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A subtle disparity materialises from the doctor’s words. It is made clear that a causal 
relationship is presumed to exist between both one’s heredity and debased environment 
and the resulting insanity (one should note that to attest insanity is influenced by 
surroundings of a ‘degrading’, ‘demoralizing’, and ‘morbid’ nature is, in this historical 
context, a form of petitio principii, for the signification of such terms and the uncertain 
object of insanity would have allowed for a rephrasing of the argument to “Things that 
can upset one’s mental faculties might disturb one’s mind”). But the idea of pauperism 
being an influence of criminal behaviour is not presented in such terms. Here, Gover 
preferred to merely locate in the poorest parts of society criminal recruits abundant. 
The slums were where depraved influences were found. Carpenter, however, 
consistently highlighted the causative lines of crime straight back to the condition of 
poverty itself, a condition from which depraved influences were made. 
 As has been shown, Carpenter argued that impoverishment pushes one to steal 
by ‘the sheer necessity of getting some kind of living in a world where every avenue 
of so called honest livelihood is closed’. But he also saw, as Kropotkin did, that such 
social conditions change the very constitution of all those who reside therein: ‘[M]oral 
lunatics’, Carpenter tells us, are not recruited from, but ‘are the products of our slums 
and other diseased social conditions’. The slum is not specified as that which merely 
houses degrading influences. Diseased social conditions do not merely contain 
demoralising contagion. They are causes of crime themselves. The social conditions 
that arose from the property system not only provided the stage on which criminal acts 
could be performed, but influenced the very characters of those waiting in the wings. 
The subtle contrast between the reach of his and Gover’s reasoning is that for Carpenter 
the imbalanced moral minds of criminals that the doctor condemned are themselves a 
‘consequent’ of poverty.533 Carpenter’s approach can be found to have occupied the 
scientific domain that had erupted out of Lombroso’s school, as he encountered the 
criminal as a physiological object shaped by phenomenal conditions. Of course, by 
locating the pathogen of crime in the environment, his affinities stayed close to the 
Italian school’s French rivals. Carpenter, too, saw a middle ground in the nature–
nurture debate. But despite viewing criminal behaviour from both the environmental 
and physiological positions, he would visualise its sources far more clearly in the 
former – the conditions of life in its entirety largely shaped the condition of the 
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individual. For Carpenter, the reality was that within the structure of modern 
civilisation invariably rest the germs of crime. The influence of the social environment 
on the individual’s bearing was to form the foundations of his criminological enquiry. 
 In assuming such frames of reference, Carpenter rejected the classical 
illustration of poor people wilfully choosing to commit crimes in their attempts to 
acquire property or meliorate their lower social standing. Carpenter had first questioned 
the classical interpretation of crime in ‘Defence of Criminals’. Since the sources of 
crime had been found to largely reside in the organisation of society he decided to 
address the veracity of the custom of judging acts as righteous or wicked, consequently 
proposing it inappropriate to base the concept of morality within what an individual 
does. Such a custom was as ‘superficial and transient’ as the public opinion from which 
it emerged, and a study of its tenets was merely a history of class conflict.  
 
I think it is obvious that there is no such thing as a permanent moral 
code – at any rate as applying to actions. Probably the respect or stigma 
attaching to particular classes of actions arose from the fact that these 
classes of actions were – or were thought to be – beneficial or injurious 
to the society of the time.534 
 
In refuting an act-based morality, Carpenter did not only allude to the transience of 
social ideals, but biological ones, dismissing the anthropologists who claimed that 
virtue lay in those actions that were beneficial for the race. Carpenter insisted that a 
moral code based on principles to ensure intraspecific survival – whether such 
principles circumscribed to competitive individualism or mutual aid – would have to 
change in accordance with the conditions of life. As the natural and social environments 
were varied and ever-changing, what is ‘good’ (in this case for the species) is dependent 
entirely on time and place. Those principles and habits that had previously pushed the 
historical processes of cultural and biological evolution could, according to Carpenter, 
conversely bring ruin to his day. Such a moral relativism was immersed within fears of 
sociobiological degeneration and maladaptation. A specific code of moral action based 
on safeguarding the survival of the species would quickly become racially injurious 
when it did not apply to the existing climate.535 The criminal act could not direct 
Carpenter towards an understanding of the assumed reality of criminality and 
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immorality. In contemplating the foundational position of his criminological 
perspective, wherefrom he looked for crime not in the offence but elsewhere, he 
becomes a luminous reference point for Foucault’s historical excavation of a 
‘substitution of objects’, whereby he comprehended the discourse of crime and 
punishment between 1740 and 1860 to have shifted away from the traditional domain 
of the criminal act.536  Carpenter knew that anti-social behaviour was bred by the 
conditions of the social surroundings. But what variables were to account for its 
cultivation? Just as he followed a genealogy of crime to the environment, he was 
compelled to trace the branches back to the body of the criminal itself. 
 Immediately after dismissing the idea in his 1889 article that an immutable 
immorality resided in the criminal deed, Carpenter marked out the impossibility of 
locating its existence in the criminal’s quintessence. Indeterminacy shawled the idea of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ traits, and vices and virtues, like actions, were culturally and 
contextually relative qualities. Chastity and reverence, for instance, were not always 
more desirable than unrestraint and insolence. And if ‘moral’ qualities are too ardently 
followed the excessive virtuousness can be ruinous and acrimonious: ‘The white-
washed heroes of our biographies with their many virtues and no faults’, besmirched 
Carpenter, ‘do not please us’. 537  It was his opinion that enquiry into ethics and 
criminality had to look beyond the transient superficiality of sinfulness and goodness 
altogether, whether that be in one’s actions or in one’s nature. The sources of anti-
social behaviour were located in the environment, but their growth, too, had to be 
explained by natural phenomena and the laws that governed them – those verifiable 
conditions that moulded our existence. Following the likes of Quetelet, Lombroso, and 
Lacassagne – separated in disciplinal branch and methodology but united under one 
broad, epistemological assumption – Carpenter believed that natural forces of causation 
and mechanism could uncover the observable truths that lay behind anti-social 
behaviour. 
 For Carpenter, the simplistic Manichean fallacy of morality was eliminated 
once one removed the normative values of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ from human desires, 
impulses, and instincts. Behind one’s ‘criminal’ actions, underneath one’s ‘immoral’ 
intentions, lie natural forces and drives, the first sparks of human conduct. In his 
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reading of Plato’s chariot allegory in the Phaedrus, Carpenter finds a fitting expression 
for his theory of morality. For Plato, human nature can be represented as a horse-drawn 
chariot (the soul) guided by a charioteer (the faculty of reason). The chariot is pulled 
by two horses: on the one side, a ‘heavenward’ horse (a positive influence, such as the 
feeling of righteous indignation, sympathy, commiseration); on the other, an 
‘earthward’ horse (an irrational, desirous influence, feelings of rapacious appetite and 
concupiscence – the egoistic tendencies of humankind). Neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’, these 
energies must be steered in tandem by the charioteer if he wants to reach ‘enlightened’ 
destinations.538 Behind the deed, behind the passion of the deed, lies the two essential 
drives, an imbalance of which would affect one’s capability for reasoned thought and 
feeling. Carpenter reads Plato’s allegory as he walks over ground being disturbed by 
the modern mental sciences.539 Of his printed works ‘Defence of Criminals’ serves as 
his first amble into the scientific discourse of deviance and abnormality, and as he 
became increasingly literate in the burgeoning behavioural science sub-fields of 
psychology, psychiatry, and sexology, Carpenter would visit such a site with more 
authority. In Homogenic Love in 1895 he would grapple with Krafft-Ebing and 
neurologist Albert Moll’s (1862-1939)540 psycho-sexological enquiries and in his 1904 
Art of Creation he would touch upon the crowd psychology of Gustave Le Bon (1841-
1931), the psycho-criminology of Charles Féré (1852-1907), and the moral physiology 
of his long-standing correspondent Richard Bucke (1837-1902), the psychiatrist and 
superintendent of Ontario’s London Asylum for the Insane. In both of these subsequent 
works Carpenter continued to place Platonic thought and nineteenth-century 
psychological theory alongside one another in discussions on deviancy. 
 In his 1889 article Carpenter portrays a mind wherein thought and action is 
regulated by the conflict and complement of many drives, each of which is necessary 
for its typical, healthy function. It is only when relations between forces are found to 
be disproportionate and irregular that one finds the foundations of anti-social 
behaviour. Lust, Carpenter insists, though ‘maniacal and monstrous in its aberrations’, 
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is when married with the drive of love directed towards positive ends.541 This same cast 
of thought – that which normalises those elements considered deviant or pathological 
by observing them as natural forces required to function correctly else they lead to 
impaired character – is expressed in very similar terms in the aforementioned 
Homogenic Love and Art of Creation. In the latter he again commented on sexual drives 
contending that if lust is not tempered by love, corruption of the mind would inevitably 
follow. Similarly, in the former he asserts ‘there are excesses of the passion […] as in 
ordinary sex-love, where mere physical desire becomes a mania’.542 These examples 
highlight Carpenter’s attempts to convey that those passions widely considered to be 
‘vices’ are in fact common and naturally-occurring psychological drives that do not 
necessarily result in deviant thought nor behaviour. One is reminded of Kropotkin’s 
words from In Russian and French Prisons, whereby he contends that though 
‘disproportionate vanity […] may produce a maniac like Napoleon’, it can in the right 
conditions and when complemented by other mental faculties produce brilliant 
entrepreneurs and humanitarians.543 Morality and immorality could not be placed with 
instinctual tendencies, just as they could not with actions. But Carpenter, like 
Kropotkin, observed that where emotional drives were exaggerated and intemperate, 
immoral deeds could follow. In searching for the efficient causes of aberrant behaviour, 
criminological enquiry would have to focus on the discordance and unrestraint of the 
passions. From that location could the question of prevention and recovery be 
addressed. 
 In Prisons, Carpenter was to return to such a site, but with a far more pragmatic 
approach than he did in ‘Defence of Criminals’. If in his 1889 articles his portrayal of 
excessive tendencies carried a resemblance to a rather romantic Carlylean or 
Nietzschean outsider who transcends social mores, whose ‘evil passions, so-called, are 
not things to be ashamed of, but things to look straight in the face and to see what they 
are good for’,544 in Prisons he took a stance that sought to suppress such aberrancy. 
Those proven to have harmful imbalanced drives – those who have been labelled 
‘insane’ or ‘criminal’ by the normative codes of society – are reformable. Irregular 
function could be reversed, and to combat the growing malaise of modern society a 
                                                 
541  Carpenter, ‘Defence of Criminals’, p. 40. 
542  Edward Carpenter, The Art of Creation; Essays on the Self and its Powers (London: George Allen, 
1904), p. 162. Carpenter, Homogenic Love, p. 16. 
543  Kropotkin, In Russian and French Prisons, pp. 354-55. 
544  Carpenter, ‘Defence of Criminals (Concluded)’, p. 64. 
162 
 
programme of treatment had to be established ‘to evoke as far as possible the dormant 
social instinct of the criminal’.545 The English criminological founders were correct in 
placing deviancy within the criminal, but they are challenged in their claims of 
irretrievability – Carpenter’s criminals in Prisons have brighter futures than do 
Maudsley’s with their inescapable destinies or prison doctor J. Bruce Thomson’s 
(1810-1873) with their ‘incurable nature’.546 Dormant instincts could be awakened, and 
this was the task Carpenter laid at the feet of the criminal justice system in Prisons. His 
was a call for the apparatus responsible for the treatment of the criminal to enter the 
final social-evolutionary stage. Having departed the primitive era of Revenge, civilised 
society had now outgrown the two ages of Punishment and Deterrence, yet there it 
remained, incarcerated by the violence of tradition.547 To enter the final stage, that of 
Reclamation, real changes of practice that followed the paradigmatic shift in thought 
would have to transpire. The practical measures found in Prisons that contemplated the 
reform of the criminal through the reform of the criminal justice system belonged to 
what Carpenter saw as a transitional phase. Of course, far reaching change would have 
to accompany such measures for the realisation of that free, voluntarily communal life 
he craved. Thus Carpenter ends Prisons with his vision of wide-scale social 
reorganisation and the image of ‘Non-Governmental Society’, where criminals were 
no longer manufactured or brutalised by an inequitable sociopolitical system and an 
unjust code of law. If the concluding chapter appears slightly out of kilter with the 
pragmatic tone of the preceding ones, it should be remembered that, as a utopian 
projection of Carpenter’s, it is vividly different from the romantic and fanciful tone of 
Towards Democracy and England’s Ideal. But taken as a whole, there is a marked 
difference between Prisons and ‘Defence of Criminals’, as touched upon above. As 
will be discussed towards the close of this chapter, in his desire to effectively 
commence the transition to a crime-free society, Carpenter felt it necessary to look 
towards the rehabilitative measures of indeterminate sentences and even corporal 
punishment. 
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In Defence of Desires 
 
John Stokes writes that Carpenter’s criminology was founded on his idea of 
exfoliation. 548  Frank McLynn considers his understanding of crime ‘as entirely 
socioeconomic in causation’.549 And a contemporary of Carpenter’s argued that all of 
his thought – from that concerned with the relations between the sexes to ‘the no less 
difficult problem of reforms in Prison Management and Criminal Procedure’ – was 
directed by the strong belief that through mankind’s history there grows in the social 
body the conscious tendencies of socialistic sentiment and at the same time in the 
individual the unconscious internal drives for a return to nature.550 There is validity in 
each author’s contention. What is worthy of consideration is how, if at all, these 
explanations share a common ground. Whilst being careful not to posit that Carpenter 
approached the subject of crime – or any topic – consistently from a single, 
unaccommodating standpoint, it is argued that his thoughts on the nature and activity 
of the individual and of society are supported by a particular philosophical approach. 
To begin to understand his broad ontological outlook, it is important to examine his 
attempts to naturalise morality, as seen in his defence of homosexuality. 
 Carpenter’s homosexuality has been thoroughly explored and documented.551 
David Goodway contends that it is from Carpenter’s sexuality that his moral radicalism 
derives.552 This is perhaps a rather bold statement, but the idea that his opinions on 
sexuality, including that of his own, are tied to much of his wider thought is certainly 
sound. As has already been referenced, in his defence of instincts he would commonly 
emphasise that lust was a natural drive. The moral matters of homosexuality, however, 
particularly that which concerned sexual passion, was a more difficult area to contend 
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with. To find a place for homosexuality in a repressive, persecutory Victorian society, 
Carpenter first had to define what homosexuality was as an object, where it originated 
from, and how it functioned within an individual. In this sense, he was of course trying 
to understand and define himself as a living being existing within a social collective. 
Sexual feelings and behaviour – those criminalised or not – would have to be explained, 
Carpenter thought, by scientific theory. If the condition that one would call 
‘homogenic’ – Carpenter’s preferred term over what he saw as the crass and reductive 
‘homosexual’ – was to escape the socially and legally constructed domain of 
immorality and criminality, it would first have to be shown as a naturally occurring 
biological phenomenon.553 
 In early 1894 Carpenter started to make approaches on the subjects of sex, love, 
and gender, attempting to reconcile some of the issues surrounding such matters that 
were so sensitive in Victorian society. Homogenic Love, the last of four pamphlets, was 
distributed at the beginning of 1895. Although Carpenter had it circulated privately, it 
still, he later recollected, caused ‘some alarm’, which would continue due to the furore 
whipped up around Wilde’s homosexual activities.554 His intentions were to show that 
homosexuality – like heterosexuality – could not be reduced to a mere act of carnal 
pleasure, in the case of males ‘of the crudest and grossest kind’.555  
 
While it is not my object in this paper to condemn special acts or 
familiarities between lovers (since these things must no doubt be largely 
left to individual judgement, aided by whatever light Science or 
Physiology may in the future be able to throw upon the subject) – still I 
am really anxious that it should be clearly understood that the glow of a 
really human and natural love between two persons of the same sex may 
be, and often is, felt without implying (as is often assumed) mere 
depravity of character and conduct.556 
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For Carpenter to release homosexuality from the charge of depraved character and 
conduct, he intended to show the scientific basis of it as an ‘inner feeling’,557 that like 
all other drives was not subject to the culturally and historically constructed concepts 
of vice and virtue. Carpenter looked to the flourishing discursive fields of psychiatry 
and medical psychology to legitimise his belief, drawing on the work of Moll, Krafft-
Ebing, Paul Moreau (1844-1905), Lombroso, Benjamin Tarnowsky (1837-1906), and 
Paolo Mantegazza (1831-1910), all of whom had established on epistemological 
grounds the theory of ‘sexual inversion’, that homosexual thought and behaviour 
originated not from depraved external influences but from an individual’s 
physiological make-up. Far from being a passive observer, Carpenter directly engaged 
with and even challenged some of the scientific findings. He disagreed with Moll’s 
conclusion that one can classify homosexuality as ‘morbid’ simply based on the fact 
that it was not part of the ‘natural’ desire of race propagation, arguing that sexual 
relations amongst humans had evolved, biologically and socially, to be much more than 
a mere means of survival.558 Such a contention was consistent with that found in 
‘Defence of Criminals’ where Carpenter had refuted the idea of finding a moral code 
in any fixed notions of evolutionary selection. On another flank he challenged Krafft-
Ebing’s assertion that homosexuality emerged from biological degeneration. In a 
similar vein to much of his reasoning on criminality in general, Carpenter would argue 
that degenerative tendencies observed in homosexual individuals were caused by an 
oppressive, dehumanising society that pours scorn on their very nature, resulting in the 
repression of the healthy expression of desire and affection. As such, the ‘nervous 
temperament’ which Krafft-Ebing concludes to be an example of the homosexual’s 
degenerative qualities ‘ought perhaps to be looked upon as the results rather than the 
causes of the inversion’.559 
 As he would come to argue in Prisons, Carpenter emphasised the notion that 
physiological foundations were susceptible to change under certain environmental 
conditions. In his defence of homogenic sexual drives he nevertheless admitted the 
existence of a form of ‘morbid’ homosexuality, differentiating the ‘sexual invert’ from 
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those who would engage in homosexual activity ‘out of mere carnal curiosity or 
extravagance of desire, or from the dearth of opportunities for a more normal 
[womanly] satisfaction (as in schools, barracks, etc.)’.560 Reiterated once more is the 
idea that the repression and exaggeration of sexual passions – leading to an instability 
of natural instincts – and not the passions themselves would result in ‘immoral’ 
character or conduct. The innate drive of homosexual love found in some individuals 
was not a morbid disorder afflicting the heterosexual condition nor a degenerative 
aberration.561 In the same way that he came to the defence of all drives and instincts, 
Carpenter would insist that homosexuality was not something to be reformed or cured, 
even if it were possible to do so.562 Homosexual individuals could live healthy and 
‘moral’ lives only once society stopped dehumanising them. Such individuals were 
physiologically afflicted with the scourge of deleterious social conditions in the same 
way as those who were driven to crime.  
 Like Ellis and his sexological studies, Carpenter participated within that 
epistemological domain that plotted humankind’s deviancy on charts of physiological 
and psychological knowledge. His attempts to explain homosexual drives were, as 
Beverly Thiele points out, driven by his endeavour to moralise homosexuality.563 But 
it also belongs to a wider part of his ontological belief. Carpenter’s moralising of 
homosexuality was part of his conviction in a ‘naturalised’ morality. All human activity 
could be explained by conscious and unconscious impulses that were neither ‘good’ 
nor ‘bad’ in a normative sense. Drives and passions were ‘earthward’ and ‘heavenward’ 
only in their direction towards the ‘I’ or the ‘Other’, and morality existed only in their 
interrelation with reasoned thought. Carpenter’s exoneration of passions and desires – 
such as that found in Prisons and ‘Defence of Criminals’ as well as his sexological 
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the presumption that restraint and denial were the mechanisms for transcending the grosser desires 
and gaining access to the higher human emotions, and the assumption of essential differences - 
were all necessary elements of Carpenter's justification of the morality of homosexuality’. Thiele, 
‘Coming of Age’, p. 106. My emphasis. 
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texts – is predicated on the idea that without social sanction and legislation, humans 
have, like other gregarious animals, acted towards the social good. He told audiences 
in Edinburgh and London in 1886 that man had existed in a ‘healthy’, harmonious 
society in the past – the ideal of the Common Life in embryonic form – and once 
humankind wakes from ‘the immense nightmare’ of civilisation it will return to its 
natural ways of sociality, in matured form.564 Communality and fraternity lay in the 
origins of mankind, and was not imposed by the authority of Hobbes’ state leviathan, 
nor reasoned through the principles of duty and conformity. There existed in man a 
natural morality, the basic tendencies for humankind to deviate towards what Carpenter 
would later call a ‘voluntary’ collectivism and socialism.565 As it has been shown, 
much of his writing on humankind’s moral instinct is very similar to Kropotkin’s. His 
words also ring resoundingly similar in places to those of Guyau, whose moral 
philosophy was revered by the Russian émigré. Although Guyau has become a 
forgotten figure, he was sufficiently well known in England to have his works 
translated shortly after his early death.566 In his major philosophical treatise, A Sketch 
of Morality Independent of Obligation or Sanction (1885), he portrays a holistic 
understanding of ethics, arguing, in contrast to both the materialist’s dismissal of an 
absolute moral code or the idealist’s categorical hypothesis, for a morality that is 
defined by its variability, its autonomy, and its anomy. Natural desires and tendencies 
are found in humankind to be social and connective. All life feels outwards, it is 
expansive. Morality for Guyau was merely the physical laws of life’s fecundity.567 The 
                                                 
564  Edward Carpenter, ‘Private Property: A Lecture given in London and in Edinburgh, 1886’ in 
Carpenter, England’s Ideal, and other Papers on Social Subjects (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 
Lowry & Co., 1887), pp. 115-38 (pp. 137-8). 
565  Carpenter, Prisons, Police and Punishment, pp. 108, 111. The emphasis is Carpenter’s. 
566  Indeed, Guyau was certainly well-known in socialist circles by the close of the century, his 
Éducation et Hérédité: étude sociologique (1889) published as part of the Contemporary Science 
Series in 1891, whilst Havelock Ellis was editor. As well as Kropotkin’s later writing concerning 
his thought, Ellis in 1900 would quote Guyau in his second volume (but subsequently renumbered 
as the first) of Studies in the Psychology of Sex. See Ellis, Studies in the Psychology of Sex: The 
Evolution of Modesty. The Phenomena of Sexual Periodicity, Auto-Erotism (Philadelphia, PA: F. 
A. Davis Company, 1901), p. 5. I also suspect that Carpenter knew of Guyau’s moral philosophy. 
The English edition of Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction was translated by 
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Cultuur en Samenleving: Tien Jaren Strijd Door (Arnhem, NL: N.v. Uitgevers-Maatschappij van 
Loghum Slaterus & Visser, 1925), p. xliv. 
567  [Jean-]M[arie]. Guyau, A Sketch of Morality Independent of Obligation or Sanction, trans. by 
Gertrude Kapteyn (London: Watts & Co., 1898), pp. 3-5, 86-87. First published in French as 
Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction (1884). For analyses of Guyau’s moral 
philosophy see Marco Orru, ‘The ethics of anomie: Jean-Marie Guyau and Emile Durkheim’, The 
British Journal of Sociology, 34, 4 (1983), 499–518, and Keith Ansell-Pearson, ‘Morality and the 
philosophy of life in Guyau and Bergson’, Continental Philosophy Review, 47, 1 (2014), 59-85. 
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similarities with Carpenter’s moral thought should be clear. In 1907 Carpenter 
discussed the ‘New Morality’, and how it would function under socialism. It did not 
come from laws, but from the ‘sense of organic unity, of the common welfare, the 
instinct of Humanity, or of general helpfulness, […] things which run in all directions 
through the very fibre of our individual and social life’. And echoing Guyau most 
resolutely, Carpenter stated that morality ‘is simply abundance of life’.568 
 Like Guyau and Kropotkin, in holding the belief that morality stems from 
existence itself, Carpenter’s charge was to account for the emergence of immorality. 
Quoting from Kropotkin’s essay ‘Law and Authority’, Carpenter asked in Prisons what 
‘has nursed and developed the instincts of cruelty in man […], what corruption, what 
degradation of the soul is continually bred in humanity by these notions of obedience 
[…], of punishment, [and] of authority’.569 It has already been shown that Carpenter 
saw the social conditions of modern life as creating an imbalance in the individual’s 
natural drives, encouraging discordant and unreasonable thought and behaviour – the 
ingredients for immoral and criminal acts. This is not to say that Carpenter did not 
observe the numerous steps that could complicate the transition from poverty to crime, 
such as the increased likelihood of alcohol abuse in impoverished conditions, or simply 
an increased desire for goods that are otherwise unattainable. These, as well as the 
physiological and psychological aberrations that stem from depraved social conditions 
– are the efficient causes of crime. But Carpenter’s aetiological understanding also 
found that anti-social thought and behaviour was the final outcome, irrevocably, of the 
social inequity that characterised modern society. Criminal contagion may run through 
the squalid, overcrowded, demoralised city, infecting the bodies and minds of its 
constituents. But the pathogenesis of such moral sickness, for Carpenter, was found in 
the very inception of civilisation. He stated in Prisons that to tackle the scourge of law 
and crime one had to look to the social conditions of modern civilisation, for ‘[t]here 
clearly the root of the evil lies’.570 The idea that Carpenter was expressing here, as will 
be shown henceforth, was that immoral behaviour did not merely occur through a 
myriad of cause-effect stages, whereby one can plot the journey from, for instance, 
                                                 
568  Edward Carpenter, ‘The New Morality’ in Carpenter, Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure, and Other 
Essays, complete edition (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1921), pp. 243-264 (p. 257) 
Originally published as ‘Morality Under Socialism’ in the Albany Review (1907) 
569  As quoted in Carpenter, Prisons, Police and Punishment, pp. 38-39. 
570  Ibid., p. 61. 
 169 
poverty to alcohol abuse to intemperate emotions to crime, but that crime existed within 
the very roots of civilisation themselves. 
 In Carpenter’s earlier work Towards Democracy he included a poem entitled 
‘In the Grass: By a Monad (of Leibnitz)’, paying homage to Whitman’s Leaves of 
Grass (1855) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’ (1646-1716) theory of ‘monadology’. 
Carpenter found a common ground in Whitman’s and Leibniz’ atomist ontologies that 
would come to influence his own ideas on human nature.571 Thus, a brief exposition of 
Leibniz’ monad is necessary. The body’s smallest substance, the monad, contains the 
entelechy, the vital principle of existence. An initial state of perception and appetition, 
it is the most elementary form of a ‘soul’. The entire universe and its perfect order is 
mirrored by the monad, thus, in the perception of the monad there can be found perfect 
order. As a body is merely an aggregate of monads, it too contains the represented order 
of the universe. A body is the instrument of the monadic soul, and works according to 
the natural order external to it, mirrored within its soul. It is a natural automaton, 
governed by natural laws.572 The laws of causation in Leibniz’ philosophy is important 
to understand here, as it is found that Carpenter’s thought assumes a similar shape. In 
1702 he laid out some of his aetiological assumptions. Whereas in the body each state 
of being emerges from a previous state according to the laws of efficient causes (a 
mechanical series of motions, from cause to effect), in the monadic soul a state emerges 
from the previous according to the laws of final causes (from appetition, from the end 
to the means). The image of the end in the soul is the efficient cause of the image of 
the means.573 Leibniz’ ontology, then, posits that ends, final causes, outcomes, existing 
within the perception of the monad, are the root cause of subsequently emergent 
states.574 
 Carpenter is found discussing the nature of existence and the mechanism of 
cause and effect in his essay ‘Exfoliation: Lamarck versus Darwin’ in 1889. Therein 
he advocates a Lamarckian theory of evolution with a distinctly Leibnizian inflection. 
                                                 
571  Steven Jay Marsden similarly finds Carpenter to have perceived a shared philosophical domain in 
Whitman and Leibniz. Steven Jay Marsden, ‘“Hot Little Prophets”: Reading, Mysticism, and Walt 
Whitman’s Disciples’ (unpublished PhD, Texas A&M University, 2004), pp. 274-276. 
572  Gottfried Leibnitz, ‘The Monadology, 1714’ in The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz, trans. (with 
notes) by George Martin Duncan (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1890), pp. 218-232 (p. 
227-8). 
573  Gottfried Leibniz, Opera Omnia, ed. by L. Dutens, vol. 2 (Geneva: Fratres De Tournes, 1768), pp. 
133-134. 
574  This is the main argument in Laurence Carlin, ‘Leibniz on Final Causes’, Journal of the History of 
Philosophy, 44, 2 (2006), 217-33.  
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Believing that variation occurs through need and desire rather than spontaneous 
chance, Carpenter states that the theory of exfoliation ‘fixes the attention on that which 
appears last in order of Time, as the most important in order of causation, rather than 
on that which appears first’.575 The concept of the monad can be located in a number 
of his illustrations. As he would echo in The Art of Creation by saying that the image 
of the tree exists in the seed like a ‘formative ideal’, 576  Carpenter asserted in 
‘Exfoliation’ that the image of the house is the cause of the brick, and that ‘cells are 
not the origin of Man, but Man is the original of the cells’.577 Continuing with such 
observations, he discusses the notion of causation in similarly Leibnizian terms: 
 
[A] reconsideration […] might, I take it, lead us not so much to look on 
the later changes as caused by the earlier, as to look on the earlier as the 
indications and first outward and visible signs of the coming of the later. 
When a man feels in himself the upheaval of a new moral fact, he sees 
plainly enough that that fact cannot come into the actual world all at 
once—not without first a destruction of the existing order of society—
such a destruction as makes him feel satanic; then an intellectual 
revolution; and lastly only, a new order embodying the new impulse. 
When this new impulse has thoroughly materialised itself, then after a 
time will come another inward birth, and similar changes will be passed 
through again.578 
 
In fact, Carpenter considered, that if one was to think in terms of causation at all, it 
should be seen that ‘the final cause and the efficient cause are one’, that all external 
phenomena are not linked to one another, but exist together by an underlying thought 
or feeling.579 His belief was that the complex social structures of family and community 
that can be observed throughout human history and even in intelligent animals are 
found in the vital principle of the monadic soul. A plurality of individuals is held 
together not by links, but by entelechial forces. Attempting to articulate such a position 
in The Art of Creation, Carpenter would draw upon the crowd psychology of Le Bon, 
                                                 
575  Carpenter, ‘Exfoliation: Lamarck versus Darwin’, p. 142. Some have said that Carpenter’s ‘desire’ 
differs from Lamarck’s ‘need’ (besoin), in that it is more conscious and active, but that is not the 
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6). 
576  Edward Carpenter, The Art of Creation, p. 29. 
577  Edward Carpenter, ‘Exfoliation: Lamarck versus Darwin’, p. 143. 
578  Ibid., pp. 143-44 
579  Ibid., p. 144. 
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insisting that a mass of individuals becomes an individual organism itself. The ‘social 
organism’, he is well aware, has become a common term in contemporary parlance. 
But Carpenter differentiates his concept from abstract descriptions and metaphors. It 
was his strong belief that society, echoing Kropotkin in no uncertain terms, was 
‘something very much alive indeed’, the image of which is found within the very 
essence of the monad.580  
 Following his aetiological and ontological assumptions, it can be posited with 
confidence that Carpenter did not merely see crime as the result of efficient causes. 
Undeniably, the vast majority of crime, he thought, was ‘instigated by the desire for 
property or possession’.581 But it was in the very roots of social inequity, the very 
essence of the property system, that crime inexorably and interminably lay. The society 
within which Carpenter lived, that organism of which he was a constituent part, was, 
as expressed in the basic idea of Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure, an aberration of 
existence. An excessive mutation deriving from the deep-rooted principle of Gain, it 
had been fortified by the offshoots of fear and greed.582 The balanced, inherently social 
propensities that lay in the origins of humankind had become warped; the ‘physical 
unity which constitutes health’ lost in both society and the individual.583 Carpenter’s 
monadological perspective saw the image of anti-social ends in the root of civilisation. 
Ever since the unity of ‘true society’ fell into discord after being infected with such a 
disease, the individual inevitably suffered from the same malady: 
 
This sense of unrest, of disease, penetrates down even into the deepest 
regions of man’s being—into his moral nature—disclosing itself there, 
as it has done in all nations notably at the time of their full civilisation, 
as the sense of Sin.584 
 
Whereas civilisation was an aberrance of human existence, crime was the natural 
outcome of civilisation. In the same way that Carpenter found homosexuality to lie 
within the natural proclivities of individuals, and both morality and immorality to 
reside within instinctual driving forces, crime and criminality was found in the very 
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582  Ibid., p. 100. 
583  Carpenter, ‘Civilisation: Its Cause and Cure’, pp. 32-33  
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core of the inequitable social system within which all lived. The image of crime existed 
in civilisation like a formative ideal.  
 
 
Turning the Criminal into a Fellow Citizen and Brother 
 
Carpenter saw crime as an elemental integrant of civilisation. This artificial phase of 
human history would come to pass, he believed, as society began its ‘descent’ – a return 
to its roots. Such a passage would see the criminal ‘reclaimed’, and become once again 
‘a fellow citizen and a brother’.585 The specifics of social reorganisation would change 
for Carpenter, as he flirted with images of the institutional structures of both non-
governmental society and the ‘double collectivism’ of a coexisting voluntary and state 
socialism.586 The formative ideal, however, found in both the roots of human existence 
and in its final realisation, was always total freedom for the individual, and it was this 
pursuit that he saw as the ultimate aim of socialism: 
 
[T]he general Socialist movement (including therein the Anarchist) has 
done and is still doing a great and necessary work and I am proud to 
have belonged to it. It has defined a dream and an ideal, that of the 
common life conjoined to the free individuality, which somewhere and 
somewhen must be realized, because it springs from and is the 
expression of the very root-nature of Man.587 
 
When Carpenter thought about the institutional make-up of society he never let go of 
his central ontological beliefs. The desire to be free has always existed in humankind, 
and any restrictions on such freedom would result in poor health for both the individual 
and social body. During the transition to freedom, Carpenter thought that the arm of 
the state could be extended to the administration of some industry, commerce, and 
public service – indeed, it could be put to great use – but such would be the limit of its 
reach. Marie-Françoise Cachin believes that Carpenter’s anarchist-socialism is not just 
a political endeavour, but a wider philosophical one that places the individual and his 
fulfilment at its fore. In Cachin’s view, such individualism was Carpenter’s 
‘counterbalance’ to his socialist hopes of the Common Life. 588  Rather than a 
                                                 
585  Carpenter, Prisons, Police and Punishment, p. 9. 
586  Cachin, ‘“Non-governmental Society”’, pp. 62-63. 
587  Carpenter, My Days and Dreams, p. 130 
588  Cachin, ‘“Non‐ governmental Society”’, pp. 67-8. 
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counterbalance, I believe, it should be seen as an integral component to the Common 
Life – only a free individual could be a social individual, living and working in common 
with his fellow men. This was ‘Communism and Individualism in one vital unity’, he 
wrote in My Days and Dreams, which would only come about after the state gave way 
to ‘voluntary and instinctive consent and mutual helpfulness’, the anarchist ideal 
realised. 589  Such an image was expressed in ‘Non-Governmental Society’: ‘How 
Utopian it all sounds!’,590 Carpenter would wryly exclaim. ‘But it is really absurd to 
argue about the possibility of these things in human society, when we have so many 
actual examples of them before our eyes’.591 He saw the coexistence of the Common 
Life and the free individual in early and existing tribes of humans and animals. His 
hopes were that such a life would again be realised; a life without any form of externally 
organised restraint. ‘Surely the time will come’, he wrote in 1902, in one of his most 
utopian poems, when fear, torment, hanging and imprisonment would not be used to 
secure the well-being of society.592 Forever keeping hold of the image of his ideal 
future, Carpenter had in the closing years of the century started to direct his thought to 
the necessary transitional phase, to the course of remedial treatment that needed 
prescribing. Prisons, and the suggested measures therein, should be seen in such a light. 
It was his contention that whether or not the social harmony of the Common Life would 
one day be achieved, ‘the practical question’ was how the current institutional evils 
‘can be moulded and modified in the right direction’.593 
 As stated at the beginning of Prisons, the transition would have to involve both 
the protection of society and the rehabilitation of the criminal. A tension emerges 
between, on the one hand, Carpenter’s anticipation of the paradigmatic shift of thought 
that would allow humankind to see past its confined conceptions of immorality and see 
the reunion of individual and community, and on the other the need to work within the 
current paradigm towards the immediate objectives of social protection and criminal 
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rehabilitation.594 Though, as it has been shown, Carpenter was vehemently opposed to 
judicial law, in dealing with the contemporary problem of the criminal he felt 
compelled to call upon its use. In contrast to Kropotkin’s calls for the abolishment of 
prisons, the police, and the judiciary that concluded his 1882 article on Law and 
Authority Carpenter believed such abolitionism was ‘quite impractical’.595 Whatever 
the future held, in the present day criminals would continue to offend and prisoners 
would continue to serve sentences, and the defence of society, Carpenter thought, was 
vital. In this sense, it is easy to place his thought, as it was with Kropotkin’s, within 
that knowledge regime that surrounded the object of ‘the dangerous individual’, a 
figure that threatened society and needed rehabilitation or even cure. Before the 
Common Life was realised, society ‘had the right’ to expurgate the injurious elements 
of its body. The present prison system needed drastic reform, particularly as it resulted 
in recidivism, and aligned as close as possible to the ideal towards which society was 
moving. 
 As Carpenter had asserted at the beginning of Prisons, humankind had to leave 
the epistemic stages of Punishment and Deterrence and enter that of Reclamation. If 
the property system ‘manufactured’ the criminal, the prison system reinforced his 
criminal propensities. Agreeing with the likes of Kropotkin and Wilde, he saw the 
paralysing effects prison had on the spirits of its inmates, weakening their minds and 
turning them into machines. This belongs, of course, to his wider ontological 
assumptions and criticism of civilisation.596 He proscribed for the criminal that which 
he proscribed for individuals in general: they needed to be nursed back to health 
through good diet, associated work, a hygienic and communal environment. These 
were needed for the institutions that were to sequestrate the criminal from society until 
resocialised. The image of the industrial reformatory reappears once again, placed on 
a pedestal with its promise of education, training, and remedial care. Carpenter can be 
somewhat excused for his advocating a system that would come to be associated with 
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abuses against individuals – particularly young offenders – in the name of work, 
reform, and cure, for his was an ideal that genuinely believed in prisons providing good 
work and fresh air.597 And yet writing in 1905 he would have been aware of the 
investigations into such abuse at Elmira. More unedifying, however, is his support to 
varying degrees for the practices one also finds him condemn. Abandoning all forms 
of punishment was not only the ‘best and wisest’ idea, Carpenter asserted, but ‘the only 
possible course’ to be taken. 598  And yet, his criminological approach provided 
legitimacy for corporal punishment in specific circumstances. As a form of 
punishment, Carpenter condemned bodily harm as a contemptible and dangerous 
practice, calling for its command to be taken out of the hands of judges.599 But as a 
form of remedial treatment, under the charge of medical heads of reformatories, it was 
acceptable.600 The epistemological framework adopted by Carpenter legitimised such 
methods by positioning criminality inside the individual’s body – even if it did not 
originate there – an affliction that could be cured or removed by physical means so as 
to make one a social creature once again. It is on such a ground that Carpenter, 
astonishingly, could advocate capital punishment, though quite unwillingly. In the case 
of ‘hopeless recidivists’ and those whose ‘criminal propensities […] have been proved 
to be entirely ineradicable’, death would be the only means to prevent them from 
harming society.601 Whereas corporal punishment was acceptable if it removed the 
criminal affliction from the individual body, capital punishment would have to be used 
to remove the criminal affliction from the social body, a form of social surgery. On the 
question of such methods of punishment, Carpenter knew that they would not facilitate 
the realisation of the Common Life, but when faced with the real issue of society’s 
protection from threatening elements, they were necessary courses of action: 
 
I do not believe that society will be saved by the rule of nonviolence, 
nor by any hard and fast rule—certainly not by the rule of Violence. But 
I believe in good sense.602 
 
Sensible violence, then, in Carpenter’s view could be applied by those professionals, 
medical or otherwise, who were safeguarding society from the object of the criminal 
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as it was defined by science, particularly the branches of psychiatry and medical 
psychology. The epistemological grounds on which Carpenter could justify such 
measures of coercion and force as a means to protect society from dangerous 
individuals would also, as seen in the thought of Wells and Ellis, be used to legitimise 
the discussion of sterilisation in the practice of negative eugenics. The rehabilitative 
ideal, particularly when assimilated by an ideological approach that would, to varying 
degrees, elevate the well-being of the social over the liberty of the individual, was a 
method of violence even in the gentle hands of Carpenter. 
 The variation in the approach found in Prisons and that in ‘Defence of 
Criminals’ can be considered in a number of different contexts. Prisons was largely a 
response to texts and developments emerging from within the confines of governmental 
enquiry. A shape similar to that of ‘Defence of Criminals’ would not fit well in such a 
frame. And Carpenter’s understanding of crime would have naturally altered to some 
extent over the years, his picture of criminal behaviour continually marked by the 
tumultuous and fertile sciences of psychiatry and criminology. But it may also reflect 
a development in his political outlook, a participant in the thick of a transforming 
political landscape. The utopianism emanating from the socialist movements in the 
1880s had dissipated in the succeeding decade. Rowbotham follows Carpenter’s 
directional shift at the beginning of the 1890s that saw him, swimming with the tides 
of change, moving away from the anarchist-communist idealised future and instead 
start to focus on the collectivist-socialist transitional phase.603 He saw, like others, the 
need for the socialist movement to embrace a pragmatic radical political programme 
rather than merely living a life of liberty. The birth of the Independent Labour Party in 
1893 represented ‘an impulse towards a wider-reaching socialism’.604  The aspirations 
of radical party politics were perhaps wider, with real opportunities of change 
apparently within reach, but it was certainly a shorter-sighted perspective. The utopia 
of the future faded into the distance, overshadowed by the reform of tomorrow. As 
Carpenter said in 1897 in ‘Transitions to Freedom’, reprinted in Prisons, ‘it is getting 
time to be practical’.605 
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 The influences behind Carpenter’s shift can be speculated, but it is not for this 
study to focus on the reasons behind his decision-making; an exploration of the author. 
The aforementioned conditions are significant, however, in that they help to create a 
‘feel’ of the climate in which his text is produced. The salient point is that Prisons was 
a piece of work constructed in a climate consumed by ideas of practical reform in 
criminal law. A critical site had been reached, a result of the incompatibility of newly 
emergent concerns and epistemologies and the space set out by the ‘classical’ apparatus 
born in the eighteenth century. It was a specific point that insisted on intervention rather 
than speculation, practical action rather than far-removed apotheosis: 
 
There will necessarily be a long and difficult period of transition. That, 
however, is no reason why we should not begin at once to make the 
transition. Indeed, it is clear that if we are to save ourselves from 
destruction we must do so.606 
 
 Carpenter was writing Prisons within a framework that required alternative measures 
grounded in the real world of crime and its prevention. A diagnosis of the criminal and 
of the deficiencies of the existing structure of the moral and legal constitution had been 
introduced in ‘Defence of Criminals’ and developed in Prisons. The latter, however, 
composed within the centre of a perceived critical point, was to prescribe remedial 
action: 
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Conclusion 
 
At the end of the period on which this thesis is focused, one finds the publication of 
The English Convict, Goring’s seminal criminological treatise. First commissioned in 
1901 by Visiting Inspector of Prisons Sir Bryan Donkin (1845-1927) and Medical 
Inspector of Prisons Sir Herbert Smalley (1851-1945), it would come to be known as 
the English contribution to criminological thought. 607  Largely a polemic against 
Lombroso’s methodological approach to the science of crime, it followed Quetelet, 
Galton, and Pearson – the latter enlisted to apply his biometric method to the criminal 
data Goring had gathered – as it encountered crime on a road ‘paved by statistical 
facts’. 608  It boasted the authority of numbers and mathematical proficiency that 
Lombroso’s criminology had supposedly lacked, going so far as to claim the 
anthropological school’s Italian founder’s approach was devoid ‘of any virtue of 
science’ and expressed ‘the total lack of the scientific spirit’. 609  Goring not only 
asserted that such investigations were unscientific but he represented the approach 
therein as both antiquated and unreasonably monocausal, protesting that Lombroso’s 
‘anthropological monster’ had been misleadingly presented as having a peculiar 
organisation that ‘stigmatised him as predestined to evil’.610 
 And yet, though lauded by some as the successful refutation of the assumed 
hard biological determinism of Lombroso, The English Convict was by others seen as 
a corroboration of the anthropological school’s tenets. Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, 
following her father in the study of criminal psychiatry, stated with the same hyperbole 
as Goring in a much quoted remark that the latter had shown himself to be ‘more 
Lombrosian than Lombroso’611. Such a dissonant reception has largely been explained 
in Beirne’s analysis of The English Convict’s investigation. The confusion can be 
attributed to the attempt of Goring to dismiss the notion of the born criminal, but at the 
same time propose a remarkably similar figure, one that also ‘allowed a definite space 
                                                 
607  See Beirne, ‘Heredity versus Environment’, pp. 315-16. 
608  Charles Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Study (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1913), p. 370. 
609  Ibid., p. 12. 
610  Ibid,, p. 370. 
611  Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, ‘The Results of an Official Investigation Made in England by Dr. Goring 
to Test the Lombroso Theory’, trans. by Victor Von Borosini, Journal of the American Institute of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, 5, 2 (1914), 207-23, p. 210. First published in Italian in Archivio 
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for the intersection of rigidly determinist concepts of criminality and abnormality’.612 
This difficult to define figure sat between Goring’s erroneous portrayal of both 
Lombroso’s and the sociological school’s criminal, and will be familiar to the reader 
of this thesis. Indeed, Goring rejected three schools of criminological thought on rather 
unsophisticated grounds: the classical school as that which posited the ‘deliberate 
choice’ of the criminal, who ‘had enlisted away from the side of the angels’; 
Lombroso’s positivist school as a monocausal view that portrayed offenders only as 
abnormal and diseased; and the sociological school which, he claimed, saw that anti-
social behaviour ‘must be solely and entirely the product of an adverse environment’.613 
On the back of the unexceptional testimony that there was no such figure as the free-
willed individual who merely chose to do evil, as the abnormal individual born a 
criminal, or as the normal individual forced into crime by his environment, Goring 
claimed his and Pearson’s investigation proved that a large sample of people will show 
groups of individuals exhibiting specific tendencies and traits common to those found 
in prisons.614 
 Goring’s findings followed the current trend in the prominent talking points of 
medico-legal discourse – the object of mental deficiency and the practice of eugenics 
– as he concluded that ‘the genesis of crime, and the production of criminals, must be 
influenced by heredity’. 615  For Goring, the undesirable traits he had identified as 
common to the criminal would need to be modified through the means of education, or 
removed from society by measures of detention or controls on reproduction: 
 
The crusade against crime may be conducted in three directions. The 
effort may be made to modify inherited tendency by appropriate 
educational measures; or else to modify opportunity for crime by 
segregation and supervision of the unfit; or else—and this is attacking 
the evil at its very root—to regulate the reproduction of those degrees 
of constitutional qualities—feeble-mindedness, inebriety, epilepsy, 
deficient social instinct, etc.—which conduce to the committing of 
crime.616 
 
                                                 
612  See Beirne, ‘Heredity versus Environment’, p. 336. 
613  Goring, The English Convict, p. 26. 
614  Through another example of his misreading, he said that there were those expressing such ‘a 
constitutional proclivity […] so potent in some, as to determine for them, eventually, the fate of 
imprisonment’. Ibid, p. 26. 
615  Ibid., p. 372. 
616  Ibid., p. 373. 
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The ambiguous notion of being predisposed to criminality, what Goring termed 
‘criminal diathesis’, a medicalised notion of potential, has been a major focal point in 
this thesis. For him, the problem posed by these constitutional qualities was to be solved 
through education, incarceration, or eugenics. And yet, dismissing almost entirely the 
causative role of the environment,617 Goring did not appear to think that socioeconomic 
reorganisation was a matter for criminological enquiry. 
 As Wells, Ellis, Kropotkin, and Carpenter approached the question of crime and 
criminality, they each circled this site of ambiguity. For them, thinking about crime 
was part of a wider intellectual activity, and they contemplated this space as it was 
situated within epistemological and ontological assumptions of human nature, the 
process of evolution, the meaning of society, the role of politics, and so on. The 
transmuting figure of the criminal, as they saw it, was formed on the assumptions that 
it was on the one hand a complex organism of physiological and intellectual drives, 
and on the other a malleable being that was related to the forces of its environment. 
Unlike Goring, who saw the criminal almost exclusively as a biological fact that 
continued to threaten to impress its harmful mark on society, each of this thesis’ 
protagonists were also particularly concerned with the other side of the coin: how 
society continued to threaten to impress its harmful mark on individuals. Fundamental 
social reorganisation could be a means to alleviate the anti-social tendencies residing 
in bodies and minds. The idea of social reorganisation was different for each, and 
presented itself in various ways. Wells creatively explored new futures, mapping 
worlds – each ‘utopian’ to varying degrees – and planned the remaking of mankind. 
Ellis too would consider what utopia would look like, but mainly focused on the means 
by which society could secure the health and well-being of its progeny. Never straying 
from his sociopolitical endeavour of illuminating the dangers of the state, Kropotkin 
drew upon primitive societies to depict idyllic communities freed from external 
authority and united by the natural instincts of mutual aid. And Carpenter always 
looked to the time when humankind escaped the scourge of civilisation, and considered 
what roads to take on the transition to freedom. At the same time, they each had 
considerable interest in the human body. Since his early sociobiological journalism, 
Wells is found to be fascinated by the individual as a product of evolution that would 
continue to change with time – sometimes presenting the future of the species in 
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distinctly alien forms. Ellis, particularly through his criminological and sexological 
writing, presented an image of the body as a complicated network of natural drives and 
forces, the restraint or freedom of which would strongly influence one’s mind and 
behaviour. For Kropotkin it was impossible to see the body as anything other than 
central to all sociopolitical matters. Society was something living, and the individual 
organism, a naturally social being, was but one part of a complex body. He believed 
that artificial changes to society would have considerable effects on one’s biological 
composition, and not only would the state infect the body through the disease it brought 
to the population, but authority itself would affect one’s physiological faculties. And 
Carpenter’s spiritual ontology placed a social destiny at the inception of human 
existence, and whilst the individual was simultaneously guided by and towards this 
ideal, exfoliating through ever-fitter forms, such a path was hindered by an imbalance 
of one’s psychological drives. 
 Wells, Ellis, Kropotkin, and Carpenter each shared with Goring the idea that 
certain tendencies exhibited by an individual could make criminal behaviour more 
likely. Wells grappled with the notion that there existed hereditary predispositions – 
such as that of the craving for alcohol – which encouraged anti-social feelings and 
activity. Though he opposed Reid’s and others’ ideas on eugenics as a means to tackle 
such a problem on the grounds of scientific prematurity, in his projections of utopia he 
could envisage the practice of such methods. For Wells, the idea of a regulatory, 
expansive state that ensured the well-being of future generations by benevolently 
putting its ‘mistakes’ out of misery and expelling any who showed a lack of control 
over criminal diatheses was not anathema to him. But in reality, as he assumed that the 
biological sciences were not yet sound enough to warrant such intervention in that 
space between the body and the environment, he moved, somewhat resentfully, closer 
to the latter as the intellectual site from which the complex web of accidents and 
circumstances of crime could be approached. For Kropotkin, in a similar way to how 
Carpenter and Ellis saw the subject, crime was a matter of imbalanced drives and a lack 
of self-restraint. Every individual has had anti-social feelings, he would remark, but 
their social counterparts would keep them in check. In his understanding of moral 
evolution Kropotkin, largely following Guyau, would see the mutual aid tendencies 
develop into a conscious morality, regulating the balance of the drives of egoistic self-
assertion and altruistic self-denial. To approach the question of crime, like that of war, 
one had to examine the corrupting influences of the environment. Finding them to 
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originate in the state and permeate its institutions of power, such as the court and the 
prison, Kropotkin saw how the moral faculties of individuals were disrupted, resulting 
in the criminal activity and depraved practices of the poor and rich alike. Carpenter and 
Ellis both perceived how ‘bad’ traits were largely relative constructs, making political 
criminals and deviants out of those who challenged the normative ideals of law and 
society. Both saw how a badly organised environment that disturbed the natural, free 
play of impulses could harm the minds and bodies of individuals. For Carpenter, a 
repressive society could cause atypical urges to degenerate into the temperaments it 
criminalised, and that disproportionate drives could develop into mania if the social 
conditions did not encourage compassion and fraternity. Ellis too believed that all 
impulses should be free to develop unrestrained in unbounded diversity, and the means 
of preventing such drives from leading to criminal thought and activity was through 
healthy self-restraint. 
 These four figures’ outlooks were interdisciplinary, with broader perspectives 
on society and biology than those only directly related to crime. They approached the 
criminal from a wide variety of disciplinary standpoints, all of which imagined, 
challenged, or discussed the shape of society and how it affected the well-being of 
individuals. To understand their criminological thought, I have examined the ways in 
which crime appeared in their varied writings, and how it related to their sociopolitical 
thought: in Carpenter’s writing on homosexuality, Kropotkin’s writing on the evolution 
of egoistical and altruistic tendencies, Ellis’ sexology, Wells’ utopian fiction, and in 
the case of the latter two, their eugenics. The idea of eugenics as a means to tackle 
crime was a rather unsettled one as they approached that ambiguous area of anti-social 
tendencies. Goring did not seem too encumbered by the fact that the criminal diathesis 
was something that could not be observed, for it was proven by statistics. For Wells 
and Ellis it was a somewhat contentious subject. As summarised above, Wells believed 
that eugenics could be a good measure to use against the criminal, but that it was not a 
science, and until it became one there was a strong moral argument against it. Ellis, 
too, believed that such eugenic methods showed promise, but he was concerned about 
the extent of coercion. Ellis hoped for a society that was morally responsible in the 
matters of procreation, and the idea of state intervention, as I have shown, made his 
thought rather unsettled and ambiguous. His ideal of a reasonable anarchy could at 
times be undermined by the extent of state coercion needed to achieve it. The images 
of a moralised society, where individuals were better behaved and crime was greatly 
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reduced, were complicated by the proposed paths on which all would travel. 
Furthermore, if such a space were realised, immoral individuals would be far less 
tolerated. As in Wells’ excursions to utopia, crime and anti-social behaviour could 
result in rather severe repercussions when society had been moralised, for it would both 
prove the failure resided within the individual and it would threaten the harmonious 
life of the collective. The literary socialist utopia often exhibited crime and punishment 
in such a way. Projections of moralised futures would right the assumed wrongs in the 
immoral age from which they were projected, sculpted by the discursive domains in 
which the interlocutor participated. The socialist utopia would often see the overthrow 
of capitalism and the removal of property result in behaviour being bettered, crime 
greatly reduced, and even physiological faculties improved. Yet, as in Wells, in the 
event of the criminal’s appearance, strong measures would be adopted for society’s 
safeguarding. Exile, corporal and capital punishment, and eugenics would in these 
societies be a rational and seemingly proportional means of tackling the criminal. The 
literary anti-socialist dystopia would criticise and satirise its counterpart on such 
grounds. State socialism would lead to despotism, and punishment would be severe and 
unfair. Furthermore, such a sternly regulated order would sometimes be depicted as 
increasing crime levels by reducing the individual to an automaton, lacking the human 
moral faculties or strength of will to deter anti-social feelings. Conversely, a socialist 
society directed along the lines of anarchism would be presented as entirely chaotic, 
and crime would go largely unpunished. With the breakdown of traditional institutions 
and relations, individuals would regress to barbaric beings, and immoral hedonism and 
depravity would ensue. 
 The idea of a moralised society, as seen in Wells and Ellis, could be steered by 
a positivism that would ultimately mire the humanitarian hopes of the original 
projection, and the highly rationalised means of producing change ‘for the better’ could 
be rather heinous. In the context of building utopia, both figures could think about 
crime in rather disagreeable terms. Kropotkin and Carpenter, as they found the 
criminal, were much less inclined to lower their compassionate approach. Indeed, 
Kropotkin is the only figure in this thesis to refrain from advocating any form of 
punishment or coercion in the matter. The criminal is so deep-rooted to conceptions of 
society that it is difficult to accept, let alone comprehend, any image of society from 
which such a figure is absent. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), with his socialist and 
anarchist sympathies, largely agreed with Kropotkin’s idea that crime, as determined 
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by inequity and poor social structure, would largely disappear in an equal and 
unrepressed society, and the anarchist’s emphasis on education would in all likelihood 
see criminal tendencies diminish. However, he could not believe that all crime would 
be eradicated, and questioned how Kropotkin’s ideal society, without the institutions 
of government, law, the police, or the military, would defend itself if anti-social figures 
emerged to threaten it: 
 
To take an extreme case, we cannot suppose that there would be no 
lunatics in an Anarchist community, and some of these lunatics would, 
no doubt, be homicidal. Probably no one would argue that they ought to 
be left at liberty. But there are no sharp lines in nature; from the 
homicidal lunatic to the sane man of violent passions there is a 
continuous gradation. Even in the most perfect community there will be 
men and women, otherwise sane, who will feel an impulse to commit 
murder from jealousy. These are now usually restrained by the fear of 
punishment, but if this fear were removed, such murders would 
probably become much more common […]. Apart from such cases, 
there would be the very real danger of an organized attempt to destroy 
Anarchism and revive ancient oppressions. Is it to be supposed, for 
example, that Napoleon, if he had been born into such a community as 
Kropotkin advocates, would have acquiesced tamely in a world where 
his genius could find no scope? […] So long as the love of power exists, 
I do not see how it can be prevented from finding an outlet in oppression 
except by means of the organized force of the community.618 
 
Had he answered Russell, Kropotkin would have repeated what he had previously 
expressed. Returning to a state of existence whereby the mutual aid tendencies in 
individuals are again allowed to flourish would see the egoistical impulses checked by 
unconscious and conscious modulation, and vicious tendencies would all but vanish in 
a distinctly utopian perspective. The figure of Napoleon, familiar in Kropotkin’s 
thought on crime, was the maniacal product of a psychotic civilisation. And yet next to 
Kropotkin stands Carpenter, the gentle, sandal-wearing pacifist and animal-rights 
campaigner, who relatively easily found a place for corporal and even capital 
punishment in his projections of voluntary socialism. Thinking about crime is fraught 
with inconsistency, as is the very idea of a moralised society. This thesis has 
contributed to such a complex history, where ideas on crime and criminality are 
considered amongst individuals’ varied sociopolitical ideals, ontological beliefs, and 
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epistemological assumptions that permeate and unsettle the discursive space between 
the body and the environment. 
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